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viting them was, that they might become mediators, and thus heal their disputes.

the greatest part of those whom they caught. Many dead bodies were soon seen upon the sands, and others were floating upon the water; and including those who were seized and carried off, and those who were drowned and killed, either by the firing of the ships or by the people of New Town, three hundred were lost to the inhabitants of Old Town on that day.

The inhabitants of Old Town, happy to find that their differences were likely to be accomodated, joyfully ac cepted the invitation. The three brothers of the grandee just mentioned, the eldest of whom was Amboe Robin John, first entered their canoe, attended by twenty-seven others, and, being fol lowed by nine canoes, directed their course to the Indian Queen. They were dispatched from thence the next morning to the Edgar, and afterwards to the Duke of York, on board of which they went, leaving their canoe and attendants by the side of the same vessel.brother of the grandee of Old Town, In the mean time the people on board the other canoes were either distributed on board, or lying close to, the other ships.

"This being the situation of the three brothers, and of the principal inhabitants of the place, the treachery now began to appear. The crew of the Duke of York, aided by the captain and mates, and armed with pistols and cutJasses, rushed into the cabin, with an intent to seize the persons of their three innocent and unsuspicious guests. The unhappy men, alarmed at this violation of the rights of hospitality, and struck with astonishment at the behaviour of their supposed friends, attempted to escape through the cabin windows, but being wounded were obliged to desist, and to submit to be put in irons.

"Inthe same moment, in which this atrocious attempt had been made, an order had been given to fire upon the canoe, which was then lying by the side of the Duke of York. The canoe soon filled and sunk, and the wretched attendants were, either seized, killed, or drowned. Most of the other ships followed the example. Great numbers were additionally killed and drowned on the occasion, and others were swimming to the shore.

"At this juncture the inhabitants of New Town, who had concealed themselves in the bushes by the water side, and between whom and the commanders of the vessels the plan had been previously concerted, came out from their hiding-places, and, embarking in their canoes, made for such as were swimming from the fire of the ships. The ships' boats also were manned, and joined in the pursuit. They butchered

"The carnage, which I have been now describing, was scarcely over, when a canoe, full of the principal people of New Town, who had been the promoters of the scheme, dropped along-side of the Duke of York. They demanded the person of Amboe Robin John, the

and the eldest of the three on board. The unfortunate man put the palms of his hands together, and beseeched the commander of the vessel, that he would not violate the rights of hospitality by giving up an unoffending stranger to his enemies. But no entreaties could avail. The commander received from the New Town people a slave, of the name of Econg, in his stead, and then forced him into the canoe, where his head was immediately struck off in the sight of the crew, and of his afflicted and disconsolate brothers. As for them, they escaped his fate; but they were carried off with their attendants to the West In dies, and sold for slaves.

"The knowledge of this tragical event now fully confirmed me in the senti ment, that the heart of those, who were concerned in this traffic, became unusually hardened, and that I might readily believe any atrocities, however great, which might be related of them. It made also my blood boil as it were within me. It gave a new spring to my exertions. And I rejoiced, sorrowful as I otherwise was, that I had visited Bristol, if it had been only to gain an accurate statement of this one fact."

This detail is followed by another of the horrid treatment of the crew

of the Alfred by the incarnate devil its captain, who escaped in one instance the vengeance due to his crimes, by bribing the principal wit ness to disappear, and who would often boast, "how he had tricked the law on that occasion."

The author proceeds to give an account of his various journeys in

ear

different parts of the kingdom, and of his endeavours to interest his countrymen in forwarding his views in bringing about the abolition. A considerable number of petitions were at length presented to the house of Commons, and towards the end of the session, 1788 Mr. Wilberforce being indisposed, Mr. PITT after a few introductory observations on the importance of the subject, and declining to give his own opinion on the question of the abolition, moved, that the house should " "ly in the next session take the "circumstances of the slave trade, complained of in the petitions into "consideration." Mr. Fox expressed his open and decided condemnation of the trade, and his great surprise at the secrecy which Mr. Pitt had observed relative to his own opinion on this important subject. After a short debate the motion was carried. Shortly afterwards Sir W. DOLBEN introduced a bill for regulating the middle passage, and thereby somewhat alleviating those horrors, the result of the avarice and cruelty of the traders, attending the transportation of the miserable Africans from their own country to the West Indies. The bill after some resolute opposition in both houses from the friends to the trade in all its branches, and carried on to its full extent, was passed into a law. These dawnings of humanity inspired the friends of the abolition with the hope that their complete triumph would ere long be accomplished.

[To be concluded in our next.]

