The reward indeed was proclaimed, but the delight was not to be found. If by delight, he said, you mean fome good; fomething conducing to real happiness; it might have been found, perhaps, and yet not hit the monarch's fancy. Is that, faid I, poffible? It is poffible, replied he, though it had been the fovereign good itself. And indeed what wonder? Is it probable that such a mortal as an eastern monarch; fuch a pampered, flattered, idle mortal, fhould have attention or capacity for a fubject fo delicate? A fubject, enough to exercife the fubtleft and moft acute r

WHAT then is it you efteem, faid I, the fovereign Good to be? It fhould feem, by your reprefentation, to be fomething very uncommon. Ask me not the question, faid he; you know not where it will carry us. Its general idea indeed is eafy and plain; but the detail of particulars is perplexed and long; paffions and opinions for ever thwart us ; a paradox appears in almost every advance. Befides, did our inquiries fucceed ever fo happily, the very fubject itself is always enough to give me pain. That, replied 1, feems a paradox indeed. It is not, faid he, from any prejudice, which I have conceived against it; for to man I esteem it the nobleft in the world. Nor is it for being a subject to which my genius does not lead me; for no fubject at all times has more employed my attention. But the truth is, I can scarce ever think of it, but an unlucky ftory ftill occurs to my mind :-"A certain ftar-gazer with his telescope was "once viewing the moon; and defcribing her feas, her "mountains, and her territories. Says a clown to his companion, Let him spy what he pleases; we are as near to "the moon as he and all his brethren." So fares it, alas! with these our moral speculations. Practice too often creeps, where theory can foar. The philofopher proves as weak, as thofe whom he most contemns. A mortifying thought to fuch as well attend it. Too mortifying replied i, to be long dwelt on, Give us rather your general idea of the So

vereign

vereign Good. This is easy from your own account, how

ever intricate the detail.

THUS then, faid he, fince you are fo urgent, it is thus that I conceive it. The Sovereign Good is that the poffeffion of which renders us happy. And how, faid I, do we poffefs it? Is it fenfual or intellectual? There you are entering, faid he, upon the detail. This is beyond your queftion. Not a fmall advance, faid I, to indulge poor curiofity? Will you raise me a thirst, and be so cruel not to allay it? It is not, replied he, of my raifing, but your own. Befides, I am not certain, fhould I attempt to proceed, whether you will admit fuch authorities as it is poffible I may vouch. That, faid I, must be determined by their weight and character. Suppose, said he, it should be mankind; the whole human race. Would you not think it fomething ftrange, to feek of thofe concerning Good, who purfuè it a thousand ways, and many of them contradictory? 1 confefs, faid I, it feems fo. And yet, continued he, were there a point in which fuch diffentients ever agreed, this agreement would be no mean argument in favour of its truth and juftness. But where, replied I, is this agreement to be found?

HE anfwered me by asking, what if it fhould appear, that there were certain original characteristics and preconceptions of good, which were natural, uniform, and common to all men, which all recognized in their various purfuits; and that the difference lay only in the app ying them to particulars? This requires, faid I, to be illuftrated. As if, continued he, a company of travellers, in fome wide foreft, were all intending for one city, but each by a rout peculiar to himself. The roads indeed would be various, and many perhaps falfe; but all who travelled, would have one end in view It is evident, faid I, they would. So fares it then, added he, with mankind in the purfuit of good. The ways indeed are many, but what they feck is one.

FOR

FOR inftance: Did you ever hear of any, who in pursuit of their good were for living the life of a bird, an infect, or a fish? None. And why not? It would be inconfiftent, anfwered I, with their nature. You fee, then, faid he, they all agree in this, that what they purfue, ought to be confiftent, and agreeable to their proper nature. So ought it, faid I, undoubtedly. If fo, continued he, one preconception is discovered, which is common to good in general. It is, that all good is fuppofed fomething agreeable to nature. This indeed, replied I, feems to be agreed on

all hands.

