more powerful means applied in hell, should not be productive of the same effect, in a single instance, within so long a period as a thousand years. That none are to be delivered out of hell, within a thousand years after the general judgment, is explicitly taught by Dr. C. His words are, "This period," (a thousand years) "must run out, before the wicked dead could any of them live as kings and priests with Christ.”* We all doubtless believe, that many sinners die impenitent, who are not the subjects of depravity and hardness of heart vastly greater, than are in some, who are brought to repentance in this life. Now put the case of the class of sinners, who are the subjects of a depravity and hardness of heart, the very next in degree to that of the most depraved of those who are brought to repentance in this life. Is it reasonable to believe, that these cannot be brought to repentance, even by the most powerful means of grace enjoyed in hell, within a less time than a thousand years? If it be not reasonable to believe this, then it is not reasonable to believe Dr. C's scheme of disciplinary punishment. 15. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. This death is understood by Dr. C. and other advocates for universal salvation, to mean the second death. Then the second death is doubtless an enemy. But if it consist in a necessary discipline, the most wise and wholesome, the most conducive to the good of the recipients, and to the divine glory, which the wisdom of God can devise; surely it is no enemy either to God or the recipients; but is a perfect friend to both. With what truth then could the apostle call it an enemy? 16. The scripture, so far from declaring those who suffer chastisement and disciplinary pains, accursed, merely on that account, expressly declares them blessed. Ps. 94: 12, "Blessed is the man whom thou chastenest, O Lord, and teachest him out of thy law; that thou mayest give him rest from the days of adversity." But where are the damned ever said to be blessed? They are constantly declared to be accursed. Heb. 12: 5-9, "Ye have forgotten the exhortation, which speaketh to you, as unto children, my son, despise not thou the chastening of the Lord, nor faint when thou art rebuked of him. For whom the Lord loveth, he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth. If ye endure chastening, God dealeth with you as with For what son is he whom the Father chasteneth not? But if ye be without chastisement, whereof all are partakers, then are ye bastards and not sons.' This passage evidently considers those who suffer chastisement from the hand of God, as his chil sons. * Page 402. dren, his sons. If therefore the damned suffer a mere chastisement, they are not accursed, but are the blessed sons or children of God. But are they ever so called in scripture? Beside; this passage evidently supposes, that some men do not suffer fatherly chastisement, of which all the sons or children of God are partakers; and expressly declares, that such as do not suffer it are bastards and not sons; which seems not to agree with the idea, that all the damned, will by fatherly chastisement be brought to final salvation. If no other punishment be inflicted by God, than fatherly chastisement, then there are no bastards in the universe. Yet it is evidently supposed in this text, that there are bastards. Heb. 10: 28, "He that despised Moses' law died without mercy-of how much sorer punishment shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the son of God?" etc. But if all who die impenitent, be sent to a state of discipline most excellently adapted to their good and salvation, no man dies without mercy. This discipline itself is the greatest mercy which can, in their state of mind, be bestowed upon them. With respect to the same subject, it is said, Heb. 2: 2, "That every transgression and disobedience, received a just recompense of reward." A just recompense, is a punishment adequate to the demands of justice; and this, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, cannot be a mere merciful discipline. 17. If the punishment of hell be a mere wholesome discipline, then what the apostle says of the discipline of christians in this life, may be said with equal truth and propriety of the punishment of the damned; thus, We glory in damnation; knowing that damnation worketh repentance, and repentance salvation. 18. If no other than a disciplinary punishment be consistent with the divine goodness; surely the requirement of an atonement in order to pardon is unaccountable. The doctrine of atonement, and of the necessity of it to pardon and salvation, is abundantly holden by Dr. C. He says, "Jesus Christ is the person upon whose account happiness is attainable by the human race."* He speaks of the "sacrifice of himself," which Christ" offered up to God to put away sin."+ "The obedience of Christ to death, is the ground or reason upon which it hath pleased God to make happiness attainable by any of the race of Adam."1 "By thus submitting to die, he" (Jesus) "made atonement, not only for the original lapse, but for all the sins this would be introductory to." "Christ was sent into the world to make way for the wise, just and holy exercise of mercy towards the sinful sons of men."|| "The only begotten Son of God both Page 17. p. 18. p. 19. § 5 Dissertations, p. 245. || Ib. p. 247. did and suffered everything that was necessary, in order to a righteousness on account of which God might, in consistency with the honor of his perfections, and the authority of his law, make the grant of life. Accordingly this meritorious righteousness is that for the sake of which, upon the account of which, this blessing is conferred." According to Dr. C. then, Christ hath not only made atonement by his obedience and death, but that atonement was necessary to the wise, just and holy exercise of mercy to the sinner; and without that atonement, saving mercy could not have been exercised toward the sinner, in a consistency with wisdom, justice and holiness, or the honor of the divine perfections, or the authority of the divine law and government. The constitution therefore, by which salvation can be obtained in no other way than in consequence and on account of his obedience and death, is not only consistent with wisdom, holiness, justice, yea, all the divine perfections, and the authority of the divine law and government; but it was required by them all. But the sufferings and death of Christ, or his atonement, is no discipline of the sinner. They are as foreign from it as the vindictive