direction to that by which we expected them. It was, I suppose, some peculiar echo from the Vitosh. After seeing M. Tsanoff (Minister for Foreign Affairs), I sent him to the Russian Agency for advice, and then returned myself to the battle. Tsanoff was badly received, and all he got was a shrug of the shoulders, and a curt rejoinder-Even if the Serbs were already at the gates, as they will be soon, I will undertake to send them back if your Ministry will depose Prince Alexander.' This was not to be thought of, and he left at once in a rage. At five o'clock he received my telegram announcing our complete victory. He jumped into a carriage, and, with my message in his hand, went straight to the Legation. There he found M. Koyander, with all his staff, and several ladies, taking their afternoon tea in the drawing-room. Congratulate us,' he cried, as he entered, we have won the day.' 'Impossible ! What a shame!' was Koyander's reply. That was all the sympathy we had from our Russian protectors."

The next house to the Russian Legation is that of Madame Teneff, once Madame Panitza. It was the scene of the theatrical arrest of the Major by the Prime Minister himself in the dead of night. The danger of the partially revealed plot was imminent and of unknown proportions, and Panitza's violent character made the question of his seizure a difficult one. There was no time to lose, and rather than trust to subordinate officials who might be either in league with the culprit or cowed by his bluster, M. Stamboloff decided to act himself. Unarmed and alone he entered the bedroom, and bade Panitza follow him as his prisoner. A loaded revolver was lying on a table beside the bed, but the desperado never thought of resisting the cool command of a courage superior to his own. It would be hard to find a better instance of the power of moral prestige. A friend of Panitza's afterward asked his wife why she at least had not seized the opportunity and "shot down the ruffian," adding that it would have been quite legitimate, since Stamboloff's presence was burglarious. But the same supreme disregard of personal danger which had paralyzed the man had also subdued the woman. Then comes the Hotel Vitosh, once kept by Arnaoudoff, who, convicted of participation in the

conspiracy, was expelled. It was a wellknown rendezvous for revolutionaries, and is now closed awaiting better times. When the Russian Legation takes down its shutters, the Hotel Vitosh may follow suit. Going on, we have the Octroi Station on the left, and the house of M. Grékoff, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the right. Lower down, the new club house of the "Slavianska Beséda," where a Bohemian opera troupe perforins on such nights as the great hall is not engaged for public balls, and on the right the Union Club, of more modest appearance, the daily resort of most of the diplomatic corps and resident foreigners, with an equal contingent of leading Bulgarians. Next door lives M. Guesshoff, ex-Minister of Finance and a brilliant scholar, and we pass the Italian Legation with its familiar tame eagle in the courtyard, to come to the Central Post and Telegraph Station. Nearly opposite is the Utchastuk, or guardhouse, where Panitza was confined after his attempt to bribe the jailers of the Black Mosque. It was here that by special favor I had an interview with him before the trial commenced, in order to obtain denial or confirmation of the stories that were being circulated of his maltreatment. These he denied totally, and seemed in good health, with that confidence in his own salvation which prisoners in his case so often display. Lastly, at the right-hand bottom corner of the street proper, before it winds away to lose itself in the fields, lies the house of the Prime Minister himself.

The

It is a small unpretentious whitewashed villa with green venetians and nothing to mark it from a hundred similar ones except the presence of the sentries who patrol the two sides open to the road. visitor hands his card to one of these, who rings and passes it through the door opened just half-an-inch wide. In a minute comes the answer, either "cannot receive" or walk in." The short halt on the doorstep represents the usual half hour or more cut to waste in a Salle des Pas perdus, and the guest enters forthwith. If somebody is already engaged with the master of the house, he is shown into a side room with a table and a couple of chairs, looking out into the back garden, where a peasant girl is hanging out the clothes on the bushes to dry. There is never long to wait, though, before the

One

communicating door opens and a cheery voice invites him to pass. After the usual handshake M. Stamboloff subsides into a rocking chair, and if in a happy mood, talks and rocks indefinitely till disturbed by a fresh call. The study where he receives is the cosey room of a worker. angle is crossed by the writing table under which a magnificent bearskin carpets the floor, and a repeating rifle leans against the wall ready to hand. The plain deal boards on trestles which take up another side of the room are littered with maps and plans for the ports of Varna and Bourgas, and various municipal schemes, together with a heterogeneous pile of the day's letters and telegrams, which arrive every few moments. A huge cupboard full of State papers and surmounted by a stuffed owl completes the furniture. In personal appearance M. Stamboloff is short and thick-set, with a rapidly growing tendency to stoutness. He was once very thin: "before he married," as he remarks with a twinkle in his eyes; but marriage and the quiet of home, in exchange for the somewhat riotous living of his youth, have marvellously agreed with him. His hair is thinning over his capacious forehead and is clipped close on his cheeks, leaving a small imperial, and mustache not thick enough to hide the mouth. His eyes are small and set deep under heavy brows, while he has a habit of half closing them, which makes them look smaller still. It is only when angered that they open fully and blaze like flame. His voice is low but clear, and his usual delivery rapid. In ordinary talk, he seldom raises his monotone, but in public speaking, or when animated, his organ is flexible, and, aided by look and gesture, very expressive.

