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tigable warmth of Demosthenes and Cicero. [e] I am convinced, that a genius is the first and most necessary quality for a pleader; but I am also certain, that study is of great service. Tis like a second nature, and if it does not impart a genius to him who had none before, it however rectifies, polishes, improves, and invigorates it. And Cicero had great reason to insist very much upon this article, and to assert, that every thing in Eloquence depends on the care, the pains, the application and vigilance of the orator.

S. The knowledge of the law, and its different customs, form properly the science of the lawyer; and to pretend to plead without those advantages, is to attempt the raising of a great building, without laying a foundation.

4. The talent of speaking constitutes an orator; it is, as it were, the instrument which enables him to make use of all the rest. But, in my opinion, it is not enough cultivated. Whether it be the effect of idleness, or a confidence in ourselves, we generally think genius alone will enable us to excel in it. But Cicero is of another opinion. His endeavours to attain perfection in this particular, would seem incredible, did not he himself attest it in several places. He should be the model to youth, in this and every thing else. To imbibe Rhetoric from the very fountain, to consult able masters, to read carefully the ancients and moderns, to be constantly employed in composing and translating, and to make his language a particular study: these were the exercises which Cicero thought necessary to form the great orator.

5. But of all the qualifications of an orator, action and utterance are the most neglected; and yet nothing contributes more towards giving success to speeches.

[e] Cùm ad inveniendum in dicendo tria sint, acumen, ratio, diligentia; non possum equidem non ingenio primas concedere: sed tamen ipsum ingenium diligentia etiam ex tarditate incitat.... Hæc præcipuè colenda est nobis; hæc semper adhibenda; hæc nihil est

quod non assequatur. ... Reliqua
sunt in curâ, attentione animi, co-
gitatione, vigilantiâ, assiduitate, la-
bore; complectar uno verbo, quo
sæpe jam usi sumus, diligentiâ,
quâ unâ virtute omnes virtutes re-
liquæ continentur.
147, 148, 150.

2. de Orat. n.

That

[f] That external Eloquence, as Cicero calls it, which is adapted to the capacities of all auditors, in regard it speaks to the senses only, has something so enchanting and dazzling, that it often supplies the place of every other merit, and sets a lawyer of no great parts above those of the gteatest abilities. [g] Every one has heard the celebrated answer of Demosthenes, concerning the qualification which he thought most necessary in an orator, the want whereof could least be concealed, and which at the same time was best adapted to conceal the rest. This induced him to make incredible efforts to succeed in it. Cicero imitated him in that, as in every thing else; and he was in some measure obliged to it, from the desire he had to equal Hortensius, who excelled in that particular. The example of both ought to have great weight with young lawyers.

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6. A great many of these, in my opinion, want a certain quintessence of polite literature and erudition, which embellish, however, and enrich the understanding vastly, and diffuse a delicacy and beauty over discourse, which it can have from no other source. The reading of ancient authors, the Greeks especially, is very much neglected. How closely did Cicero study them? orators, poets, historians, philosophers, he was acquainted with them all, and made them all of service to him; and the latter more than the rest. Young lawyers ought not to attempt pleading too soon, but should employ their time, at their first setting out, in acquiring a valuable and necessary fund of knowledge, which cannot be attained afterwards.

the practice of the Bar is the best master, and most capable of making them great lawyers; but it should not consist, at first, in frequent pleading. There we listen assiduously to great orators, we study their

[f] Est actio quasi corporis quædam eloquentia. Nam & infantes. actionis dignitate, eloquentiæ sæpe fructum tulerunt : & diserti, de formitate agendi, multi infantes putati sunt. Orat. n. 55, 56.

[8] Actio in dicendo una domi-
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natur. Sine hâc summus orator esse in numero nullo potest: mediocris, hâc instructus, summos sæpe superare. Huic primas dedisse Demosthenes dicitur,cum rogaretur quid in dicendo esset primum: huic secundas, huic tertias. 3. de Orat. n. 213.

nius,

nius, we observe their action, we are attentive to the opinions which the learned give of them; and thus we endeavour to improve equally by their perfections and defects.

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7. If it should be asked, what is the proper age for being called to the Bar, and pleading at it? I answer, that is a thing which cannot be brought to any fixed rule: and Quintilian's advice upon it is very prudent. [h] A medium, says he, must be observed; so that "a youth should not expose himself in public before "he is capable of doing it with advantage: nor make a parade of his knowledge, while it is crude and indigested, if I may use the expression: for by that "means he will despise pains and study; impudence "takes deep root in him; and, what is a greater "misfortune, confidence and boldness, precede vigour and strength. But he must not, on the other hand, wait till he grows old, for then he will grow more timid every day: and the longer he delays, "the more fearful he will be to venture to speak in public: so that, whilst he is deliberating whether "it is time to begin, he finds it is too late."

