boundaries of fpecies of animals to us, who have no other measures than the complex ideas of our own collecting and fo far are we from certainly knowing what a man is; though, perhaps it will be judged great igno rance to make any doubt about it. And yet, I think, I may fay, that the certain boundaries of that fpecies are fo far from being determined, and the precife number of fimple ideas, which make the nominal effence, fo far from being fettled and perfectly known, that very material doubts may ftill arife about it. And I imagine, none of the definitions of the word man, which we yet have, nor defcriptions of that fort of animal, are fo perfect and exact, as to fatisfy a confiderate inquifitive perfon; much lefs to obtain a general confent, and to be that which men would every-where ftick by, in the decifion of cafes, and determining of life and death, baptifm or no baptifm, in productions that might happen.

But not fo arbitrary as

mixed modes.

§. 28. But though these nominal effences of fubftances are made by the mind, they are not yet made fo arbitrarily as thofe of mixed modes. To the making of any nominal effence, it is neceffary, Firft, that the ideas whereof it confifts have fuch an union as to make but one idea, how compounded foever. Secondly, that the particular idea fo united be exactly the fame, neither more nor lefs. For if two abftract complex ideas differ either in number or forts of their component parts, they make two different, and not one and the fame effence. In the firft of thefe, the mind, in making its complex ideas of fubftances, only follows nature; and puts none together, which are not fuppofed to have an union in nature. No-body joins the voice of a fheep, with the shape of a horfe; nor the colour of lead, with the weight and fixednefs of gold; to be the complex ideas of any real fubftances: unless he has a mind to fill his head with chimeras, and his difcourfe with unintelligible words. Men obferving certain qualities always joined and exifting together, therein copied nature; and of ideas fo united, made their complex ones of fubftances. For though men may make what complex

Though very

imperfect

ideas they please, and give what names to them they will; yet if they will be understood, when they [peak of things really exifting, they must in fome degree conform their ideas to the things they would fpeak of: or elfe men's language will be like that of Babel; and every man's words being intelligible only to himfelf, would no longer ferve to converfation, and the ordimary affairs of life, if the ideas they ftand for be not fome way anfwering the common appearances and agreement of fubftances, as they really exist, §. 29. Secondly, though the mind of man, in making its complex ideas of substances, never puts any together that do not really or are not fuppofed to co-exist; and fo it truly borrows that union from nature: yet the number it combines depends upon the various care, induftry, or fancy of him that makes it. Men generally content themselves with fome few fenfible obvious qualities; and often, if not always, leave out others as material, and as firmly united, as thofe that they take. Of fenfible fubftances there are two forts; one of organized bodies, which are propagated by feed; and in thefe, the fhape is that, which to us is the leading quality and most characterif tical part that determines the fpecies. And therefore in vegetables and animals, an extended folid substance of fuch a certain figure ufually ferves the turn. For however fome men feem to prize their definition of "animal rationale," yet fhould there a creature be found, that had language and reason, but partook not of the ufual shape of a man, I believe it would hardly pafs for a man, how much foever it were "animal rationale." And if Balaam's afs had, all his life, difcourfed as rationally as he did once with his mafter, I doubt yet whether any one would have thought him worthy the name man, or allowed him to be of the fame fpecies with himself. As in vegetables and ani-, mals it is the fhape, fo in most other bodies, not propagated by feed, it is the colour we moft fix on, and are most led by. Thus where we find the colour of gold, we are apt to imagine all the other qualities,

com

comprehended in our complex idea, to be there also: and we commonly take these two obvious qualities, viz. fhape and colour, for fo prefumptive ideas of several fpecies, that in a good picture we readily fay this is a lion, and that a rofe; this is a gold, and that a filver goblet, only by the different figures and colours reprefented to the eye by the pencil.