Such is a rough sketch of the outer man on whose energy and self-control the fate of the Balkan Peninsula has really depended for several years past. Any swerving from the policy he has upheld would quickly embroil Bulgaria with her neighbors; any false step toward the Powers might bring about a general war. It requires inexhaustible patience to deal with provocations from Bulgaria's equals among the nations, and no common firmness to resist alike threats and promises from her superiors. These qualities M. Stamboloff possesses to an extraordinary degree, all the more extraordinary when

we consider that the earlier years of his life were passed as an artisan and an exile, and that they were called into requisition and put to the supremest tests before he had reached the age when most of our European statesmen had only begun their training. Even now he is only five-andthirty, having already been in possession of alinost dictatorial powers for three years.

For M. Stamboloff's policy and manner of carrying it out, I cannot do better than quote his own words from my note-book, where I find him saying on March 1st, 1890:

"The story of our trying to dissemble Russian participation in the Panitza plot is most ridiculous. Indeed I do not know what we could do that we have not done, and that we are not doing, to show our contempt for Russia, and our resolve not to be bullied by her. We are a little State, but we form an impenetrable barrier, so long as we subsist, to Russian advance. My own idea was, long before I came to power, and will be to the end, though I may never see its realization, a Confederation of the Balkan States. Singly, it seems to me, they must inevitably fall, and when they are out of the way Russia can do what she likes with Constantinople. And just as we are necessary to Constantinople, so are the Turks necessary to us. Another power at Stamboul, Russia, England, Germany-any other, would mean the end of Balkan nationalities. We are anxious to keep up the bond with Turkey if she will only for once shake off her lethargy and indecision and help us. We want no material help, but merely the moral support of her recognition of our status. It has cost us enough to arrive at what we are, and it has cost Turkey nothing. I am urged to declare the independence at once, but I may tell you that we have appealed to the Porte lately, within the last fortnight, to recognize the Prince. We have no answer; I do not suppose we shall get one. It is the eternal shilly shally of Stamboul which ruins them and us. If, however, the Porte refuses, I do not say that we shall not be forced to declare ourselves free. How would it be done? Not openly at first, but merely by omitting to pay the tribute. This would open the door to official explanations, and we could, and should, say that if the parent threw off the child, the child would decline any longer

to recognize the parent. I do not know what the result would be at first, but I am sure that all Bulgaria would be with us. The present situation is so intolerable that it cannot last. Leaving the Government out of the question, the strain on the Prince is prodigious. It is not fair to him to have to run all the risks and bear all the burdens of Prince of Bulgaria without being recognized as such. There are very few men who would do it. I may frankly say that I doubt if I would myself, but he has determined never to leave, and you may be quite sure that he will die at Sofia, whether as recognized Prince or uncrowned ruler. And why, in Heaven's name, should not the Powers agree to his recognition? It is merely the timidity of Turkey and the rage of Russia, both hypocritically backing themselves up by the Berlin Treaty. It has been infringed often enough for us not to have any very delicate scruples about the letter of it. The spirit of the infraction -as far at least as Bulgaria is concerned -was recognized years ago. The fact is, that Russia has been mistaken all through about Bulgaria. Her first idea was to get hold of Servia, but failing there, she hoped to get a tool in a new State, which she created for no other purpose, quite forgetting that when once endowed with political shape and form and material strength, Bulgaria had brains to see that salvation lay, not with Russia, but rather with Turkey. Russia has never yet been able to swallow this pill, but with idiotic obstinacy continues to attempt to blindfold and gag us, and to persuade all Europe that we ought to be nothing else than an advanced guard for her.