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8. It were very much to be wished, that the custom observed formerly among the Romans, should take place among us: and that the houses of old lawyers should be, as it were, the school of the youth designed for the Bar. What can be more worthy a great orator, than to conclude the glorious course of his pleading, by so honourable a function? [i] We shall see, says Quintilian, a whole company of studious young people frequenting his house, and consulting him upon the

[b] Modus mihi videtur quidam tenendus, ut neque præproperè distringatur immatura frons, & quicquid est illud adhuc acerbum proferatur. Nam inde & contemptus operis innascitur, & fundamenta jaciuntur impudentiæ, & (quod est ubique perniciosissimum) prævenit vires fiducia. Nec rurfus differendum est tyrocinium in senectutem. Nam quotidie metus crescit, majusque fit semper quod ausuri sumus:

&, dum deliberamus quando incipiendum sit, incipere jam serum est. Quint. 1. 12. c. 6.

[] Frequentabunt ejus domum optimi juvenes more veterum: & veram dicendi viam velut ex oraculo

petent. Hos ille formabit quasi eloquentiæ parens, &, ut vetus gubernator, littora, & portus & quæ tempestatum signa, quid secundis flatibus, quid adversis ratis poscat, docebit. Quint. 1. 12. c. 11.

proper

proper methods of speaking. He forms them, as though he were the father of Eloquence; and, like an old experienced pilot, points out to them the course they are to steer, and the rocks they must shun, when he sees them ready to set sail.

ARTICLE III.

OF THE LAWYER'S MORALS.

I DID not think proper to conclude this little treatise on the Eloquence of the Bar, without saying something of the lawyer's morals, and the chief qualifications requisite to his profession. Youth will find this subject treated in all the extent it deserves, in the twelfth book of Quintilian's Institutions, which is the most elaborate and most useful part of his work,

I. PROBITY.

Cicero and Quintilian lay it down as an indisputable principle, in several parts of their works, that Eloquence should not be separated from probity; that the talent of speaking well supposes and requires that of living well; and that to be an orator, a man must be virtuous, agreeable to Cato's definition: Orator vir bonus dicendi peritus. [k] Without this, says Quintilian, Eloquence, which is the most beautiful gift that nature can bestow upon man, and by which she has distinguished him, in a particular manner from other living creatures, would prove a fatal present to him; and be so far from doing him any service, that she would treat him as a step-mother, and like an enemy, rather than a mother, in imparting a talent to him for

[k] Si vis illa dicendi malitiam instruxerit, nihil sit publicis privatisque rebus perniciosius eloquentiâ. ... Rerum ipsa natura, in eo quod præcipuè indulsisse homini videtur, quoque nos à cæteris animalibus separasse, non parens, sed noverca

fuerit, si facultatem dicendi sociam scelerum, adversam innocentiæ, hos tem veritatis invenit. Mutos enim nasci, & egere omni ratione satius fuisset, quam providentiæ munera in mutuar perniciem convertere, Quint. 1. 12. c. I.

no other end, but to oppress innocence, and fight against truth, like the putting a sword into the hands of a madman. It would be better, adds he, that a man should be destitute of speech, and even of reason, than to employ them to such pernicious ends.

The slightest attention will discover how necessary honesty is to a pleader. His whole design is to persuade; [] and the surest way of affecting it is to prepossess the judge in his favour, so that he may look upon him as a man of veracity and candour, full of honour and sincerity; who may be entirely trusted; is a mortal enemy to a lie, and incapable of tricks and cunning. In his pleadings, he should appear not only with the zeal of an advocate, but with the authority of a witness. The reputation he has acquired of being an honest man, will give great weight to his arguments whereas, when an orator is disesteemed, or even suspected by the judges, it is an unhappy omen to the cause.

II. DISINTERESTEDNESS.

[m] The question treated by Quintilian, in the last book of his Rhetoric, whether lawyers ought to plead without fees or gratuity, does not square with the nanners or customs of our days; but the principles he there lays down suit all ages and times.

[n] He begins with declaring, that it would be infinitely more noble and becoming men of so honourable a profession, not to sell their service, nor debase the merit of so great a benefit, since most things may seem contemptible, when a price is set upon them.

[] Plurimum ad omnia momenti est in hoc positum, si vir bonus creditur. Sic enim continget, ut non studium advocati videatur afferre, sed penè testis fidem. Quint. 1. 4. c. I.

Sic proderit plurimum causis, quibus ex suâ bonitate faciet fidem. Nam qui, dum dicit, malus videtur, utique malè dicit. L. 6. c. 3.

Videtur talis advocatus malæ

causæ argumentum. L. 12. c. 1.

[m] Quint. l. 12. c. 7.

[] Quis ignorat quin id longè sit honestissimum, ac liberalibus disciplinis & illo quem exigimus animo dignissimum, non vendere operam, nec elevare tanti beneficii auctoritatem! cùm pleraque hoc ipso possint videri vilia, quòd pretium habent.

He

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