ber of their enemies be ever so superior; and are commanded, by abiding firm in their post, either to conquer or to die."* Xerxes was not offended at the liberty wherewith Demaratus spoke to him, and continued his march. SECTION IV. THE LACEDÆMONIANS AND ATHENIANS SEND TO THEIR ALLIES IN VAIN TO REQUIRE SUCCOURS FROM THEM. THE COMMAND OF THE FLEET GIVEN TO THE LACEDEMONIANS. LACEDEMON and Athens, which were the two most powerful cities of Greece, and the cities against which Xerxes was most exasperated, were not indolent or negligent while so formidable an enemy was approaching. Having received intelligence long before of the designs of that prince, they had sent spies to Sardis, in order to have a more exact information of the number and quality of his forces. These spies were seized and as they were just on the point of being put to death, Xerxes countermanded it, and gave orders that they should be conducted through his army and then sent back without any harm being done to them. At their return, the Grecians understood what they had to apprehend from so potent an enemy.† They sent deputies at the same time to Argos, into Sicily, to Gelon tyrant of Syracuse, to the isles of Corcyra and Crete, to desire succours from them, and to form a league against the common enemy. The people of Argos offered a considerable succour, on condition they should have an equal share of the authority as either of the two kings of Sparta. This was granting them a great deal: but into what errors and mischiefs are not men led by a mistaken point of honour, and a foolish jealousy of command! The Argives were not contented with this offer, and refused to enter into a league with the Grecians, without considering, that if they suffered them to be destroyed, their own ruin must inevitably follow.‡ The deputies proceeded from Argos to Sicily, and addressed themselves to Gelon, who was the most potent prince of the Greeks at that time. He promised to assist them with two hundred vessels of three benches of oars, with an army of twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, two thousand light-armed soldiers, and the same number of bow-men and slingers, and to supply the Grecian army with provisions during the whole war, on condition they would make him generalissimo of all the forces both by land and sea. The Lacedæmonians were highly offended at such a proposal. Gelon then abated somewhat in his demands, and promised the same, provided he had at least the command either of the fleet or of the army. This proposal was strenuously opposed by the Athenians, who made answer, that they alone had a right to command the fleet, in case the Lacedæmonians were willing to give it up. Gelon had a more substantial reason for not leaving Sicily unprovided with troops, which was the approach of the formidable army of the Carthaginians, commanded by Amilcar, which consisted of three hundred thousand men.§ The inhabitants of Corcyra, now called Corfu, gave the envoys a more favourable answer, and immediately put to sea with a fleet of sixty vessels. But they advanced no farther than to the coasts of Laconia, pretending they were hindered by contrary winds, but in reality waiting to see the success of an engagement, that they might afterwards range themselves on the side of the conqueror. The people of Crete, having consulted the Delphic oracle, to know what resolution they were to take on this occasion, refused to enter into the league. T Thus were the Lacedæmonians and Athenians left almost to themselves, all the rest of the cities and nations having submitted to the heralds that Xerxes had sent to require earth and water of them, excepting the people of Thespia and of Platææ.** In so pressing a danger, their first care was to put an end to all discord and division among themselves; for which reason the Athenians made peace with the people of Ægina, with whom they were actually at war.tt Herod. 1. vii. c. 145, 146. Herod. 1. vii. c. 163. ↑ Idem. Idem, c. 169–171. 1 Idem, c. 149-152. **Herod. 1. vii. c. 132. Idem, c. 153-161. Their next care was to appoint a general: for there never was any occasion wherein it was more necessary to choose one capable of so important a trust, than in the present conjuncture, when Greece was upon the point of being attacked by the whole force of Asia. The most able and experienced captains, terrified at the greatness of the danger, had taken the resolution of not presenting themselves as candidates. There was a certain citizen at Athens, whose name was Epicydes, who had some eloquence, but in other respects was a person of no merit, was in disrepute for his want of courage, and notorious for his avarice. Notwithstanding all which, it was apprehended, that, in the assembly of the people, the votes would run in his favour.