That is to say, "go, passenger, and tell at Lacedæmon, that we died here in obedience to her sacred laws." Forty years afterwards, Pausanias, who obtained the victory of Platææ, caused the bones of Leonidas to be carried from Thermopyla to Sparta, and erected a magnificent monument to his memory; near which was likewise another erected for Pausanias. Every year at these tombs was a funeral oration pronounced to the honour of those heroes, and a public game, wherein none but the Lacedæmonians had a right to participate; in order to show, that they alone were concerned in the glory obtained at Thermopyla. Xerxes in that affair lost above twenty thousand men, among whom were two of the king's brothers. He was very sensible, that so great a loss, which was a manifest proof of the courage of their enemies, was capable of alarming and discouraging his soldiers. In order, therefore, to conceal the knowledge of it from them, he caused all his men that were killed in that action, except a thousand, whose bodies he ordered to be left upon the field, to be thrown together into large holes, which were secretly made, and covered over afterwards with earth and herbs. This stratagem succeeded very ill; for when the soldiers in his fleet, being curious to see the field of battle, obtained leave to come thither for that purpose, it served rather to discover his own littleness of soul, than to conceal the number of the slain.* Dismayed with a victory that had cost him so dear, he asked Demaratus if the Lacedæmonians had many such soldiers? that prince told him, that the Spartan republic had a great many cities belonging to it, all the inhabitants of which were exceedingly brave; but that the inhabitants of Lacedæmon, who were properly called Spartans, and who were about eight thousand in number, surpassed all the rest in valour, and were all of them such as those who had fought under Leonidas.† I return for a short time to the battle of Thermopylæ, the issue of which, fatal in appearance, might make an impression upon the minds of the reader to the disadvantage of the Lacedæmonians, and occasion their courage to be looked upon as the effect of a presumptuous temerity, or a desperate resolution. That action of Leonidas, with his three hundred Spartans, was not the effect of rashness or despair, but was a wise and noble conduct, as Diodorus Siculus has taken care to observe, in the magnificent encomium upon that famous engagement, to which he ascribes the success of all the ensuing victories and campaigns. Leonidas, knowing that Xerxes marched at the head of all the forces of the East, in order to overwhelm and crush a little country by his overwhelming numbers, rightly conceived, from the superiority of his genius and understanding, that if they pretended to place their hopes of success in that war in opposing force to force, and numbers to numbers, all the Grecian nations together would never be able to equal the Persians, or to dispute the victory with them; that it was therefore necessary to point out to Greece other means of safety and preservation, while she was under these alarms; and that they ought to show to the world whose eyes were upon them, what glorious things may be done, when greatness of mind is opposed to force of body, true courage and bravery to blind impetuosity, the love of liberty to tyrannical oppression, and a few disciplined veteran troops to a confused multitude, however numerous. These brave Lacedæmonians thought it became them, who were the choicest soldiers of the chief people of Greece, to devote themselves to certain death, in order to impress upon the Persians how difficult it is to reduce free men to slavery, and to teach the rest of Greece, by their example, either to vanquish or to perish. These sentiments do not originate in fancy, nor do I ascribe them to Leonidas without foundation: they are plainly comprised in the short answer which that worthy king of Sparta made to a certain Lacedæmonian, who, being astonished at the generous resolution the king had taken, spoke to him in this *Herod. 1. viii. c. 24, 25. Herod. 1. viii. c. 134, 137. Diod. I. xi p. 9. manner: "is it possible then, sir, that you can think of marching with a handful of men against such a mighty and innumerable army?" "If we are to rely upon numbers,” replied Leonidas, "all the people of Greece together would not be sufficient, since a small part of the Persian army is equal to her entire population: but if we are to rely upon valour, my little troop is more than sufficient."