ing able to judge aright in points that are not very clear, are apt rather to take things upon trust, than to give themselves the trouble to examine whether they be true or no. But when they find, that what a man undertakes to give them for a demonstration, is really none at all, they do not only conclude they are deceived by him, but begin also to suspect they have been ill used by those, who first imposed upon them a notion, for which no demonstration can be given; and from that suspicion proceed to this other of a more dangerous consequence, that what is not demonstrable, may perhaps too

not be true.

I shall, therefore, in this discourse, make use of another method, and content myself with endeavouring to shew what, in my opinion, is most probable; demonstration being, as to matters of faith, absolutely unnecessary: because, if I can convince a man, that the notions I maintain are more likely to be true than false, it is not in his power not to believe them no man believing any thing because he has a mind to believe it, but because his judgment is convinced, and he cannot chuse but believe it, whether he will or no: and belief is all that is required of us in the speculative part of religion.

Besides, demonstration being such an evidence of a thing, as shows the contrary of it to be impossible; it is, if you mark it, a whimsical kind of expression to say, that a man does but believe a thing to be so, which he is sure cannot possibly be other wise. It is just as ingenious as if one should profess, that he hopes he shall but begin to have a thing to morrow, which he is already this day in possession of, Belief and faith being as entirely swallowed up in demonstration, as hope is in frui

tion.

My design in this paper is, to induce men to a belief of religion, by

the strength of reason; and therefore I am forced to lay aside all arguments which have any dependence upon the authority of scripture, and must fashion my discourse as if I had to do with those that have no religion at all.

The first main question, upon the clearing of which I shall endeavour to ground the reasonableness of mens' having a religion, or worship of God, is this, whether it is more probable that the world has ordered itself to be in the form it now is, or was contrived to be so by some other being of a more perfect, and more designing nature? For whether or no the world has been created out of nothing, is not material to our purpose; because if a supreme intelligent agent has framed the world to be what it is, and has made us to be what we are, we ought as much to stand in awe of it, as if it had made both us and the world out of nothing. Yet because this latter question ought not to be totally passed by, I shall take the liberty to offer some conceptions of mine upon it,

The chief argument used against God Almighty's having created the world, is, that no man can imagine how a thing should be made out of nothing; and that, therefore, it is impossible he should have made the world, because there is nothing else out of which it could be made.

First then, I cannot chuse but observe, that to say, because we are not able to imagine how a thing should be, therefore the being of that thing must be impossible, is in itself a disingenuous way of argumentation; especially in those, who at the same time declare they believe this world to be eternal, and yet are as little able to comprehend how it should be eternal, as how it should be made out of nothing.

In the next place I conceive, that nothing can be properly said to endure, any longer than it remains just

the same; for in the instant any part of it is changed, that thing, as it was before, is no more in being.

In the third place, that every part of this world we live in is changed every moment; and by consequence, that this whole world is so too, because the whole is nothing else but what is composed of every part; and that therefore we cannot properly say, this world has continued for many ages, but only that all things in this world have been changed for several years together.

To evade which opinion, those who maintain the eternity of the world, are forced to say, that the matter of it is not changed, but the accidents only. Though this be a sort of argument which they will not allow of in others; for when it is by the Romanists urged, in defence of transubstantiation in the sacrament, that the accidents of the wafer remain, though the substance of it be changed, they reject that as a ridiculous notion: and yet it is not one jot more absurd to say, that the accidents remain when the matter is changed, than that the matter remains when the accidents are changed: nay, of the two, the asserters of this latter opinion are the least excusable, because they boldly attribute it to a natural cause; whereas the Romanists have the modesty at least to own it for a mysterious miracle.

But that the weakness of this imagination, of separating accidents from bodies, may the plainlier appear, let us examine a little what the meaning of the word accident is. Accident then does not signify a being distinct from body or matter, but is only a word, whereby we express the several ways we consider of what is in a body, or matter that is before us. For example; if we perceive a body to have length, then we consider of that length as an accident of that body; and when we perceive a body to have a smell, or taste, then we consider of that smell and that

taste as accidents of that body. But in none of these considerations we mean that any thing can have length, or smell, or taste, but what really is body; and when any thing, that had a smell or tase, has left off to have a smell or taste, it is, because that part of it which had a smell or taste, is no more in it. So that, upon an examination of the whole matter, I am apt to believe, that there can be naturally no change of accidents, but where there is a real change of bodies.

