in particular in those sciences which have assumed them severally as their proper subjects.

SECT. V. Of the ten Categories. Of Substance modified.

WE have thus given an account of the two chief objects of our ideas, namely, substances and modes, and their various kinds and in these last Sections we have briefly comprised the greatest part of what is necessary in the famous ten ranks of being, called the ten predicaments, or categories of Aristotle, on which there are endless volumes of discourses formed by several of his followers. But that the reader may not be utterly ignorant of them, let him know the names are these: substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, where, when, situation, and clothing. It would be mere loss of time to shew how loose, how injudicious, and even ridiculous, is this ten-fold division of things; and whatsoever farther relates to them, and which may tend to improve useful knowledge, should be sought in ontology, and in other sciences.

Besides substance and mode, some of the moderns would have us consider the substance modified, as a distinct object of our ideas; but I think there is nothing more that need be said on this subject than this, namely, There is some difference between a substance when it is considered with all its modes about it, or clothed in all its manners of existence, and when it is distinguished from them, and considered naked without them,

SECT. VI.-Of Not-being.

AS being is divided into substance and mode, so we may consider not-being with regard to both these.

1. Not-being is considered as excluding all substance, and then all modes are also necessarily excluded; and this we call pure nihility, or mere nothing.

This nothing is taken either in a vulgar or a philosophical sense; so we say, there is nothing in the cup, in a vulgar sense, when we mean there is no liquor in it; but we cannot say there is nothing in the cup, in a strict philosophical sense, where there is air in it, and perhaps a million of rays of light are there.

II. Not-being, as it has relation to modes or manners of being, may be considered either as mere negation, or as a privation.

A negation is the absence of that which does not naturally belong to the things we are speaking of, or which has no right, obligation, or necessity to be present with it; as when we say a slone is inanimate, or blind, or deaf, that is, it has no life, nor sight, nor hearing; nor when we say a carpenter or a fisherman is unlearned, these are mere negations ·

But a privation is the absence of what does naturally belong to the things we are speaking of, or which ought to be pre

sent with it, as when a man or a horse is deaf, or blind, or dead, or if a physician or a divine be unlearned, these are called privations; so the sinfulness of any human action is said to be a privation; for sin is that want of conformity to the law of God, which ought to be found in every action of man.

Note, There are some writers who make all sort of relative modes or relations, as well as all external denominations, to be mere creatures of the mind, and entia rationis, and then they rank them also under the general head of not beings; but it is my opinion, that whatsoever may be determined concerning mere mental relations and external denominations, which seem to have something less of entity or being in them, yet there are many real relations, which ought not to be reduced to so low a class, such are the situation of bodies, their mutual distances, their particular proportions and measures, the notions of fatherhood, brotherhood, sonship, &c. all which are relative ideas. The very essence of virtue or holiness consists in the conformity of our actions to the rule of right reason, or the law of God: the nature and essence of sincerity is the conformity of our words and actions to our thoughts, all which are but mere relations; and I think, we must not reduce such positive beings as piety, and virtue, and truth, to the rank of non-entities, which have nothing real in them, though sin (or rather the sinfulness of an action) may be properly called a not-being, for it is a want of piety and virtue. This is the most usual, and perhaps the justest way of representing these matters.

CHAP. III.-Of the several Sorts of Perceptions or Ideas.

IDEAS may be divided with regard to their original, their nature, their objects, and their qualities.

SECT. I. Of sensible, spiritual, and abstracted Ideas.

There has been a great controversy about the origin of ideas, namely, whether any of our ideas are innate or no, that is, born with us, and naturally belonging to our minds. Mr. Locke utterly denies it; others as positively affirm it. Now, though this controversy may be compromised, by allowing that there is a sense, wherein our first ideas of some things may be said to be innate, as I have shewn in some remarks on Mr. Locke's Essay, (which have lain long by me) yet it does not belong to this place and business to have that point debated at large, nor will it hinder our pursuit of the present work to pass it over in silence.

There is sufficient ground to say, that all our ideas, with regard to their original, may be divided into three sorts, namely, sensible, spiritual, and abstracted ideas.

I. Sensible or corporeal ideas, are derived originally from our senses, and from the communication which the soul has with the animal body in this present state; such are the notions we frame of all colours, sounds, tastes, figures or shapes, and motions: for our senses, being conversant about particular sensible objects, become the occasions of several distinct perceptions in the mind, and thus we come by the ideas of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities. All the ideas which we have of body and the sensible modes and properties that belong to it, seem to be derived from sensation.

And howsoever these may be treasured up in the memory, and by the work of fancy may be increased, diminished, compounded, divided, and diversified, (which we are ready to call our invention) yet they all derive their first nature and being from something that has been let into our minds by one or other of our senses. If I think of a golden mountain, or a sea of liquid fire, yet the single ideas of sea, fire, mountain, and gold, came into my thoughts at first by sensation; the mind has only compounded them.

II.* Spiritual or intellectual ideas are those which we gain by reflecting on the nature and actions of our own souls, and turning our thoughts within ourselves, and observing what is transacted in our own minds. Such are the ideas we have of thought, assent, dissent, judging, reason, knowledge, understanding, will, love, fear, hope.