* The event showed the justness of this prince's sentiments. That illustrious example of courage astonished the Persians, and gave new spirit and vigour to the Greeks. The lives then of this heroic leader and his brave troop were not thrown away, but usefully employed; and their death was attended with a double effect, greater and more lasting than they themselves had imagined. On one hand it was in a manner the cause of their ensuing victories, which made the Persians for ever after lay aside all thoughts of attacking Greece; so that during the seven or eight succeeding reigns, there was neither any prince, who durst entertain such a design, nor any flatterer in his court, who durst propose the thing to him. On the other hand, so singular and exemplary an instance of intrepidity made an indelible impression upon all the rest of the Grecians, and left a persuasion deeply rooted in their hearts, that they were able to subdue the Persians, and subvert their vast empire. Cimon was the first who made the attempt with success. Agesilaus afterwards pushed that design so far, that he made the great monarch tremble in his palace at Susa. Alexander at last accomplished it with incredible facility. He never had the least doubt, any more than the Macedonians who followed him, or the whole country of Greece that chose him general in that expedition, that with thirty thousand men he could reduce the Persian empire, as three hundred Spartans had been sufficient to check the united forces of the whole East. SECTION VI.-NAVAL BATTLE NEAR ARTEMISIUM. THE very same day, on which the glorious action was fought at Thermopylæ, there was also an engagement at sea between the two fleets. That of the Grecians, exclusive of the little galleys and small boats, consisted of two hundred and seventy-one vessels. This fleet had lain by near Artemisium, a promontory of Euboea, upon the northern coast towards the strait. That of the enemy, which was much more numerous, was near the same place, but had lately suffered in a violent tempest, which had destroyed above four hundred of their vessels. Notwithstanding this loss, as it was still vastly superior in number to that of the Grecians, which they were preparing to attack, they detached two hundred of their vessels with orders to wait about Euboea, so that none of the enemy's vessels might be able to escape them. The Grecians having got intelligence of this separation, immediately set sail in the night, in order to attack that detachment at day-break the next morning. But not meeting with it, they went, towards the evening, and fell upon the main body of the enemy's fleet, which they treated very roughly. Night coming on, they were obliged to separate, and both parties retired to their post. But the very night that parted them, proved more destructive to the Persians than the engagement which had proceeded, from a violent storm of wind, accompanied with rain and thunder, which distressed and harassed their vessels till break of day and the two hundred ships also that had been detached from their fleet, as we mentioned before, were almost all cast away upon the coasts of Euboea: it being the will of the gods, says Herodotus, that the two fleets should become very nearly equal.t : The Athenians having the same day received a reinforcement of fifty-three vessels, the Grecians, who were apprised of the disaster that had befallen part of the enemy's fleet, fell upon the ships of the Cilicians, at the same hour they had attacked the fleet the day before, and sunk a great number of them. The Persians ashamed of seeing themselves thus insulted by an enemy so much Plut. in Lacon. Apoph. p. 225. † Herod. 1. vii. 1-18. Diod. I. xi. p. 10. 11. inferior in number, thought fit the next day to appear first in a disposition to engage. The battle was very obstinate this time, and the success pretty nearly equal on both sides; but the Persians, who were incommoded by the great size and number of their vessels, sustained the greater loss. Both parties, however, retired in good order. All these actions, which took place near Artemisium, did not bring matters to an absolute decision, but contributed very much to animate the Athenians, as they were convinced by experience, that there is nothing really formidable, either in the number and magnificent ornaments of vessels, or in the insolent shouts and songs of victory of barbarians, to men that know how to come to close engagement, and have the courage to fight with steadiness and resolution; and that the best way of dealing with such an enemy, is to despise all that vain appearance, to advance boldly up to them, and to charge briskly and vigorously, without ever giving ground.* The Grecian fleets having by this time had intelligence of what had passed at Thermopylæ, resolved upon the course they were to take without any farther deliberation. They immediately sailed away from Artemisium and advancing towards the heart of Greece, they stopped at Salamis, a small island very near and opposite to Attica. While the fleet was retreating, Themistocles passed through all the places where the enemy was obliged to land, in order to take in fresh water or other provisions, and engraved in large characters, upon the rocks and the stones, the following words, which he addressed to the lonians: "Be of our side, ye people of Ionia: come to the party of your fathers, who exposed their own lives for no other object than to maintain your liberty or, if you cannot possibly do that, at least do the Persians all the mischief you can, when we are engaged with them, and put their army into disorder and confusion." By this means Themistocles hoped either to bring the Ionians really over to their party, or at least to cause them to be suspected by the barbarians. We see this general had his thoughts always intent upon his business, and neglected nothing that could contribute to the success of his designs.