.on:

› construction permits should be issued until the reports and :ndations of this Commission, the NRC self-evaluation and the sional investigations are complete and until the President gress have had an adequate opportunity to consider such endations, including the recommendation to restructure the

one of six Commissioners who voted in favor of this

on; four voted against it and two abstained. I very much this important recommendation failed to obtain the seven-vote :essary to adopt it.

lso one of four Commissioners who voted for a stronger the above recommendation.

John G. Kemeny

October 25, 1979

A.

"No new construction permits should be issued until the reports of this Commission, the NRC self-evaluation, and the Congressional investi gations are completed and until the President and Congress have had an adequate opportunity to consider such recommendations including restructuring the NRC."

Six of the ten Commissioners who voted supported this resolut

B.

"No new limited work authorization permits or construction permits should be issued by the present NRC or the restructured NRC that are inconsistent with the siting recommendations in 6 and 6a."

(This reference is to approved recommendations that call for to the maximum feasible extent, the siting of new power plant remote from concentrations of population.)

Six of the nine Commissioners who voted supported this.

In view of the strong support in our Commission for thes measures, I recommend that the Congress and the President ena

A minority within the Commission strongly resisted recom that might delay further nuclear plant construction. Neither Commission nor its staff was free from the mind-set that nucl is adequately safe--the mind-set for which the Commission cri NRC and the nuclear industry.

II. The study was not subjected to the penetrating crit could have been provided by one or more of the highly technic critics of nuclear energy safety available in our country. I that the President and the Congress involve such experts in t appraisal of the safety of nuclear energy. This is especiall when considering the possible accident conditions which can 1 major release of radioactive material from the plant.

III. The Commission ruled that an investigation of the the TMI-2 nuclear wastes lay outside its assignment. Yet, in this constitutes, over the long run, the most hazardous aspec nuclear power industry. While the industry waits for the gov

converted that plant to a reprocessing plant. A large-scale essing plant is being built at TMI-2 for handling the huge highly radioactive waste that have escaped from the fuel rods. The safe processing and disposal of these prompt and close surveillance by some independent group.

al comment, I wish to emphasize my conviction, strongly this investigation, that the complexity of a nuclear d with the normal shortcomings of human beings so well n the TMI accident--will lead to a much more serious accident metime. The unprecedented worldwide fear and concern caused "near-miss" foretell the probable reaction to an accident release of radioactivity occurs over a wide area. It tial to provide humanity with alternate choices of energy rdingly, I recommend the development by our federal government, ome more fully committed to the vulnerable nuclear energy rategy which does not require nuclear fission energy.

Russell W. Peterson

October 25, 1979

7

emphasis upon equipment to attain reactor safety, there has little emphasis upon the adequacy of people to help achieve The lack of such people emphasis has been properly stressed report. However, that stress has now obscured the very impo that, in spite of the very crucial errors of operators and s at TMI-2, the safety equipment did indeed function. In spit open PORV, leaks in the vent gas system, and other equipment the overall system of equipment was sufficiently good that, human errors, the accident at TMI-2 would have been only a m

The reactor containment and its auxiliary equipment did function to protect the public. Except for the small fracti escaped to the environment, the radioactivity was contained. site radiation doses were small. We have found that the act of radioactivity to the atmosphere will have a negligible ef physical health of individuals. Equipment failures were not cause of the TMI-2 accident. The accident was, in fact, a d that the equipment is effective.

Although there has been considerable speculation about TMI-2 came to a worse accident, our staff analyses show that of the reactor fuel cladding had been oxidized to form hydro if appreciable fuel melting or even a meltdown had occurred, would still have survived and protected the public. The acc that the "defense-in-depth" approach towards nuclear reactor indeed yielded significant results.

The emphasis in this report upon equipment vs. people o fact that the equipment itself is only one product of the de or multiple-barrier design approach, which also encompasses of how equipment components must perform and how systems of must operate. The accident demonstrated that this system of performed better than expected. Earlier assumptions and stu AEC/NRC (TID-14844 and WASH-1400) have suggested far greater and greater releases of radioactivity from the fuel and into containment under such degraded cooling conditions.

The accident has also demonstrated many areas wherein e modifications can result in further improvements in safety o and future reactors in this country.

These are important positive results from our investiga