what then? Why the Doctor" upon the closest examination cannot find any change in the operativeness of his mind." Be it so; yet as it is supposed, that his mind is the subject of a new act, he can doubtless find a change in the act of his mind; and if he cannot find a change in the operativeness of it, it must be because operativeness, which is a peculiar and favorite word with the Doctor, means something different from act, and therefore is nothing to the present purpose, as the subject under consideration is the production of a new act by the Deity. And we do not pretend, that when the Deity produces a new act in the mind, he produces a new operativeness too, unless act and operativeness be the same. If they be the same, whenever the Doctor can perceive a change in the act of his mind, he can doubtless perceive a change in the operativeness of it.

The Doctor thinks he has said something new concerning his favorite word operativeness. But I see nothing new or important in it, unless it be a new word used in an ambiguous manner.

"I say, that the operativeness of the mind on different objects is always uniformly one and the same thing, and not that there are as many operations, as there are objects on which the mind acts." Here it is manifest, that the Doctor uses the word operativeness as synonymous with operation, otherwise he is guilty of the most gross equivocation. And is it indeed one and the same operation of mind to love virtue and love roast beef? To choose the service of God and choose a pine-apple? This is new indeed. In this, I presume the Doctor is an original!

5. My actions are mine; but in what sense can they be properly called mine, if I be not the efficient cause of them? Answer my thoughts and all my perceptions and feelings are mine; yet it will not be pretended, that I am the efficient of them all.

6.. It is said to be self-evident, that absolute necessity is inconsistent with liberty. Answer: This wholly depends on the meaning of the words liberty and necessity. Absolute natural necessity is allowed to be inconsistent with liberty; but the same concession is not made with regard to absolute moral necessity. All that is requisite to answer this and such like objections is to explain the words liberty and necessity. If by liberty be meant uncertainty, undoubtedly absolute moral necessity, which is the certainty of a moral event, is utterly inconsistent with liberty. But if by liberty be meant exemption from natural necessity, there is not the least inconsistence between the most absolute moral necessity and the most perfect freedom or exemption from natural necessity. The most perfect exemption from natural necessity is * Page 13.

consistent with the most absolute previous certainty of a moral action. Judas in betraying his Lord "according to the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God," was entirely exempted from natural necessity; yet his conduct was according to an absolute previous certainty.

7. That we have liberty of self-determination is argued from our moral discernment, or sense of right and wrong and of desert of praise and blame. And some are so confident of the sufficiency of this argument against moral necessity, that they are willing to rest the whole cause on this single point. It is therefore a very important point. It is said, that our estimating the moral character of the man, from his internal dispositions and acts, is on the supposition, that these are within the power of the man. But the word power is equivocal; if it mean natural power, and that the agent is under no natural inability, (as before explained) to other dispositions and acts; it is granted, that in this sense they are in his power. But if it mean, that there was no previous certainty, that he would have those very dispositions and acts; and that no man will or can reasonably blame himself or another but in case of a perfect previous uncertainty with respect to those dispositions and acts; this is not granted, nor is it proved.

It is said, that no man ever did commend or blame himself for what he knew to be necessary and unavoidable, not within his power, or not determined by himself. This stripped of the ambiguity of words is this merely; that no man ever did commend or blame himself for what he knew to be previously certain, and was not entirely casual. But this is manifestly false; because every man knows or may know, that all things are previously certain, as they are the objects of the infallible foreknowledge of God. And if no man can commend or blame himself for what is previously certain, no man can commend or blame himself, for anything.

Will it be pretended, that we are more blamable for an action, which is previously uncertain and casual, and which we perform by chance without motive, end or design, than for that which is previously certain and future, and which we do from motive, and with an end and design? Take the instance of Judas' treachery. The fact is, that this treachery was previously certain and infallibly foreknown by God. Now, was Judas less blamable than if his conduct had been previously uncertain, and had taken place by pure chance? To say, that he was blamable, if this conduct proceeded from self-determination, affords no satisfaction, unless this self-determination were by chance. For otherwise the selfdetermining act was previously certain and morally necessary,

and therefore liable to all the objections, which are brought against moral necessity in any case.

Blameworthiness is nothing but moral turpitude or odiousness; praiseworthiness is nothing but moral amiableness or excellence. But the moral amiableness of an action does not depend on the circumstance, that it is efficiently caused by ourselves; because this runs into the absurdity and impossibility of an infinite series of actions causing one another. Nor does it depend on this circumstance, that the action is, as Dr. West holds, uncaused; for no actions of creatures fall under this description. Either of those hypotheses would shut moral amiableness and odiousness out of the world.

That moral necessity or previous certainty of moral conduct is consistent with moral discernment, may be argued from the case of the saints and angels in heaven. It will not be pretended, but that there is a certainty, that they will continue in their state of perfect holiness and happiness to eternity. Nor will it be pretended, but that they are the subjects of moral discernment and of that virtue and holiness which is truly amiable in the moral sense, and the proper object of approbation and reward. Therefore moral necessity is not inconsistent with praise and blame.

