BOOK ment, but to the unavoidable necessity of vindicating the honour of his crown.* VII. 1541. Francis's for war. However just Francis might esteem his own cause, he did not trust so much to that as to neglect the proper precautions for gaining other allies besides the sultan, by whose aid he might counterbalance the emperor's superior power. But his negotiations to this effect were attended with very little success. Henry VIII. eagerly bent at that time upon schemes against Scotland, which he knew would at once dissolve his union with France, was inclinable rather to take part with the emperor, than to contribute in any degree towards favouring the operations against him. The pope adhered inviolably to his ancient system of neutrality. The Venetians, notwithstanding Solyman's solicitations, imitated the pope's example. The Germans, satisfied with the religious liberty which they enjoyed, found it more their interest to gratify than to irritate the emperor; so that the kings of Denmark and Sweden, who on this occasion were first drawn in to interest themselves in the quarrels of the more potent monarchs of the south, and the duke of Cleves, who had a dispute with the emperor about the possession of Guelders, were the only confederates whom Francis secured. But the dominions of the two former lay at such a distance, and the power of the latter was so inconsiderable, that he gained little by their alliance. But Francis by vigorous efforts of his own activity supplied industry in preparing every defect. Being afflicted at this time with a distemper, which was the effect of his irregular pleasures, and which prevented his pursuing them with the same licentious indulgence, he applied to business with more than his usual industry. The same cause, which occasioned this extraordinary attention to. his affairs, rendered him morose and dissatisfied with the ministers whom he had hitherto employed. This accidental peevishness being sharpened by reflecting on the false steps into which he had lately been betrayed, as well as the insults to which he had been exposed, some of those in whom he had usually placed the greatest confidence felt the effects of this change in his temper, and were deprived of their offices. At last he dis * Bellay, 367, &c. Jovii Hist. lib. xl. 268. VII. graced Montmorency himself, who had long directed affairs, BOOK as well civil as military, with all the authority of a minister no less beloved than trusted by his master; and Francis being 1541. fond of showing that the fall of such a powerful favourite did not affect the vigour or prudence of his administration, this was a new motive to redouble his diligence in preparing to open the war by some splendid and extraordinary effort. 1542. He brings armies it to the He accordingly brought into the field five armies. One to act in Luxembourg under the duke of Orleans, accompanied by the duke of Lorraine as his instructor in the art of war. field. Another commanded by the dauphin marched towards the frontiers of Spain. A third, led by Van Rossem the marshal of Guelders, and composed chiefly of the troops of Cleves, had Brabant allotted for the theatre of its operations. A fourth, of which the duke of Vendome was general, hovered on the borders of Flanders. The last consisting of the forces cantoned in Piedmont, was destined for the admiral Annebaut. The dauphin and his brother were appointed to command where the chief exertions were intended, and the greatest honour to be reaped; the army of the former amounted to forty thousand, that of the latter to thirty thousand men. Nothing appears more surprising than that Francis did not pour with these numerous and irresistible armies into the Milanese, which had so long been the object of his wishes as well as enterprises; and that he should choose rather to turn almost his whole strength into another direction, and towards new conquests. But the remembrance of the disasters which he had met with in his former expeditions into Italy, together with the difficulty of supporting a war carried on at such a distance from his own dominions, had gradually abated his violent inclination to obtain footing in that country, and made him willing to try the fortune of his arms in another quarter. At the same time he expected to make such a powerful impression on the frontier of Spain, where there were few towns of any strength, and no army assembled to oppose him, as might enable him to recover possession of the country of Rousillon, lately dismembered from the French crown, before Charles could bring into the field any force able to obstruct his progress. The necessity of supporting his ally the duke of Cleves, and the hope of VOL. III. 2 VII. BOOK drawing a considerable body of soldiers out of Germany by his means, determined him to act with vigour in the LowCountries. 1542. June. Their ope rations. The dauphin and duke of Orleans opened the campaign much about the same time; the former laying siege to Perpignan the capital of Rousillon, and the latter entering Luxembourg. The duke of Orleans pushed his operations with the greatest rapidity and success, one town falling after another until no place in that large dutchy remained in the emperor's hands but Thionville. Nor could he have failed of overrunning the adjacent provinces with the same ease, if he had not voluntarily stopt short in his career of victory. But a report prevailing that the emperor had determined to hazard a battle in order to save Perpignan, on a sudden the duke, prompted by youthful ardour, or moved, perhaps, by jealousy of his brother, whom he both envied and hated, abandoned his own conquest, and hastened towards Rousillon, in order to divide with him. the glory of the victory. On his departure some of his troops were disbanded, others