At this time things were wearing rather a dispiriting aspect, and from the preceding conversation it will be seen that the mind of the Premier was already more than half made up concerning the despatch of the final note some months later demanding the appointment of the Macedonian bishops and the recognition of the Prince, of which more anon. He has often been blamed for precipitancy in the election of Prince Ferdinand against Russia's expressed disapproval, and on this head I find him saying: "We had immense difficulties in the past under the Regency, before electing a prince. All the foreign diplomatic agents tried to dissuade me from the step. But my argu

ment was that a regency represented essentially, by its very nature, a temporary and provisional rule, and it was not under a regency that Bulgaria could ever hope. to be free. We must have a prince, with a prospect of a dynasty, and it was not easy to find one. At first we wanted King Charles of Roumania. We offered him the throne, but he refused. At one time we would even have taken King Milan, not knowing his character, but after the Servian war it was impossible to put the king of the vanquished over us the victors, and we were lucky to have been saved from him." And again, on another occasion-"As far as Bulgaria internally is concerned everybody recognizes the Prince, who was duly elected by ourselves in National Assembly. The only reason, in fact, I want him recognized by the Porte, is to be able to shake the people's belief in the prestige of Russia. They have been accustomed to look on the power of Russia as next, and nearly equal, to that of God. Russia has said that Prince Ferdinand shall not be recognized, and I wish to show that Russia's word is not infallible nor her will omnipotent.'

A few days after the despatch of the first spring note M. Stamboloff said, "When M. Vulkovitch handed my letter to the Grand Vizier he was probably somewhat disturbed, and communicated his feelings to the ambassadors. It was thus that it reached Berlin. Up till now no notice has been taken of our request. I remain entirely of the same opinions which I have already expressed. Some Ministers merely retain their portfolios for the glory of sitting in the seat of office, but one who undertakes the duties with the will and determination of doing his best for the country, does not shrink from responsibility. I have never shrunk from mine, and never will, and I repeat that unless the Porte makes concessions, we will declare our independence. It promised three years ago to recognize the prince we should elect, and it has never done so. I do not fear the consequences of declaring independence so much as those of inaction. If his Majesty the Sultan were to write to me three hundred times that he would declare war, I should not believe it. Because what could he gain? Merely, at the very uttermost, the re-establishment of the status quo of the Treaty of

Berlin-viz., a discontented Eastern Roumelia, which would inevitably wait and watch for the day when it could once more unite with us in a Bulgaria which would never again be content to remain as it began first. In other words, the Porte would re-enter into the enjoyment of its tribute of three millions (which would be paid much more regularly if it recognized the Prince), and which, in any case, are of no personal value to the Sultan, since they go direct to the pockets of foreign bondholders. Putting aside, for argument's sake, the easy alternative of recognition, and supposing the case of our throwing off the suzerainty, would it be worth while for the Porte to make war for its miserable three millions, which are all that it would lose, and to really advance Russia to a hundred kilometres of Constantinople? And would the other Powers permit her to declare war for such an object? I will even allow, if you like, that the Powers will be furious with us, and leave us to fight it out with Turkey. There are precedents which show that tens of thousands have beaten hundreds of thousands. Take Shahin Pasha, with his ten thousand men at Adrianople, who utterly routed the hundred thousand opposed to him, and pursued them to Philippopolis. Still I do not say that we should beat the Turks, but our army would give them a great deal of trouble, and we should fight it out to the bitter end if it came to an invasion. And if we were conquered we should not be worse off than before-that is, we should immediately find ourselves in the predicament we are now struggling to avoid a Russian occupation, for that is what would ensue very quickly if the Turks attacked us. I need not go on with this side of the question. The pros and cons are as plain to you as to me. In imagining the possibility of a war with Turkey, I am stretching my fancy a long way, for I do not believe it could ever happen. We are destined to be friends, and I am confident that we shall become So. And later, on the same subject. "Cæteris paribus, Bulgaria will prefer the risk of war to the risk of a Russian occupation, the more so as the latter is approaching within measurable distance, and I am not at all sure that the proclamation of independence would bring about war. At least not with Turkey. With Servia! Yes. I am tolerably sure that as soon as

