borne to the existence of one supreme God by the natural voice of Conscience, and by the works of Creation. To this testimony, therefore, Tertullian appeals: and in thus appealing, far from thinking that he could be accused of pursuing a course derogatory to the honour, or injurious to the interests of the Gospel, he conceived that he was offering the strongest evidence in confirmation of its truth; by shewing that the revelation, which God has been pleased to make of himself, in his visible works and in the soul of man, is in perfect harmony with that contained in his written word.

But though approved, as we have seen, by Milner, Tertullian's reasoning will be far, we suspect, from commanding universal assent in the present day. Since the publication of Dr. Ellis's work, entitled "The Knowledge of Divine things from Revelation," it has become

Nos unum Deum colimus, quem omnes naturaliter nostis; ad cujus fulgura et tonitrua contremiscitis: ad cujus beneficia gaudetis. Ad Scapulam, c. 2. Si enim anima, aut divina aut a Deo data est, sine dubio datorem suum novit. De Testim. Animæ, c. 2. Quum etiam ignorantes Dominum nulla exceptio tueatur a pœnâ, quia Deum in aperto constitutum, et vel ex ipsis cœlestibus bonis comprehensibilem ignorari non licet, quanto cognitum despici periculosum est! De Pœnitentiâ, c. 5. De Spectaculis, c. 2. De Coronâ Militis, c. 6. Åd Nationes,

L. ii. c. 5.

the fashion with many to treat, not merely as vain and idle, but even as presumptuous and almost impious, every attempt to prove the existence and attributes of God from the visible works of Creation, or from the internal constitution of man. "Unless," we are told, "the idea of a God had in the first instance been communicated to the mind; unless God had himself taught it to our first parents, and it had thus been transmitted through succeeding generations; no contemplation of the works of creation-no induction from the phenomena of the natural and moral world could ever have enabled mankind to discover even his existence. But as soon as we are taught that there is a Creator necessarily existent and of infinite perfections, our understandings readily admit the idea of such a Being; and we find in the natural world innumerable testimonies to the truth of the doctrine."

Now we are ready to grant, that man never did by reasoning a posteriori discover the existence of God; or 13 in Warburton's words, that "all religious knowledge of the Deity and of man's relation to him was revealed, and had descended traditionally down (though broken

13 Doctrine of Grace, Book iii. c. 2. Warburton is speaking in the person of an opponent of Natural Religion.

and disjointed in so long a passage) from the first man." Still this concession does not, in

our estimation, affect the only important part of the question; which is not, whether man ever did, without previous intimation of a Supreme Being, reason from the works of creation to the existence of a Creator; but whether, if he had so reasoned, he would have reasoned correctly.

When, however, it is affirmed that man not only never did, but never could so have reasoned, we must be permitted to examine the arguments by which the assertion is supported. Why then could not man discover the existence of God from the contemplation of the works of creation, &c.? "Because, it is said, between matter and spirit, things visible and invisible, time and eternity, beings finite and beings infinite, objects of sense and objects of faith, the connexion is not perceptible to human observation.” And we are, therefore, to conclude that, unless we had been taught that there is a spiritual, invisible, eternal, infinite Being, we never could have arrived at the knowledge of that Being. Yet the same writers contend that the fact is no sooner proposed, than it commands the assent of the understanding. What then

are the grounds on which that assent is given? The mere statement cannot alone be sufficient to produce conviction. The truth is, that the understanding assents, because the fact proposed agrees with our previous observations-with the previous deductions of reason. Reason tell us that there are in the nature of man faculties for the existence of which we cannot account by any modification of matter known to us-thought, memory, invention, judgement. Reason tells us that no bounds can be set to time or spacehence we are led to admit the existence of a spiritual, eternal, infinite Being. The reasoning is equally valid, whether we apply it in confirmation of a fact which has been revealed to us; or without any previous revelation infer that fact from it. The latter is doubtless by far the more difficult operation: but we are now speaking only of its possibility or impossibility. The 14 same series of proofs by which we establish a known truth, might surely have conducted us to the knowledge of that truth.

14 To borrow an illustration from science. For how long a period were the ablest mathematicians employed in endeavouring to effect the passage from finite to infinite, or from discrete to continuous, in geometry? The discovery was at length made, and therefore was at all times possible.

Let us suppose a sceptic to ask why we believe the existence of God: what must be our reply? According to the writers whose opinions we are now considering: "This truth was originally made known by revelation." But if the sceptic proceeded to deny, as he probably would, the authority of the revelation, by what arguments must we endeavour to convince him? The answer is, 66 we must necessarily refer him to those testimonies, which the natural and moral phenomena of the world abundantly supply, of a Creator all-wise, powerful, good." It is admitted then by the very answer that those testimonies are sufficient to prove to the sceptic the existence of God; and is not this in fact to give up the point in dispute?

Perhaps, however, there may be some who will foresee this inevitable consequence of referring the sceptic to testimonies drawn from the natural and moral world; and will answer, "We can prove the authority of the revelation by historical investigation. We possess certain records, the genuineness of which we have ascertained; these declare that at a certain time a revelation was made from Heaven; and that the person who was sent to make it, attested the truth of his mission by miracles." Perhaps the sceptic will reply, that no human testimony