' rather than encounter the fatiguing detail of 'its evidence.' These are weaknesses of the mind, which every one who would judiciously display, or fairly estimate the Evidences of Christianity, ought undoubtedly to guard against. As under each of the terms External and Internal Evidence, various proofs dissimilar in character have been sometimes included, it seems necessary for avoiding confusion to state, that the External Evidence is here understood as embracing the argument from miracles, whether of knowledge or of power;the testimony of the first publishers of Christianity to the fact of their being commissioned of God;-with the Historical Evidence, or written testimony, the effect of which, if complete, is to place subsequent generations of men nearly in the same situation with those who witnessed the miracles, and heard the testimony above mentioned:*-while the term * The history of Christianity furnishes some proofs of its truth which were not possessed by the first Christians'; particularly in Internal Evidence is restricted to those proofs, which are founded on the character of Christian doctrines and morals. the department of prophecy. Such proofs, however, are the same in kind with those which formed the grounds of their belief; and the admissibility of those proofs depends on the legitimacy of that particular kind of evidence to which they belong. There are other evidences furnished by history, which have been styled collateral, and which may be considered as wholly distinct from those on which the belief of the early Christians was founded. Evidences of this description, have not, it is believed, been considered by any as competent to establish the truth of Christianity, supposing that those possessed by the early believers are in reality illegitimate or insufficient. Thus, upon the supposition that certain principles which we assume, render the argument from miracles inconclusive, we cannot contend that the conversion of any number of men, effected by means of miracles, furnishes any valid ground for our belief.-It may be proper, however, to state, that whatever proofs history may furnish, of a nature distinct from that of those evidences on which the faith of the early Christians was founded, are not affected by the reasonings which follow. DENCE-CONSEQUENCES WHICH FOLLOW FROM SECT. I. The Conclusions of Natural Theology, and the Internal Evidence of Christianity, avowedly subverted. THE leading principle which forms the foundation of the reasonings here subjected to examination is, that all conclusions of a theological nature which are drawn from other sources than divine revelation, are fallacious. Hence it follows, that from the known character, or tendency of a religious system, we are incapable of forming any judgment respecting the validity of its claims to divine authority. "There is perhaps nothing,' says Dr Chalmers, ' more thoroughly beyond the cognizance of 'the human faculties than the truths of reli6 gion, and the ways of that mighty and invi'sible Being who is the object of it.'* 'We C are not competent to judge of the conduct 'of the Almighty in given circumstances;' such judgment is founded on assumption entirely.'t To assign the character of the 'divine administration from the little that of'fers itself to the notice of our own personal 6 experience, would be far more absurd than to infer the history and character of the 'kingdom from the history and character of ' our own families.'‡ 'We hold, by the total 'insufficiency of natural religion, to pro· nounce upon the intrinsic merits of any revelation.' 'It is the part of reason to form ' its conclusions when it has data and eviden'ces before it. But it is equally the part of 'reason to abstain from its conclusions when 'these evidences are wanting. Reason can 'judge of the external evidences, &c. But 'reason is not entitled to sit in judgment over 'these internal evidences,' &c. ¶ * 184. (The references are here made to the article "Christianity," EDIN. ENCYC. † § 170. ‡ § 166. | § 177. ¶ § 192. The unusual ground on which Dr. C. has here chosen to advocate the cause of Christianity, he conceives to be of a nature peculiarly favourable for displaying its evidences with effect. He considers those deistical objections, which are directed against the reasonableness or wisdom of Christian doctrines and morals, as annihilated by the principles which he assumes; and he represents the general argument for the truth of Christianity as rendered more powerful and impressive. The advantages which he imagines to be thus gained, more than compensate, in his opinion, for the absence of those proofs which are grounded on the excellence of Christianity; and he accordingly hesitates not to advance principles avowedly subversive of evidences, which have in every age been considered as composing one of the strongest bulwarks of Christian faith. The writer feels that in 'thus disclaiming all support from what is 'commonly understood by the internal evi dence, he does not follow the general ex. 'ample of those who have written on the deistical controversy. Take up Leland's 'performance, and it will be found that one' half of his discussion is expended upon the 'reasonableness of the doctrines, and in as |