Brief Observations on the Address to his Majesty proposed by Earl Grey in the House of Lords, June 13th. 1310. By W. Roscoe, Esq. p. 44. Of the many and glaring inconsistencies of Lord Grey, ever since he, unhappily for his own character

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too apparent to admit of a doubt." It is true his lordship assures us of "his Majesty's readiness to conclude

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a peace, on just and reasonable "terms," and acknowledges "his "Majesty's just and moderate views." And at what period in the history of the world, we should be glad to know, did there ever exist a king, or the ministers of a king, who did not make the same professions; and which are, in general, similar to Lord Liverpool's professions on the subject of liberty: that staunch and uniform advocate of the slave trade, seldom arose for the purpose of opposing not only its abolition, but even its regulation, without declaring "that no one could be a greater "friend to the liberties of the human

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race than himself!" In like manner the war-loving PITT, whose iniquitous and impolitic measures, have produced more devastation throughout Europe, and brought more complicated miseries on his own country, than the measures of almost any other statesman ancient or modern, professed that his wars were waged in support of the peace and the liberties of mankind, and for the interests "of religion and social order"! All such professions being so uniformly contradicted in practice, cannot surely much longer delude beings pretending a claim to rationality.

See, in particular, Vol. VIII. p. v—x,

Mr. Roscoe then gives an extract from Lord Grey's address, in which his lordship appears, when speaking of the French Emperor, servilely to have copied that abusive nonsense which he once most justly and encrgetically reprobated. Who could have imagined that Lord Grey would ever have proposed or even consented to an address to his Majesty in the following terms?" That we are now reduced to the dilemma, either "that the attempt on our part to 26 open the door to a negociation, "would not conduce to the attainment

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enemy adopting a different system. If Bonaparte should imagine (which after the experience he has acquired by the violation of the treaty of Amiens on the part of the British cabinet, need not excite surprise) that the only end of our ministers in restoring peace is that they "may with

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more security pursue their plans" against the independence, and the existing government of France Should Bonaparte entertain this idea, what prospect of peace remains to this country?

To shew the folly of such a mode of reasoning is the design of our author, and that his arguments, powerful in themselves, are enforced in language pure and energetic, the following extracts will amply demonstrate.

"The question between the advocates of the war, and the friends of peace, is now fairly at issue. On the facts and circumstances on which their respective opinions are founded, they are perfectly agreed. The immense accession of power which our enemy has acquired in the course of the war, and the increasing difficuity of providing our own resources, are subjects not less expatiated upon by the promoters of the war, than by those who wish for its termination: but on this

occasion, as on many others, from the same premises, different persons have drawn different results. Those who are favourable to the continuance of the war, are of opinion that the successes of Bonaparte have given him so decided a superiority over us, that there can be he retains his power; and that it is more no safety, either in peace or war, whilst advisable to devote the remainder of our strength to the possibility of overturning him, than to consent to a reconciliation on any terms that can be proposed. Undoubtedly if that crisis be now ar▾ rived; if our enemies be so far aggrandized, and this country so far reduced by the present contest, that a pacification can only seal our destiny, and consign us over to slavery, dishonour, and contempt, it would be worse than folly, it would be the most detestable wickedmess, not to expend the last drop of our blood, rather than submit to such a disgrace. Fortunately however for us all, this alarming period is not yet arrived

which France may think proper to direct against us? Or shall we be so much. alarmed at our present circumstances, as to suppose there is no safety but in, desperation?

"Nor must it be understood that the depressing representations made respecting the condition and resources of this country, are to be admitted in an unqualified and unlimited sense. It is only when we contemplate the prosecution of the war, that we can be said to feel the insufficiency of our resources, or the difficulties of our situation. It is the immense expenditure of our military and naval establishments--the preparation of formidable and expensive expeditions

and it is precisely to prevent its arrival, that these considerations are offered to the public mind. That the first promoters and subsequent conductors of the war have done much to bring on such a crisis, must be admitted; but there are in this country powers of resistance which no misconduct of ministers can impair; energies which no concurrence of exterior circumstances can destroy; which depend not on the prosperity, or the disorder, of financial arrangements, but on the limbs and strength, on the hearts and minds of a people determined to be free. Whilst, therefore, the friends of peace, perceive, in its fullest extent, the additional power acquired by our enemy in the course of the war, they by the profuse and wanton manner in no means admit that his superiority is which the wealth of the nation is unaso great and so decisive, as to render the voidably expended and misapplied duestablishment of peace, upon safe and ring a state of warfare, that occasion honourable terms, an event beyond all this disproportion between our wants just and reasonable expectation. What and our supplies. Could we, for a momay be the consequence, if the same ment, allow ourselves to suppose, that steps which have hitherto been pursued, this enormous expenditure could, with should be persevered in to a further ex- safety to ourselves, be wholly, or even tent, they cannot indeed foresee; but in part avoided, our prospects would they entertain not a doubt that, under suddenly change, and we should discover the present circumstances, a reconcilia- that the difficulties by which we were tion might be effected, which should surrounded were not of an absolute and not only be consistent with the honour unalterable nature, but were merely the and interests of this country, but should result of a course of conduct which we place her beyond the apprehension of had prescribed to ourselves, and were danger from any power on earth. In determined at all events to pursue;— looking to the strength and resources of To every object of our own protection France, they are not so appalled as to -to every domestic improvement, and be forgetful of their own. If it be true, even to the liquidation of our immense that France has obtained the ascendancy incumbrances, the revenues of the counover continental Europe, it is equally try are abundantly sufficient. WE ARE true, that on the ocean this country is unrivalled. If the revenues of France, extracted from her extended population, be great, those of this country, which are supported not only by an active and industrious people, but by an inexhaustible foreign trade, are also great, and of a nature at least equally permanent. If a season of peace would give facilities to the further power and aggrandisement of France, it would afford them in a much greater degree to this country, which, from the excellence of her inanufactures, the extent of her mercantile capital, and the incalculable superiority of her fleets, is ready to enter on that career of national prosperity for which France is yet unprepared. Does it then follow, as an inevitable consequence, that because we are unable to overthrow the power of France, we are incompetent to defend ourselves from any attack