I need not insist on the necessary holiness of God and of our Lord Jesus Christ.

The writers in opposition to moral necessity insist much on its inconsistence with accountableness. This is really no other than to insist, that it is inconsistent with praise and blame or with moral agency; and is the same objection, which we have been considering. To be accountable is to be liable to be called to an account for an action, and to be the proper subject of reward or punishment. But this is no other than to be worthy of praise or blame, and to deserve love or hatred, complacency or disapprobation, on account of moral temper or conduct. So that what has been said concerning praise and blame, is equally applicable to accountableness.

It has been long since shown by President Edwards, that the moral amiableness and odiousness of actions, and their desert of praise or blame, or the essence of virtue and vice, depend not on the circumstance, that actions are efficiently caused by the subject; but that the acts themselves, without any consideration of their efficient cause, are amiable or odious. As otherwise virtue and vice will be thrown back from the caused act, to the causing act, till they are thrown out of the universe. If they consist not in acts of the will themselves, but in the acts by which they are caused, as these causing acts are also caused, virtue and vice

must for the same reason consist not in them, but those by which they are caused, and so on to an act which is not caused. But this being not caused by the subject, can, on the principle of our opponents, have no virtue or vice in it. Thus there would be no place found in the universe for virtue and vice. Not in the caused acts, because virtue and vice consist not in them, but in their cause. Not in any uncaused act or acts, because they, by the supposition, are not caused by their subject. There is no way to avoid this consequence, but to allow that virtue and vice, desert of praise and blame, consist, in the acts themselves and not in their cause; or if there be any virtue or vice in the cause, this is distinct from the virtue or vice, which there is in the acts themselves. If I be accountable for any volition, for the sole reason, that I cause it; then I am accountable for the act, by which I cause it, for the sole reason, that I cause that, and so on in an infinite series.

Besides; the mere circumstance, that I cause my own volition, does not on the principles of our opponents, make me accountable for it. Because that I should cause it may be a matter of previous certainty, as it may be foreknown, and even decreed, by God, that I should cause it; and therefore I cause it not freely in the sense of our opponents, but necessarily, under the influence of absolute moral necessity.

But Dr. West holds, that all our volitions are without cause. Then they take place by blind fate or chance. And how, on his principles, are we accountable for them?

The true ground of accountableness and of praise and blame, is not the circumstance, that we ourselves efficiently cause our own volitions; or the circumstance, that they take place without cause by mere chance; but the nature, moral aspect and tendency of those volitions, and of the actions which flow from them.

Our opponents observe, that we allow, that men must be the voluntary causes of their external actions, in order to be accountable for them. And then they ask, why we do not for the same reason allow, that we must be the voluntary causes of our acts of will, that we may be accountable for them? The answer is, that external actions are not volitions. The volitions of rational beings, are in their own nature moral acts, and for that reason the subjects of them are accountable for them. But external actions are not of a moral nature in themselves, and therefore the subjects of them are accountable for them then only, when they are the effects of volition. Besides; that external actions should be the effects of volition does not run into the absurdity of an infinite

series, as is implied in the supposition, that all volitions are the effects of previous volitions.

Dr. West says, "I have already shown, that necessity shuts out all sense of vileness and unworthiness."* Where he has shown this, he has not informed us. If he had, perhaps his readers, on perusal of the passage, would not have joined with him in the opinion, that he had shown it. For my part, I cannot find, that he has shown it in any part of his two books. If moral necessity, which is previous certain futurity of a moral act, "shut out all sense of vileness and unworthiness;" then it seems, that in order that a man may have any sense of vileness in sin, he must act without any previous certainty in the nature of things, or in divine foreknowledge, what his actions will be; i. e. he must act by mere chance.

8. It is objected, that this doctrine of moral necessity makes men mere machines. This objection, which is frequently made by all our opponents, depends on the sense affixed to the word machine. If it mean an intelligent voluntary agent, who does not act by perfect contingence or chance, and who does not take one step before his first step; but acts from such motives and pursues such objects, as appear to him most eligible; I grant, that we are machines. And in the same sense the saints and angels in heaven, and all intelligent beings, are machines. But whether it be not a great abuse of language, and whether it be not an artifice of our opponents, to excite a popular prejudice and clamor against our doctrine, to use the word machine in this sense; I leave the reader to judge. If by machine be meant, what is commonly meant by it, a mere material engine, without volition, knowledge or thought in itself; I presume, that our opponents themselves will not pretend, that on our principles, men are such machines as this.

Do those who make this objection hold, that the human understanding is a machine? Or that, in understanding, reasoning, judging, remembering, etc. man acts mechanically? Yet all grant, that in these things he acts necessarily.

If moral necessity imply, that we are machines, then whatever induces a moral necessity, or actually influences or persuades us to any conduct, turns us into machines. Now the opposers of moral necessity often speak of the aids of grace and of the Spirit, as necessary and influential to virtue and religion. But if any man become the subject of true virtue or piety by the aids of God's grace, so far he is passive, he is wrought upon and governed by an extrinsic cause, and his conduct is the effect of that