punishment of the sinner himself. The atonement, as Dr. C. hath explained it, makes way for the wise, just and holy exercise of mercy toward the sinner. It was therefore designed to satisfy the divine wisdom, justice and holiness. It was designed to make the grant of life to the sinner consistent with the honor of the divine perfections, and the authority of the divine law and government. And if our Lord Jesus Christ might, in the behalf of the sinner, be made to suffer in order to satisfy divine justice; why may not the sinner himself be made to suffer for the same end? If Christ have, on the behalf of sinners, suffered for the end of supporting the authority of the divine law and government; what reason can be assigned, why it should be inconsistent with any attribute of the Deity, that sinners themselves should be made to suffer for the same end? But this would be a proper vindictive punishment. Therefore Dr. C. is entirely inconsistent with himself, in allowing the atonement of Christ, in the terms before quoted; and yet denying the reasonableness of a vindictive punishment, or its consistency with the divine perfections. 19. We are assured, "that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are called according to his purpose," Rom. 8: 28. But this implies, that all things do not work for good, to them who love not God. Yet all things do work for their good, if they suffer no other than a disciplinary punishment. Concerning those who are Christ's, it is said, that "all things are theirs; whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come; all are theirs," 1 Cor. 3: 21, 22. But on the supposition, that all punishment is disciplinary, it is equally true concerning all mankind, that all things present and to come are theirs. Yet this is not said, but the contrary is implied in that it is said of those only who are Christ's or are Christians, that all things are theirs. 20. I argue from those words of the wise man, Eccl. 9: 10, "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might; for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom in the grave whither thou goest." If future punishment be disciplinary, the damned are in a state of probation, and may and will so exercise their rational powers, as shall finally issue in their salvation. But can this be reconciled with the words of Solomon, that in the future state, there is no work to be done, no device to be invented, no knowledge or wisdom to be exercised by us, to the accomplishment of what we now leave undone? This is manifestly the argument, by which he presses on us the present diligent discharge of our duty; and this argument would be utterly inconclusive, if there were another state, in which what our hand now findeth to do, might be done. Of similar import is John 9: 4, "I must work the works of him that sent me, while it is day; the night cometh when no man can work. As long as I am in the world, I am the light of the world." That our Lord, by the day, means this life, is manifest by the last words of the quotation. But if in the future state no man can work, the future state is not a state of probation. To these I may add, Gen. 6: 3, "My spirit shall not always strive with man-yet his days shall be an hundred and twenty years." As if it had been said, my spirit shall not always strive with man; yet he shall strive with him an hundred and twenty years, and no longer; for so long only shall his days be continued. But how is this consistent with the idea, that God will be striving with man, for ages of ages after his days shall have elapsed? Objection 1. If to some part of the foregoing reasoning it be objected, that it supposes future punishment to be merely disciplinary, and designed to subserve no other end, than the repentance of the sinner; whereas it is granted, that God may and will inflict vindictive punishment, but not a punishment merely vindictive; that he may take vengeance of the sinner, provided at the same time he aim at the good of the sinner ;-to this I answer: 1. That in this objection it is granted, that God may and will inflict on the damned a punishment properly vindictive, a punishment over and above that which is conducive to the personal good of the sinner. But this is to grant all which is pleaded for in this chapter, and all which at present is attempted to be proved. 2. If the meaning of this objection be, that God may inflict vengeance, provided he do it with a sole view to the good of the sinner, it confutes itself; it seems to grant something, but in reality it grants nothing. It seems to admit a proper vindictive punishment, but really admits no punishment besides that which is merely disciplinary. For to talk of inflicting vengeance with a sole view to the good of the subject, can mean nothing more than to inflict pain with a sole view to the good of the subject; and this is nothing more than a punishment merely disciplinary ; if God show displeasure with a sole view to the good of the sinner, this is mere discipline. 3. If the meaning of this objection be, that God may consistently with his perfections, inflict a proper vindictive punishment, provided at the same time that he is aiming at a proper vindication of his broken law and despised government, he aim at the good of the sinner also; I answer, if it be right and consistent with the perfections of God, to vindicate his law and government, there is no necessity of bringing in the aid of another motive or design, to make it right or consistent with his perfections. If on the other hand, it be not in itself right to vindicate his law and government, no other affections, views or actions, however right and benevolent, co-existing with the supposed vindication, can atone for it, or make it right. To illustrate this by an example:-A parent has a disobedient child; and it is become necessary both for the good of the child, and for the support of the parent's authority in his family in general, and over his child in particular, that he be properly punished. Accordingly from both these motives, the good of the child and the support of his own authority, the parent inflicts the proper punishment. This according to the objection now before us is right. But according to the same objection, if the child be desperate and there be no prospect of effecting his good by punishment, it is not consistent with the character of a good parent to inflict the same punishment, from the motives of supporting his own government and the good of the family only. If this action done from these motives only, be a wrong action, it is still |