STRONG FOR PEACE, BUT WEAK FOR
WAR;

COMPETENT TO DEFEND OUR

SELVES FROM EVERY ATTACK THAT CAN

BE MADE AGAINST US; BUT INCOMPE-
TENT TO CHANGE THE DESTINY OF EU-
ROPE, OR TO DRAG ITS PRESENT RULER

FROM HIS IMPERIAL HEIGHT. To sup-
pose, therefore, that we are reduced to
such a state of debility by the war, as
to be rendered incapable of defending
ourselves, unless we can accomplish the
destruction of our enemies, is a pre-
sumption as remote from the truth, as it
ought to be from the apprehension of
every friend to his country."

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*

* *

*

* * * *

“That there should be a necessity, in the present times, to enforce by arguments, truths which are in themselves evident, is really melancholy; but such is the dread of the power of France that has pervaded every rank and de

scription of persons in this country, that they dare no longer trust, either to the dictates of their own reason, or to the evidence of their senses. Let us, however, suppose, in compliment to their apprehensions, that on some dark winter's night, during the interval of a treacherous peace, a naval force should be provided by our enemies, which at break of day should land a numerous army on our own shores-Is there a British head or a British heart, that in contemplating the achievements of our countrymen in Egypt, in Italy, in Spain, in every part of the globe in which they have been placed in hostile array against the enemy, could feel a doubt of the result? But if such have been their courage and success in distant lands, what would be their efforts on their own shores, against an enemy whose power they have defied, whose superiority they scorn, and whose treachery they would detest? If under the supposition of an event, the occurrence of which defies probability, and outrages common sense -the invasion of England by France in a time of profound peace-we should for one moment despair of making an effectual resistance, or of inflicting upon our invaders a deserved and speedy vengeance, we are already ripe for the yoke, and ought to submit, without a murmur, to any fate that may await us. "Fear has, however, no bounds, and national fears act as an epidemic. It my therefore, perhaps, be said, that although no avowed preparations may, during a state of peace, be made by Frauce for the destruction of this country, yet that such a state will afford our enemies an opportunity of building a navy, in the various ports now under their authority, to he ready for effecting their purpose in case of a rupture, the causes of which are always in the power of either party. This, however is, in fact, only a recurrence to the former argument, and consequently admits of a similar reply. Ships cannot be built, and navies formed in secret; and if such preparations were made, beyond the extent which the exigencies of a country in a state of peace might require, they would first become the proper object of remonstrance, and, for want of explanation, of hostile interference, upon the admitted principle before stated; but, independent of this, it may justly be observed, that the period of peace is not the time in which a navy can be

formed. It is not hulks, and ropes, and canvas alone that constitute a navy; in order to render it complete and formidaable, skilful commanders and hardy and experienced seamen are required, and these can only be obtained by a long course of hostile discipline. That France should ever arrive at such a degree of maritime power as to become formidable to this country, there is but one chance, and that is, by our continuance of the present war. In the early periods of her revolution, France was not less inferior to her numerous adversaries in military strength, resources and experience, than she is now in naval power to this country; yet, being driven on by her enemies either to submission or resistance, she has, amidst dangers and calamities, internal dissention and external war, fought her way through derision, defeat, and disgrace, not only to victory and independence, but to an unexampled degree of military power and glory. In admiting therefore with Lord Grey, that our enemy now holds at his disposal the resources of all those maritime powers, who, in former times, have even disputed with ourselves the empire of the seas, let us not wantonly and unnecessarily compel him, for his own defence, to call those powers into ac tion. After having united with our allies to render him great by land, let us now at least take care that we do not render him great by sea. At present his navies are growing in the woods, and his seamen tilling the fields, or filling the ranks of his armies. Let us be cautious how we compel them to appear in more formidable situations. Men act not without motives; and without our hostility, our adversary can have no adequate reason for engaging in the task of forming a naval establishment that may rival that of this country. In the present situation of the globe, he is already superior to every other naval power, and can therefore entertain no fear but from ourselves. Even our maritime strength is to him no legitimate object of envy. Ships, colonies, and commerce, which are to us of indispensible necessity, are to him only of secondary importance. The attempt to attain them would only involve him in new contests, which it is his true interest to avoid; and notwithstanding his memorable language respecting them, which produced such a sensation in this country, there is little probability of his directing his efforts to

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