By sensation the soul contemplates things, as it were, out of itself, and gains corporeal representations or sensible ideas : by reflection the soul contemplates itself and things within itself, and by this means it gains spiritual ideas, or representations of things intellectual.

Here it may be noted, though the first original of these two sorts of ideas, namely, sensible and spiritual, may be entirely owing to these two principles, sensation and reflection, yet the recollection and fresh excitation of them may be owing to a thousand other occasions and occurrences of life. We could never inform a man who was born blind or deaf, what we mean by the words yellow, blue, red, or by the words loud or shrill, nor convey any just ideas of these things to his mind, by all the powers of language, unless he has experienced those sensations of sound and colour; nor could we ever gain the ideas of thought, judgment, reason, doubting, hoping, &c. by all the words that man could invent without turning our thoughts inward upon the actions of our own souls. Yet when once we have attained

* Here the word "spiritual" is used in a mere natural, and not in a religious sense.

these ideas by sensation and reflection, they may be excited afresh by the use of names, words, signs, or by any thing else that has been connected with them in our thoughts; for when two or more ideas have been associated together, whether it be by custom or accident, or design, the one presently brings the other to mind.

III. Besides these two which we have named, there is a third sort of ideas, which are commonly called abstracted ideas, because though the original ground or oecasion of them may be sensation, or reflection, or both; yet these ideas are framed by another act of the mind, which we usually call abstraction. Now the word abstraction signifies a withdrawing some parts of an idea from other parts of it, by which means such abstracted ideas are formed, as neither represent any thing corporeal or spiritual, that is, any thing peculiar or proper to mind or body. Now these are of two kinds.

Some of these abstracted ideas are the most absolute, general and universal conceptions of things considered in themselves, without respect to others, such as entity or being, and not-being, essence, existence, act, power, substance, mode, accident, &c.

The other sort of abstracted idea is relative, as when we compare several things together, and consider merely the relations of one thing to another, entirely dropping the subject of those relations, whether they be corporeal or spiritual; such are our ideas of cause, effect, likeness, unlikeness, subject, object, identity, or sameness, and contrariety, order, and other things which are treated of in ontology.

Most of the terms of art, in several sciences may be ranked under this head of abstracted ideas, as noun, pronoun, verb, in grammar, and the several particles of speech, as wherefore, therefore, when, how, although, howsoever, &c. so connections, transitions, similitudes, tropes, and their various forms in

rhetoric.

These abstracted ideas, whether absolute or relative, cannot so properly be said to derive their immediate complete and distinct original, either from sensation, or reflection, (1.) Because the nature and the actions both of body and spirit give us occasion to frame exactly the same ideas of essence, mode, cause, effect, likeness, contrariety, &c. Therefore these cannot be called either sensible or spiritual ideas, for they are not exact representations either of the peculiar qualities or actions of spirit or body: but seem to be a distinct kind of idea framed in the mind, to represent our most general conceptions of things, or their relations to one another, without any regard to their natures, whether they be corporeal or spiritual. And, (2.) The same general ideas of cause, and effect, likeness, &c. may be transferred to a thousand

other kinds of being, whether bodily or spiritual, besides those from whence we first derived them: even those abstracted ideas, which might be first occasioned by bodies, may be as properly afterward attributed to spirits.

Now, though Mr. Locke supposes sensation and reflection to be the only two springs of all ideas, and that these two are sufficient to furnish our minds with all that rich variety of ideas which we have; yet abstraction is certainly a different act of the mind, whence these abstracted ideas have their original; though perhaps sensation or reflection may furnish us with all the first objects and occasions whence these abstracted ideas are excited and derived. Nor in this sense and view of things, can I think Mr. Locke himself would deny my representation of the original of abstracted ideas, nor forbid them to stand for a distinct species.

Note, Though we have divided ideas in this chapter into three sorts, namely, sensible, spiritual, and abstracted; yet it may not be amiss just to notice here, that a man may be called a compound substance, being made of body and mind, and the modes which arise from this composition are called mixed modes, such as sensation, passion, discourse, &c. so the ideas of this substance, or being called man, and of these mixed modes may, be called mixed ideas, for they are not properly and strictly spiritual, sensible, or abstracted. See a much larger account every part of this chapter in the Philosophical Essays, by I. W. Ess. 3, 4, &c.

of

SECT. II.-Of simple and complex, compound and collective:

Ideas.

IDEAS considered in their nature, are either simple or complex.

A simple idea is one uniform idea which cannot be divided or distinguished by the mind into two or more ideas; such are a multitude of our sensations, as the idea of sweet, bitter, cold, heat, white, red, blue, hard, soft, motion, rest, and perhaps extension and duration: such are also many of our spiritual ideas; such as thought, will, wish, knowledge, &c.

A complex idea, is made by joining two or more simple ideas together; as a square, a triangle, a cube, a pen, a table, reading, writing, truth, falsehood, a body, a man, a horse, au angel, a heavy body, a swift horse, &c. every thing that can be divided by the mind into two or more ideas is called complex.

Complex ideas are often considered as single and distinct beings, though they be made up of several simple ideas; so a body, a spirit, a house, a tree, a flower. But when several of these ideas of a different kind are joined together, which are wont to be considered, as distinct single beings, this is called a