† SECTION VII.—THE ATHENIANS ABANDON THEIR CITY, WHICH IS TAKEN AND BURNT BY XERXES. XERXES in the mean time had entered into the country of Phocis by the upper part of Doris, and was burning and plundering the cities of the Phocians. The inhabitants of Peloponnesus having no thoughts but to save their own country, resolved to abandon all the rest, and to collect all the Grecian forces, within the isthmus, which they intended to fortify by a strong wall, extending from one sea to the other, a distance of nearly five English miles. The Athenians were highly provoked at so base a desertion, seeing themselves ready to fall into the hands of the Persians, and likely to bear the whole weight of their fury and vengeance. Some time before, they had consulted the oracles of Delphos, which had given them for answer, "that there would be no way of saving the city but by walls of wood." The sentiments of the people were much divided about this ambiguous expression: some thought it was to be understood to mean the citadel, because, heretofore, it had been surrounded with wooden palisades. But Themistocles gave another sense to the words, which was much more natural, understanding it to mean shipping; and demonstrated, that the only measures they had to take, were to leave the city empty, and to embark all the inhabitants. But this was a resolution the people would not listen to, thinking they would relinquish all hope of victory and even of safety when once they had abandoned the temples of their gods and the tombs of their ancestors. Here Themistocles had occasion for all his address and all his eloquence, to prevail upon the people. After he had represented to them, that Athens did not consist either of its walls, or its houses, but of its citizens, and *Alut. in Themist. p. 115, 117. Herod. 1. viii. c. 21, 22. Herod. 1. vii. c. 40, 41. that the saving of these was the preservation of the city, he endeavoured to persuade them, by the argument most capable of making an impression upon them, in the unhappy, afflicted, and dangerous condition they were then in, I mean the argument and motive of divine authority; giving them to understand by the very words of the oracle, and by the prodigies which had happened, that their removing for a time from Athens was manifestly the will of the gods.* A decree was therefore passed, by which, in order to soften what appeared so hard, in the resolution of deserting the city, it was ordained, "that Athens should be given up in trust into the hands, and committed to the keeping and protection of Minerva, patroness of the Athenian people; that all such inhabitants as were able to bear arms, should go on board of ships; and that every citizen should provide, as well as he could, for the safety and security of his wife, children and slaves."t The extraordinary behaviour of Cimon, who was at this time very young, was of great weight on this singular occasion. Followed by his companions, with a gay and cheerful countenance, he went publicly along the street of the Ceramicus to the citadel, in order to consecrate the bit of a bridle, which he carried in his hand, in the temple of Minerva, intending to impress upon the people by this religious and affecting ceremony, that they had no farther business with land-forces, and that it behooved them now to betake themselves entirely to the sea. After he had made an offering of this bit, he took one of the shields that hung upon the wall of the temple, paid his devotions to the goddess, went down to the water-side, and was the first who by his example inspired the greatest part of the people with confidence and resolution, and encouraged them to embark.‡ The greater part of them sent their fathers and mothers that were old, together with their wives and children, to the city of Trozene,§ where the inhabitants received them with great humanity and generosity; for they made an ordinance that they should be maintained at the expense of the public, and assigned for each person's subsistence two oboli a day, which were worth about two pence English money. Besides this, they permitted the children to gather fruit wherever they pleased, or wherever they came, and settled a fund for the payment of the masters who had the care of their education. How noble, how magnanimous, in a city, exposed as this was to the greatest dangers and calamities, to extend her care and generosity, in the very midst of such alarms, even to the education of other people's children! When the whole city came to embark, so moving and melancholy a scene, drew tears from the eyes of all that were present, and at the same time occasioned great admiration with regard to the steadiness and courage of those men, who sent their fathers and mothers another way, and to other places, and who, without being moved either at their grief and lamentations, or at the tender embraces of