* Themistocles, who was sensible that in calm weather almost any mariner may be capable of conducting a vessel, but that in storms and tempests, the most able pilots are at a loss, was convinced, that the commonwealth was ruined, if Epicydes was chosen general, whose venal and mercenary soul gave them the justest reason to fear that he was not proof against the Persian gold. There are occasions, when, in order to act wisely, I had almost said regularly, it is necessary to dispense with and rise above all rule. Themistocles, who knew very well that in the present state of affairs he was the only person capable of commanding, did for that reason make no scruple of employing bribes and presents to remove his competitor and having found means to satisfy the ambition of Epicydes by gratifying his avarice, he got himself elected general in his stead. We may here, I think, very justly apply to Themistocles what Titus Livius says of Fabius on a like occasion. This great commander finding, when Hannibal was in the heart of Italy, that the people were inclined to make a man of no merit consul, employed all his own influence, as well as that of his friends, to be continued in the consulship, without being concerned at the clamour that might be raised against him, and succeeded in the attempt. The historian adds, "the conjuncture of affairs, and the extreme danger the commonwealth was exposed to, were arguments of such weight, that they prevented any one from being offended at a conduct which might appear to be contrary to rules, and removed all suspicion of Fabius's having acted upon any motive of interest or ambition. On the contrary, the public admired his generosity and greatness of soul, in that, as he knew the commonwealth had occasion for an accomplished general, and could not be ignorant or doubtful of his own singular merit in that respect, he had chosen rather in some sort to hazard his own reputation, and perhaps expose his character to the reproaches of envious tongues, than to be wanting in any service he could render his country."§ The Athenians also passed a decree to recall all their citizens who were in banishment. They feared that Aristides would join their enemies, and influence a great many others to side with the barbarians. But they had a very false opinion of their citizen, who was infinitely remote from such sentiments. Be that as it might, at this extraordinary juncture they thought fit to recall him, and Themistocles was so far from opposing the decree for that purpose, that he promoted it with all his credit and authority. The hatred and division of these great men had nothing of that implacable, bitter, and outrageous spirit, which prevailed among the Romans in the latter times of the republic. The danger of the state was the means of their reconciliation, and when their service was necessary to the preservation of the public, they laid aside all their jealousy and rancour: and we shall see, hereafter, that Aristides was so far from secretly thwarting his ancient rival, that he zealously contributed to the success of his enterprises, and to the advancement of his glory.|| *Plut. in Themist. p. 114. ↑ Quilibet nautarum vectorumque tranquillo mari gubernare potest: ubi orta sæva tempestas est, ac turbato mari rapitur vento navis, tum viro et gubernatore opus est.-Liv 1. xxiv. n. 8. † Χρήμασι τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἐξωνήσατο παρὰ τῇ Ἐπικύδε Tempus ac necessitas belli, et discrimen summæ rerum, faciebant ne quis aut in exemplum exquireret, aut suspectum cupiditatis imperii consulem haberet. Quin laudabant potius magnitudinem animi, quod cum summo imperatore esse opus reip. sciret, seque eum haud dubie esse, minoris invidiam suam, si qua ex re oriretur, quam utilitatem reip. fecisset.-Liv. 1. xxiv. n. 9. Plut. in Arist. p 322, 323. The alarm increased in Greece, in proportion as they received advice that the Persian army advanced. If the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had been able to make no other resistance than with their land-forces, Greece had been utterly ruined and reduced to slavery. This exigence taught them how to set a right value upon the prudent foresight of Themistocles, who, upon some other pretext, had caused a hundred galleys to be built. Instead of judging like the rest of the Athenians, who looked upon the victory of Marathon as the end of the war, he, on the contrary, considered it rather as the beginning, or as the signal of still greater battles, for which it was necessary to prepare the Athenian people; and from that very time he began to think of raising Athens to a superiority over Sparta, which for a long time had been the mistress of all Greece. With this view he judged it expedient to make the Athenian power entirely maritime, perceiving very plainly, that as she was so weak by land, she had no other way to render herself useful to her allies, or formidable to her enemies. His opinion herein prevailed among the people in spite of the opposition of Miltiades, whose difference of opinion undoubtedly arose from the little probability there was, that a people entirely unacquainted with fighting at sea, and who were only capable of fitting out and arming very small vessels, should be able to withstand so formidable a power as that of the Persians, who had both a numerous land-army, and a fleet of above a thousand ships. The Athenians had some silver mines in a part of Attica, called Laurium, the whole products and revenue of which used to be distributed among them. Themistocles had the courage to propose to the people, that they should abolish these distributions, and employ that money in building vessels with three benches of oars, in order to make war upon the people of Ægina, against whom he endeavoured to inflame their ancient jealousy. No people are ever willing to sacrifice their private interests to the general utility of the public: for they seldom have so much generosity or public spirit, as to purchase the welfare or preservation of the state at their own expense. The Athenian people, however, did it upon this occasion: moved by the lively remonstrances of Themistocles, they consented that the money which arose from the product of the mines, should be employed in building a hundred galleys. Upon the arrival of Xerxes they doubled the number, and to that fleet Greece owed its preservation.