But to proceed a little further, the question being, whether it be more probable that the world, or that God Almighty, has been from all etermity; I think I may adventure to affirm, that of two propositions, the least probable is that which comes nearest to a contradiction. Now nothing can come nearer to a contradiction than eternity, or abiding the same for ever, and a continued changing, or not abiding the same one moment. And therefore I conclude, it is less probable that this changeable world should have been from all eternity, than that some other being, of more excellence, and greater perfection, should be so, whose very nature is incapable of change.

That Being of more excellence, and greater perfection, I call God; and those who, out of a foolish aver sion they have for the name of God, will call it Nature, do not in any kind differ from this notion of that Being, but only change its name, and rather shew, they have a vain mistaken ambition of being thought atheists, than that they have any reason strong enough to convince them. to be so.

The next question I shall take into consideration, is this, whether, though there be a God, it is probable that he should take a more particular care of mankind, than he does of beasts and other animals. To which I have this to offer, that though there are

several sorts of animals, which give us occasion to imagine they have some kind of reason in them, though not to so great a perfection as men have; yet since no other animal did ever any one thing, that could give us the least cause to believe, they have a conception of another world, or of a Deity; and that no man was ever yet born, but had a conception, or at least a suspicion of it, more or less: I say, for this reason, it is probable, in my opinion, that there is something nearer a-kin to the nature of God in men, than there is in any other animals whatsoever; and for that reason, that God Almighty does take a more particular care of us, than he does of them.

If then God be eternal, and it is probable there is something.in our nature, which is a-kin to the nature of God, it is also probable, that that part of us never dies.

It is also probable, that what by it we are prompted most to value and esteem, as the highest perfections, good qualities, and virtues, are parts of the essence and nature of God.

Now of all good qualities, or virtues, it is justice, which all men do most highly esteem and value in others, though they have not all the good fortune to practice it themselves. For justice is that good quality, or virtue, which causes all other good qualities or virtues to be esteemed; nay, it is that virtue, without which all other virtues become as vices; that is, they all come to be abhorred.

For he who wants justice, and has wit, judgment, or valour, will for the having wit, judgment, or valour, be the more abhorred; because the more wit, judgment, or valour he has, if he wants justice, the more he will certainly become a wicked man: and he who wants justice, and has power, will, for the having that be the more abhorred; bepower, cause the more power he has, if

he wants justice, the more he will certainly become a wicked man, And therefore, in my opinion, it is a very unreasonable thing for men, out of a design of extolling God Almighty's power, to rob him of justice; the quality without which, even power itself must necessarily be abhorred. And pray what can be more disrespectful to God Almighty, than to fancy that he shall punish us for doing that, which he bas from all eternity predestinated; that is, compelled us to do? It is an act that I can hardly believe there ever yet was born a man cruel enough to be guilty of, even in the depth of his revenge. And shall we make that an attribute of the most perfect, and the most high God, which is beneath the effect of the meanest of passions in the worst of men? It is, in my opinion, more reasonable to believe, that God Almighty, out of his love to mankind, has given us an eternal soul; that an eternal being and freewill, are things in their nature inseparable one from the other; and that therefore, according to our actions, proceeding from our wills, God Almighty, in justice, will reward and punish us in another world, for the good and ill deeds we perform in this. I do not say, that the best of our actions here, are .good enough to make us deserve the joys of hea ven; we must owe them to God Almighty's grace and favour, as indeed we owe all things else.

Neither will I take upon me to guess at the several degrees of joys there are in heaven; our dull senses making it as impossible for us to discourse well of those things, as it is impossible for a man born blind, to talk well of colours. Nor will I pretend to judge how long, or how much God Almighty will punish us hereafter; because, for the same reason that we think, him to be a God of justice, we must also conclude him to be a God of mercy.