their wives and children, passed over with so much firmness and resolution to Salamin. But what extremely raised and augmented the general compassion, was the great number of old men they were forced to leave in the city on account of their age and infirmities, many of whom voluntarily remained there, from a motive of religion, believing the citadel to be the thing meant by the oracle in the above mentioned ambiguous expression of wooden walls. There was no creature, for history has deemed this circumstance worthy of being remembered, there was no creature, even to the very domestic animals, but what took part in this public mourning; nor was it possible to look on those poor creatures, running, howling and crying after their masters, who were going on board, without being affected. Among these animals, particular notice is taken of a dog belonging to Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, which, *Herod. 1. vii. c. 139-143. ↑ Herod. 1. viii. c. 51--54. Plut. in Themist. p. 117. Plut. in Cim. p. 481. This was a small city situated upon the sea-side, in that part of the Peloponnesus called Argolis. VOL. II. 5 unwilling to be abandoned by his master, jumped into the sea after him, and continued swimming as near as he could to the vessel his master was on board of, till he landed, quite spent, at Salamin, and died the moment after upon the shore. In the same place, even in Plutarch's time, they used to show the spot wherein this faithful animal was said to be buried, which was called “the dog's burying place." While Xerxes was continuing his march, some deserters from Arcadia came and joined his army. The king having asked them what the Grecians were then doing, was extremely surprised when he was told, that they were employed in seeing the games and combats then celebrating at Olympia: and his surprise was still increased, when he understood that the victor's reward in those engagements was only a crown of olive. "What men must they be," cried one of the Persian nobles with great wonder and astonishment, "that are influenced only by honour, and not by money!"* Xerxes had sent off a considerable detachment of his army to plunder the temple of Delphos, in which he knew there were immense treasures, being resolved to treat Apollo with no more favour than the other gods whose temples he had pillaged. If we may believe what Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus say of this matter, no sooner had this detachment advanced near the temple of Minerva, surnamed the Provident, than the air suddenly grew dark, and a violent tempest arose, accompanied with impetuous winds, thunder and lightning; and two huge rocks being detached from the mountain, fell upon the Persian troops, and crushed the greatest part of them.t The other part of the army marched towards the city of Athens, which was deserted by all its inhabitants, except a small number of citizens who had retired into the citadel, where they defended themselves with incredible bravery till they were all killed, and would hearken to no terms of accommodation whatever. Xerxes having stormed the citadel, reduced it to ashes. He immediately despatched a courier to Susa, to carry the agreeable news of his success to Artabanes his uncle; and at the same time sent him a great number of pictures and statues. Those of Harmodius and Aristogiton, the ancient deliverers of Athens, were sent with the rest. One of the Antiochuses, kings of Syria, (I do not know which of them, nor at what time it was,) returned them to the Athenians, being persuaded he could not possibly make them a more acceptable present.§ SECTION. VIII.-THE BATTLE OF SALAMIN, &c. AT this time a division arose among the commanders of the Grecian fleet; and the confederates, in a council of war which was held for that purpose, were of very different sentiments concerning the place for engaging the enemy. Some of them, and indeed the major part, at the head of whom was Eurybiades, the generalissimo of the fleet, were for having them advance near the isthmus of Corinth, that they might be nearer the land-army, which was posted there to guard that pass, under the command of Cleombrotus, brother of Leonidas, and more ready for the defence of Peloponnesus. Others, at the head of whom was Themistocles, alleged, that it would be betraying their country to abandon so advantageous a post as that of Salamin. And as he supported his opinion with great warmth, Eurybiades lifted up his cane over him in a menacing manner. "Strike," said the Athenian, unmoved at the insult, "but hear me:" and continuing his discourse, proceeded to show of what importance it was for the Grecians, whose vessels were lighter and much fewer in number than those of the Persians, to engage in such a strait as that of Salamin, which would render the enemy incapable of using a great part of their forces. Eurybiades, who could not help being surprised at this moderation in Themistocles, submitted to his reasons, or at least complied with his opinion, for fear * Herod. 1. viii. c. 16. Ilered. 1. vii. c. 50-54. ↑ Idem, c. 35-39. Diod. I. xi. p. 12. |