deserted their colours, and the rest, cantoned in the towns which he had taken, remained inactive. By this conduct, which leaves a dishonourable imputation either on his understanding or his heart, or on both, he not only renounced whatever he could have hoped from such a promising commencement of the campaign, but gave the enemy an opportunity of recovering, before the end of summer, all the conquests which he had gained. On the Spanish frontier, the emperor was not so inconsiderate as to venture on a battle, the loss of which might have endangered his kingdom. Perpignan, though poorly fortified, and briskly attacked, having been largely supplied with ammunition and provisions by the vigilance of Doria,* was defended so long and so vigorously by the duke of Alva, the persevering obstinacy of whose temper fitted him admirably for such a service, that at last the French, after a siege of three months, wasted by diseases, repulsed in several assaults, and despairing of success, relinquished the undertaking and retired into their own coun *Sigonii Vita A. Doriæ, p. 1191. VH. 1542. try. Thus all Francis's mighty preparations, either from BOOK some defect in his own conduct, or from the superior power and prudence of his rival, produced no effects which bore any proportion to his expense and efforts, or such as gratified, in any degree, his own hopes, or answered the expectation of Europe. The only solid advantage of the campaign was the acquisition of a few towns in Piedmont, which Bellay gained rather by stratagem and address, than by force of arms.t 1543. another The emperor and Francis, though both considerably ex- Prepa a hausted by such great but indecisive efforts, discovering notions for abatement of their mutual animosity, employed all their atten- campaign. tion, tried every expedient, and turned themselves towards every quarter, in order to acquire new allies, together with such a reinforcement of strength as would give them the superiority in the ensuing campaign. Charles, taking advantage of the terror and resentment of the Spaniards, upon the sudden invasion of their country, prevailed on the cortes of the several kingdoms to grant him subsidies with a more liberal hand than usual. At the same time he borrowed a large sum from John king of Portugal, and, by way of security for his payment, put him in possession of the Molucca isles in the East Indies, with the gainful commerce of precious spices, which that sequestered corner of the globe yields. Not satisfied with this, he negotiated a marriage between Philip, his only son, now in his sixteenth year, and Mary, daughter of that monarch, with whom her father, the most opulent prince in Europe, gave a large dower; and having likewise persuaded the cortes of Aragon and Valencia to recognise Philip as the heir of these crowns, he obtained from them the donative usual on such occasions. These extraordinary supplies enabled him to make such additions to his forces in Spain, that he could detach a great body into the Low-Countries, and yet reserve as many as were sufficient for the defence of the kingdom. Having thus provided for the security of Spain, and committed the government of it to his son, he sailed for Italy, in his way to Germany. May *Saudov. Hist. tom. ii. 315, bid. ii. 318. Bellay, 387, &c. Ferrer. ix. 237. Ferreras, ix. 238. 241. Jovii Hist. lib. xlii. 298. 6. VII. 1543. BOOK But how attentive soever to raise the funds for carrying on the war, or eager to grasp at any new expedient for that purpose, he was not so inconsiderate as to accept of an overture which Paul, knowing his necessities, artfully threw out to him. That ambitious pontiff, no less sagacious to discern, than watchful to seize opportunities of aggrandizing his family, solicited him to grant Octavio, his grandchild, whom the emperor had admitted to the honour of being his son-in-law, the investiture of the dutchy of Milan, in return for which he promised such a sum of money as would have gone far towards supplying all his present exigencies. But Charles, as well from unwillingness to alienate a province of so much value, as from disgust at the pope, who had hitherto refused to join in the war against France, rejected the proposal. His dissatisfaction with Paul at that juncture was so great, that he even refused to approve his alienating Parma and Placentia from the patrimony of St. Peter, and settling them on his son and grandson as a fief to be held of the holy see. As no other expedient for raising money among the Italian states remained, he consented to withdraw the garrisons which he had hitherto kept in the citadels of Florence and Leghorn; in consideration for which he received a large present from Cosmo di Medici, who by this means secured his own independence, and got possession of two forts which were justly called the fetters of Tuscany.* 'The empe ror's nego with Hen ry VIII. But Charles, while he seemed to have turned his whole attiations tention towards raising the sums necessary for defraying the expenses of the year, had not been negligent of objects more distant, though no less important, and had concluded a league offensive and defensive with Henry VIII. from which he derived, in the end, greater advantage than from all his other preparations. Several slight circumstances, which have already been mentioned, had begun to alienate the affections of that monarch from Francis, with whom he had been for some time in close alliance; and new incidents of greater moment had occurred to increase his disgust and animosity. Henry, desirous of establishing an uniformity in religion in both the France and British kingdoms, as well as fond of making proselytes to his Henry's rupture with Scotland. Sleid. 312. Jovii Hist. lib. xliii. p. 301. * Adriani Istoria. i. 195. |