* When they came to the point of naming a general for the command of the navy, the Athenians, who alone had furnished two thirds of it, laid claim to that honour as appertaining to them, and their pretensions were certainly just and well grounded. It happened, however, that the suffrages of the allies all concurred in favour of Eurybiades, a Lacedæmonian. Themistocles, though very aspiring after glory, thought it incumbent upon him on this occasion, to sacrifice his own interests for the common good of the nation: and giving the Athenians to understand, that, provided they behaved themselves with courage and conduct, all the Grecians would quickly desire to confer the command upon them of their own accord, he persuaded them to consent, as he himself would do, to give up that point at present to the Spartans. It may justly be said, that this prudent moderation in Themistocles was another means of saving the state. For the allies threatened to separate the uselves from them, if they refused to comply; and if that had happened, Greece must have been inevitably ruined. SECTION V.-THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLE. THE DEATH OF LEONIDAS. THE only thing that now remained to be discussed, was to know in what place they should resolve to meet the Persians, in order to dispute their entrance into Greece. The people of Thessaly represented, that as they were the most exposed, and likely to be first attacked by the enemy, it was but reasonable that their defence and security, on which the safety of all Greece so much depended, should first be provided for; without which they should be obliged to take other measures, that would be contrary to their inclinations, but yet absolutely necessary, in case their country was left unprotected and defenceless. It was hereupon resolved, that ten thousand men should be sent to guard the passage which separates Macedonia from Thessaly, near the river Peneus, between the mountains of Olympus and Ossa. But Alexander, the son of Amyntas, king of Macedonia, having given them to understand, that if they waited for the Persians in that place, they must inevitably be overpowered by their numbers, they retired to Thermopyla. The Thessalians finding themselves thus abandoned, without any farther deliberation, submitted to the Persians.* Thermopyla is a strait or narrow pass of mount Eta, between Thessaly and Phocis, but twenty-five feet broad, which therefore might be defended by a small number of forces, and which was the only way through which the Persian land-army could enter Achaia, and advance to besiege Athens. This was the place where the Grecian army thought fit to wait for the enemy; the person who commanded it was Leonidas, one of the two kings of Sparta.† Xerxes in the mean time was upon his march; he had given orders for his fleet to follow him along the coast, and to regulate their motions according to those of the land-army. Wherever he came, he found provisions and refreshments prepared beforehand, pursuant to the orders he had sent; and every city he arrived at gave him a magnificent entertainment, which cost immense sums of money. The vast expense of these treats gave occasion to a witty saying of a certain citizen of Abdera in Thrace, who, when the king was gone, said, they ought to thank the gods that he eat but one meal a-day.‡ An extraordinary instance of magnanimity was shown on this occasion by the king of the Bisaltes, a people of Thrace. While all the other princes ran into servitude, and basely submitted to Xerxes, he bravely refused to receive his yoke, or to obey him. Not being in a condition to resist him with open force, he retired to the top of the mountain Rhodope, into an inaccessible place, and forbade all his sons, who were six in number, to carry arms against Greece. But they, either out of fear of Xerxes, or out of a curiosity to see so important a war, followed the Persians, in opposition to their father's injunction. On their return home, their father, to punish so direct a disobedience, condemned all his sons to have their eyes put out. Xerxes continued his march through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, every thing giving way before him till he came to the strait of Thermopylæ.