March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the PresentEbsco Publishing, 1987 - 311 pages Ronald E. Powaski offers the first complete, accessible history of the events, forces, and factors that have brought the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust. He traces the evolution of the nuclear arms race from FDR's decision to develop an atomic bomb to Reagan's decision to continue its expansion in the 1980's. Focusing on the forces that have propelled the arms race and the reasons behind the repeated failures to check the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Powaski discusses such topics as the Manhattan Project, the decision to drop the bomb on Hiroshima, the debate over whether to share atomic information, the effect of nuclear weapons on U.S. military and foreign policy, and the role of these weapons in arms control negotiations in the last five presidential administrations. |
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... September , Roosevelt was unable to see Sachs until October 11. After Sachs read Einstein's letter to him that day , and as a result of a subsequent conver- sation with Sachs the following day , Roosevelt was impressed by its impli ...
... September , Roosevelt was unable to see Sachs until October 11. After Sachs read Einstein's letter to him that day , and as a result of a subsequent conver- sation with Sachs the following day , Roosevelt was impressed by its impli ...
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... September 30 , 1944 , they pointed out that it was highly unlikely that the Anglo - American atomic monopoly could be maintained for more than three or four years , a remarkably prescient forecast . For the United States to stay ahead ...
... September 30 , 1944 , they pointed out that it was highly unlikely that the Anglo - American atomic monopoly could be maintained for more than three or four years , a remarkably prescient forecast . For the United States to stay ahead ...
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... September 18 , 1944 , the two leaders agreed that the atomic bomb project " should continue to be regarded as of the utmost se- crecy . " In effect , the Soviets would not be informed about the purpose of the Manhattan Project . This ...
... September 18 , 1944 , the two leaders agreed that the atomic bomb project " should continue to be regarded as of the utmost se- crecy . " In effect , the Soviets would not be informed about the purpose of the Manhattan Project . This ...
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... September 19 , 1944 , that when a bomb " is finally available , it might , perhaps , after mature consideration , be used against the Japanese . " According to Alexander Sachs , who related a conversation he had with Roo- sevelt in ...
... September 19 , 1944 , that when a bomb " is finally available , it might , perhaps , after mature consideration , be used against the Japanese . " According to Alexander Sachs , who related a conversation he had with Roo- sevelt in ...
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Table des matières
5 | |
Truman and International Control of the Atom 19451947 | 29 |
4 | 39 |
Eisenhower and Massive Retaliation 19531961 | 60 |
Eisenhower and Nuclear Arms Control 19531961 | 74 |
Johnson Nuclear Weapons and the Pursuit of SALT | 113 |
Nixon and SALT I 19691972 | 127 |
Carter and SALT II 19771981 | 162 |
Reagan and the Rearmament of America 19811983 | 191 |
Reagan and Nuclear Arms Talks 1981 to the Present | 197 |
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to ... Ronald E. Powaski Affichage d'extraits - 1987 |
Expressions et termes fréquents
accept administration administration's agreed agreement American nuclear argued atomic bomb atomic energy atomic weapons attack ballistic missiles Baruch believed bombers Brzezinski buildup Byrnes Carter ceiling Cold War Committee Conference crisis cruise missiles decision defense deploy deployment détente deterrent diplomatic Eisenhower Europe explosion first-strike Foreign Policy freeze FRUS Geneva Hereafter cited Herken hydrogen bomb Ibid ICBMs inspection Jacobsen and Stein Japan Japanese Johnson Joint Chiefs July June Kahan Kennedy Khrushchev Kissinger launchers Lilienthal limited Manhattan Project McNamara military MIRV missile gap Moscow negotiations Nixon November nuclear arms race nuclear arsenal nuclear testing nuclear weapons October Oppenheimer peace Pentagon political Potsdam Potsdam Conference President proposal quoted Reagan reduce Roosevelt SALT II Treaty Seaborg Secretary Senate SLBMs Soviet Union Soviet-American Stimson strategic arms superpowers Talbott talks targets test ban throw-weight Truman U.S. Arms Control U.S. Congress U.S. Department United Vance warheads Washington White House York
Fréquemment cités
Page 72 - In the councils of Government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.
Page 211 - Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile landbased.
Page 38 - US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure.
Page 28 - The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender.
Page 62 - You have to take chances for peace, just as you must take chances in war. Some say that we were brought to the verge of war. The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art. If you cannot master it, you inevitably get into war. If you try to run away from it, if you are scared to go to the brink, you are lost.
Page 47 - States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.
Page 142 - Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.