This only I do verily believe, that

the more we love him, the more he will love us and the less we love him, the worse it will be for us.

Again, if this instinct, or conception, we have of a Deity, be the ground of our religion, it ought also to be the guide of our religion: that is, if the strongest reason we have to believe, that God Almighty does take a more particular care of us, than he does of other animals, is, because there is something in our nature, nearer a-kin to the nature of God, than any thing that is any other animal; I say, in all reason, that part of us which is nearest akin to the nature of God, ought to be our guide and director, in chusing the best way for our religious worship of God.

There is also this other consequence, which, in my opinion, does naturally depend upon what has been said; that one of the greatest crimes a man can be guilty of, is to force us to act or sin against that instinct of religion which God Almighty has placed in our hearts; for, if that instinct be somewhat a kin to the nature of God, the sinning against it must be somewhat a-kin to the sin against the Holy Ghost.

If then it be probable that there is a God, and that this God will reward and punish us hereafter, for all the good and ill things we act in this life; it does highly concern every man to examine seriously, which is the best way of worshipping and serving this God; that is, which is the best religion.

Now if it be probable, that the instinct which we have within us of a Deity, be a-kin to the nature of God; that religion is probably the best, whose doctrine does most recommend to us those things, which, by that instinct, we are prompted to believe are virtues and good qualities. And that, I think, without exceeding the bounds of modesty, I may take upon me to affirm, is the christian religion.

And for the same reason it does also follow, that the religion amongst christians, which does most recomment virtue and a good life, is, in all probability, the best religion. And here I must leave every man to take pains, in seeking out and chusing for himself; he only being answerable to God Almighty for his own soul.

I began this discourse, as if I had to do with those who have no religion at all; and now, addressing myself to christians, I hope they will not be offended at me, for ending it with the words of our Saviour:

Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and you shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you.

I shall beg leave farther only to propose a few questions to all those, in general, who are pleased to call themselves christians.

First, Whether there be any thing more directly opposite to the doctrine and practice of Jesus Christ, than to use any kind of force upon men, in matters of religion? And consequently, whether all those that practice it (let them be of what church or sect they please) ought not justly to be called antichristians?

Secondly, Whether there can be any thing more unmanly, more bar barous, or more ridiculous, than to go about to convince a man's judg ment by any thing but by reason? It is so ridiculous, that boys at school are whipped for it; who, instead of answering an argument with reason, are loggerheads enough to ge to cuffs.

And, thirdly, Whether the practice of it has not always been ruinous and destructive to those countries where it has been used, either in monarchies or commonwealths? And whether the contrary practice has not always been successful to those countries where it has been used, either in monarchies or common. wealths.

I shall conclude with giving them

this friendly advice: if they would be thought men of reason, or of a good conscience, let them endeavour, by their good counsel and, good example, to persuade others to lead such lives as may save their

souls: and not be perpetually quar relling amongst themselves, and cutting one another's throats, about those things, which they all agree are not absolutely necessary to salvation.

The Soldier; and other Poems: By the Author of the Vernal Walk; a Descriptive Poem. 2s. Jones. The "Vernal Walk," the second edition of which was published a few years since, contains various passages, the beauty and sublimity of which naturally remind the reader of THOMPSON and MILTON. The

small volume now before us consists of various pieces on different subjects, which, if for description they do not equal the former admirable performance, display considerable originality of thought and energy of expression. The measure is various, and in the irregular pieces we suspect the author had some of Mr. Southey's poems impressed on his mind, and whose blemishes, as well as beauties, are to be traced in several of the pages before us.

In the principal of these Poems, it is the design of the author to pourtray the usual life of the Soldier, "his worth and his wrongs." The subject is introduced by the following contemplation on the sight of a newly fallen victim of war on the field of battle.

"Ah! hath the fleet ball pierc'd him?

Is he slain?

How amiable in the arms of death, Fire-crested war's dread victim he reclines!

No selfish feeling stains his final hour. Anguish hath quench'd the dim smile on his lip,

Which mourning victory hath planted there,

With trembling hand affectionate;and,oh! The widow and the orphan at his heart