§ One cannot behold without the utmost astonishment, with what a handful of troops the Grecians opposed the innumerable army of Xerxes. We find a particular account of their number in Pausanias. All their forces joined together amounted only to eleven thousand two hundred men; of which number only four thousand were employed at Thermopyla to defend the pass. But these soldiers, adds the historian, were all determined to a man either to conquer or die. And what is it that an army of such resolution is not able to effect? When Xerxes advanced near the strait of Thermopyle, he was strangely surprised to find that they were prepared to dispute his passage. He had always flattered himself, that on the first hearing of his arrival, the Grecians would betake themselves to flight; nor could he ever be persuaded to believe, what Demaratus had told him from the beginning of his project, that at the first pass he came to, he would find his whole army stopped by a handful of men. He sent out a spy before him to reconnoitre the enemy. The spy brought him word, that he found the Lacedæmonians out of their entrenchments, and that they were diverting themselves with military exercises, and combing their hair, which was the Spartan manner of preparing themselves for battle.¶ Xerxes, still entertaining some hopes of their flight, waited four days on purpose to give them time to retreat. And in this interval of time he used his utmost endeavours to gain Leonidas, by making him magnificent promises, and * A. M. 3524. Ant. J. C 480. Herod. 1. vii. c. 172, 173. Herod. 1. vii. c. 175, 177. Herod. 1. viii. c. 116. assuring him that he would make him master of all Greece, if he would come over to his party. Leonidas rejected his proposal with scorn and indignation. Xerxes, having afterwards written to him to deliver up his arms, Leonidas, in a style and spirit truly laconic, answered him in these words, "Come and take them."* Nothing remained but to prepare themselves to engage the Lacedæmonians. Xerxes first commanded his Median forces to march against them, with orders to take them all alive, and bring them to him. These Medes were not able to stand the charge of the Grecians; and being shamefully put to flight, they showed, says Herodotus, that Xerxes had a great many men, but few soldiers. The next that were to face the Spartans, were those Persians called the Immortal Band, which consisted of ten thousand men, and were the best troops in the whole army. But these had no better success than the former.‡ Xerxes, out of all hopes of being able to force his way through troops so determined to conquer or die, was extremely perplexed, and could not tell what resolution to take, when an inhabitant of the country came to him and discovered a secret path to the top of an eminence, which overlooked and commanded the Spartan forces. He quickly despatched a detachment thither, which marching all night, arrived there at the break of day, and possessed themselves of that advantageous post. The Greeks were soon apprized of this misfortune, and Leonidas, seeing that it was now impossible to repulse the enemy, obliged the rest of the allies to retire, but staid himself with his three hundred Lacedæmonians, all resolved to die with their leader, who being told by the oracle, that either Lacedæmon or her king must necessarily perish, determined, without the least difficulty or hesitation, to sacrifice himself for his country. The Spartans lost all hopes either of conquering or escaping, and looked upon Thermopyla as their burying-place. The king, exhorting his men to take some nourishment, and telling them at the same time, that they should sup together with Pluto, they set up a shout of joy, as if they had been invited to a banquet, and full of ardour advanced with their king to battle. The shock was exceedingly violent and bloody. Leonidas himself was one of the first that fell. The endeavours of the Lacedæmonians to defend his dead body were incredible. At length, not vanquished, but oppressed by numbers, they all fell, except one man, who escaped to Sparta, where he was treated as a coward and traitor to his country, and nobody would keep company or converse with him. But soon afterwards he made a glorious amends for his fault at the battle of Platææ, where he distinguished himself in an extraordinary manner. Xerxes, enraged to the last degree against Leonidas for daring to make a stand against him, caused his dead body to be hung up on a gallows, and made this intended dishonour of his enemy his own immortal shame. Some time after these transactions, by order of the Amphictyons, a magnificent monument was erected at Thermopyla to the honour of these brave defenders of Greece, and upon the monument were two inscriptions; one of which was general, and related to all those that died at Thermopylæ, importing, that the Greeks of Peloponnesus, to the number only of four thousand, had withstood the Persian army, which consisted of three millions of men: the other related to the Spartans in particular. It was composed by the poet Simonides, and is very remarkable for its simplicity. It is as follows: Το ξεῖν', ἄγγειλον Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὅτι τῇ δὲ Αντίγραψε. Μόλων λάζε. † Οτι πολλοὶ μὲν ἄνθρωποι εἶεν, ὅλίγοι δὲ ἄνδρες. Quod multi homines essent, pauci autem viri. Plut in Lacon. Apoph. p. 225. When the Gauls, two hundred years after this, came to invade Greece, they possessed themselves of the strait of Thermopyle by means of the same by-path which the Grecians had still neglected to secure.-Pausan. 1. i. p. 7. 8. Herod. 1. vii. c. 238. Pari animo Lacedæmonii in Thermopylis occiderunt, in duos Simonides: Dic, hospes, Sparta nos te hic vidisse jacentes, Dum sanctis patriæ legibus obsequiour. Cic. Tuse. Qrasti n. 101 |