BUT again, faid he, Is there a man fcarcely to be found of a temper fo truly mortified, as to acquiefce in the lowest and fhorteft neceffaries of life? Who aims not, if he be able, at fomething farther, fomething better? I replied, fcarcely one. Do not multitudes purfue, faid he, infinite objects of defire, acknowledged, every one of them, to be in no refpect neceffaries? Exquifite viands, delicious wines, fplendid apparel, curious gardens, magnificent apartments adorned with pictures and fculptures; mufic and poetry, and the whole tribe of elegant arts? It is evident, faid I. If it be, continued he, it should feem that they all confidered the Chief or Sovereign Good, not to be that which conduces to bare existence or mere being; for to this the neceffaries alone are adequate. I replied they were. But if not this, it must be fomewhat conducive to that, which is fuperior to mere being. It muft. And what, continued he, can this be, but well being, under the varicus fhapes in which different opinions paint it? Or can you fuggeft any thing elfe? I replied I could not. Mark here, then, continued he, another preconception, in which they all agree; the Sovereign Good is fomewhat conducive, not to mere being, but to well-being. I replied, it had fo appeared.

AGAIN, continued he. What labour, what expenfe, to procure those rarities, which our own poor country is un

able

able to afford us! How is the world ranfacked to its utmoft verges, and luxury and arts imported from every quarter! Nay more: How do we baffle.Nature herself; invert her order: feek the vegetables of fpring in the rigours of winter, and winter's ice during the heats of fummer! I replied, we did. And what disappointment, what remorse, when endeavours fail? It is true. If this then be evident, faid he, it would feem, that whatever we defire as our Chief and Sovereign Good, is fomething which, as far as poffible, we would accommodate to all places and times. I answered, so it appeared. See then, faid he, another of its characteristics, another preconception.

BUT, farther ftill; What contests for wealth! What fcrambling for property! What perils in the purfuit! What folicitude in the maintenance! and why all this? To what purpofe, what end? Or is not the reason plain ? Is it not that wealth may continually procure us whatever we fancy good; and make that perpetual, which would otherwise be tranfient? I replied, it feemed fo. Is it not farther defired, as fupplying us from ourselves; when without it, we must be beholden to the benevolence of others, and depend on their caprice for all that we enjoy? It is true, faid I, this feems a reafon.

AGAIN; Is not power of every degree as much contefted for as wealth? Are not magiftracies, honours, principalities, and empire, the subjects of strife and everlasting contention? I replied, they were. And why, faid he, this ? To obtain what end? Is it not to help us, like wealth, to the poffeffion of what we defire? Is it not farther to afcertain, to fecure our enjoyments; that when others would deprive us, we may be strong enough to refift them? I replied it was.

OR, to invert the whole; Why are there, who feek receffes the moft diftant and retired; flee courts and power, and fubmit to parfimony and obfcurity? Why all this, but from the fame intention? From an opinion, that small pof

6

feffions

feffions, ufed moderately, are permanent; that larger poffeffions raise envy, and are more frequently invaded; that the fafety of power and dignity is more precarious than that of retreat; and that therefore they have chosen what is moft eligible upon the whole? It is not, faid I, impro. bable that they act by fome fuch motive.

Do you not fee, then, continued he, two or three more preconceptions of the Sovereign Good, which are fought for by all, as effential to conftitute it? And what, faid I, are these? That it fhould not be tranfient, nor derived from the will of others, nor in their power to take away; but be durable, felf derived, and (if I may use the expreffion,) indeprivable. I confefs, faid I, it appears fo. But we have already found it to be confidered, as fomething agreeable to our nature; conducive, not to mere being, but to well-being; and what we aim to have accommodated to all places and times. We have.

THERE may be other characteristics, faid he, but thefe I think fufficient. See then its idea; behold it as collected from the original, natural, and univerfal preconceptions of all mankind. The Sovereign Good, they have taught us, ought to be fomething agreeable to our nature; conducive to well-being; accommodated to all places and times; durable, felf-derived, and indeprivatle. Your account, faid I, ap. pears just. HARRIS.

CHAP. II.

THE SAME SUBJECT.

BRUTUS perifhed untimely, and Cæfar did no more.These words I was repeating the next day to myself, when my friend appeared, and cheerfully bade me goodmorrow. I could not return his compliment with an equal gayety, being intent, fomewhat more than usual, on what had paffed the day before. Seeing this, he propofed a walk into the fields. The face of Nature, faid he, will perhaps difpel thefe glooms. No affistance, on my part, fhall be want