we proclaimed we should be attacked by Servia, urged on by Russia, unless, and it is a big unless, Austria threatened Belgrade. You can understand that Austria could hardly look on with indifference at a Russian Servia conquering Bulgaria. I believe Passitch is now arranging for some such eventuality at St Petersburg. We shall at any rate not make any decisive move without being well prepared. As for Passitch, I have a great contempt for him. I expelled him once from Bulgaria as a vagabond, and last summer he came here without any official character, not then being even President of the Skupshtina, as he is now. He called on me, and proposed to me to act with Servia in seizing Macedonia, and dividing it between us. I replied that before dividing other countries, it behooved us to look to our own, that at present neither did Servia belong to the Serbs, nor Bulgaria to the Bulgars. At this he stared openmouthed. I added that it might be pleasant enough to make an excursion into Macedonia, but simultaneously Russia might make her appearance at Varna, and Austria at Belgrade, and therefore for the present, instead of tearing each other's crests like fighting cocks, for the amusement of the Great Powers, or making bootless filibustering expeditions, we had better take more care at home. For the rest I bade him note that whereas I was a minister he was nobody, and I declined to discuss the field of general politics with him. He then asked what message he was to take back to General Griutch, and I replied to give him my best wishes and advice above all things to restrain his ardor. That sort of unaccredited, irresponsible agent is a very dangerous instrument to meddle with. I remember when Kaulbars was here that he sent me a message that I was to receive a certain Bogdanoff, and make future arrangements with him. At that time I was lodged at the telegraph office from morning till night, and I answered that not only would I not treat with him, but I refused to have any intercourse with such a scoundrel, and I gave strict orders he should not be allowed inside the office.'

Again during the progress of the Panitza trial, which was a most anxious time for the Government, M. Stamboloff, ferring to the machinations of Russia and the masterly inaction of the Powers, who

re

seemed to take it all as a matter of course, put forth his reasons for decisive action as follows:

"I have been waiting for the great European war for five years now, knowing that it will settle once and for all the Eastern Question. Ever since 1876 we have been told that it is imminent, and I have been holding on, but I do not really see that it is much nearer now than then. There are no tangible signs given by the Great Powers of anything but an immense desire for peace at any price-the price to be paid by the small fry! They can afford to wait and sacrifice us while they are getting ready; but our point of view is different. It is for this reason that I foresee that if nobody will help us we shall be forced to make a bid for our independence, for we cannot continue the game of patience much longer, with our hands tied, while Russia is actively undermining the roots of our national liberty. I shall not tell anybody exactly when I shall take the step. It will not be this year, except under unbearable pressure. We can resist for three years longer, perhaps even for five, without recognition of the Prince or independence, but it would be a perpetual struggle and watch. You must understand that it is not for the Prince, nor the Government, nor the people that I must declare. It is for the army. Prince Alexander fell through shutting his eyes to the possibility of treason. Two months before his abdication I was with him at Tirnovo, and he expressed his fears of a revolt among the population of Eastern Roumelia. Sire,' I answered, 'there neither is, nor ever will be, danger from the people. It is from the army that you may look for it.' He turned his back upon me in anger, declaring his children' would never be false to him. He was always repeating his faith in his children.' Afterward, when we two were seated in the victoria which was conveying him on his last journey out of Bulgaria, I reminded him of our talk. He hid his face in his hands, and muttered: Ah! yes, you were right, and knew them better than I did; but I could never have believed it.'"'

เ

Continuing from my notes I find him saying, in discussing the evidence brought to light at the Panitza trial: "The first thing I heard on my return from Philippopolis was that a letter from Zankoff had

been found among the papers of the old man Kissimoff, Chancellor of the Red Cross Society. It is curious how he could keep such a compromising document, after the arrest of his son only four or five days previously. It reminds me of the time when I was an exile in Roumania, and I knew a notorious bandit who had committed numberless murders. He always carried about him, in a back pocket, a dagger with which he had killed fourteen people. I once asked him what was the good of doing so, as it might serve as evidence against him some day. He answered that truly it was no good to him, but it brought him good luck. Just so, also, the other day we found a heap of Russian correspondence, neatly tied up and docketted, at Ozunoff's. When interrogated how he could be such a fool, he explained that he had thought perhaps the Russians might come some day, and they would prove how he had served them. Talking of Roumania brings back to me a comical scene which I once had in the Café Salis, at Bucharest. I was, with many other Bulgarians at that time, a political refugee, and one of the local papers published an article saying that all of us were either fugitives from motives of cowardice, or else traitors working against our country. This was exactly the opposite of the truth, as we had come there in order to work the better, as the result proved. At any rate, I demanded from the editor the name of the writer of the article in question, and he said he would give it me that evening at seven o'clock in the café. When he came though he refused to tell me, so I said: 'Then you are responsible, and as I know if I challenged you to a duel you would not accept, I will force you to challenge me,' and struck him several times, ending up by spitting in his face. The orchestra stopped playing, and there was a great hubbub in the café, but I never heard any more from my editor. There are some affairs which need quicker reparation than any tribunals can give. I myself have four times challenged men to a duel, and each time publicly chastised them on their refusal.

With two more characteristic little speeches I will leave M. Stamboloff. The first was at the close of the Court Martial :—

"I am vexed at the result of the Court