Which yet ferve for

S. 30. But though this ferves well enough for grofs and confufed conceptions, common and inaccurate ways of talking and thinkconverfe. ing; yet men are far enough, from having

agreed on the precife number of fimple ideas, or qualities, belonging to any fort of things, fignified by its name. Nor is it a wonder, fince it requires much time, pains, and fkill, ftrict inquiry, and long examination, to find out what and how many thofe fimple ideas are, which are conftantly and infeparably united in nature, and are always to be found together in the fame fubject. Moft men wanting either time, inclination, or industry enough for this, even to fome tolerable degree, content themselves with fome few obvious and outward appearances of things, thereby readily to diftinguish and fort them for the common affairs of life: and fo, without farther examination, give them names, or take up the names already in ufe. Which, though in common converfation they pafs well enough for the figns of fome few obvious qualities co-exifting, are yet far enough from comprehending, in a fettled fignification, a precife number of fimple ideas; much lefs all those which are united in nature. He that fhall confider, after so much stir about genus and fpecies, and fuch a deal of talk of fpecific differences, how few words we have yet fettled definitions of; may with reafon imagine that thofe forms, which there hath been fo much noife made about, are only chimeras, which give us no light into the specific natures of things. And he that fhall confider, how far the names of fubftances are from having fignifications, wherein all who use them do agree, will have reafon to conclude, that though the nominal effences of fubftances are all fup

pofed

posed to be copied from nature, yet they are all, or most of them, very imperfect. Since the composition of those complex ideas are, in feveral men, very different and therefore that these boundaries of fpecies are as men, and not as nature makes them, if at least there are in nature any fuch prefixed bounds. It is true, that many particular substances are so made by nature, that they have agreement and likeness one with another, and fo afford a foundation of being ranked, into forts. But the forting of things by us, or the making of determinate fpecies, being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms; I cannot fee how it can be properly faid, that nature fets the boundaries of the fpecies of things: or if it be fo, our boundaries of fpecies are not exactly conformable to those in nature. For we having need of general names for prefent ufe, ftay not for a perfect difcovery of all thofe qualities which would beft fhow us their most material differences and agreements; but we ourselves divide them, by certain obvious appearances, into species, that we may the eafier under general names communicate our thoughts about them. For having no other knowledge of any fubftance, but of the fimple ideas that are united in it; and obferving feveral particular things to agree with others in feveral of those fimple ideas; we make that collection our fpecific. idea, and give it a general name; that in recording our thoughts, and in our difcourfe with others, we may in one short word defign all the individuals that agree in that complex idea, without enumerating the fimple ideas that make it up; and so not waste our time and breath in tedious defcriptions: which we fee they are fain to do, who would difcourfe of any new fort of things they have not yet a name for.

Effences of

fpecies under the fame

§. 31. But however thefe fpecies of fubftances pass well enough in ordinary converfation, it is plain that this complex idea, wherein they observe several individuals to agree, is by different men made very differently; by fome more, and others lefs accurately. In fome, this complex idea contains a greater, and in

name very different.

others

others a smaller number of qualities; and fo is apparently fuch as the mind makes it. The yellow fhining colour makes gold to children; others add weight, malleablenefs, and fufibility; and others yet other qualities, which they find joined with that yellow colour, as conftantly as its weight and fufibility: for in all thefe and the like qualities, one has as good a right to be put into the complex idea of that substance wherein they are all joined, as another. And therefore different men leaving out or putting in several fimple ideas, which others do not, according to their various examination, fkill, or obfervation of that fubject, have different effences of gold; which must therefore be of their own, and not of nature's making.

The more general our ideas are, the

more incomplete, and partial they

are,

§. 32. If the number of fimple ideas, that make the nominal effence of the lowest fpecies, or firft forting of individuals, depends on the mind of man variously collecting them, it is much more evident that they do fo, in the more comprehenfive claffes, which by the mafters of logic are called genera. Thefe are complex ideas defignedly imperfect: and it is vifible at firft fight, that feveral of thofe qualities. that are to be found in the things themfelves, are purpofely left out of generical ideas. For as the mind, to make general ideas comprehending feveral particulars, leaves out thofe of time; and place, and fuch other, that make them incommunicable to more than one individual; fo to make, other yet more general ideas, that may comprehend different forts, it leaves out thofe qualities that diftinguish them, and puts into its new collection only fuch ideas as are common to feveral forts. The fame convenience that made men. exprefs feveral parcels of yellow matter coming from Guinea and Peru under one name, fets them alfo upon making of one name that may comprehend both gold and filver, and fome other bodies of different forts. This is done by leaving out thofe qualities, which are peculiar to each fort; and retaining a complex idea made up of thofe that are common to them all; to which the name metal being annexed, there is a genus

conftituted;