all distinct ideas, and some of them, being relative, are again compounded of others; all which being, as has been shown, originally got from fenfation and reflection, go to make up the idea or notion we have of God. No idea in our complex one of fpirits, but thofe got from fenfa tion or reflec tion. §. 36. This farther is to be obferved, that there is no idea we attribute to God, bating infinity, which is not alfo a part of our complex idea of other fpirits. Because, being capable of no other fimple ideas, belonging to any thing but body, but those which by reflection we receive from the operation of our own minds, we can attribute to fpirits no other but what we receive from thence: and all the difference we can put between them in our contemplation of fpirits, is only in the feveral extents and degrees of their knowledge, power, duration, happinefs, &c. For that in our ideas, as well of spirits, as of other things, we are reftrained to thofe we receive from fenfation and reflection, is evident from hence, that in our ideas of fpirits, how much foever advanced in perfection beyond thofe of bodies, even to that of infinite, we cannot yet have any idea of the manner wherein they difcover their thoughts one to another: though we muft neceffarily conclude, that separate fpirits, which are beings that have perfecter knowledge and greater happiness than we, muft needs have alfo a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have, who are fain to make use of corporeal figns and particular founds; which are therefore of most general ufe, as being the beft and quickest we are capable of. But of immediate communication, having no experiment in ourselves, and confequently no notion of it at all, we have no idea how fpirits, which use not words, can with quickness, or much lefs how fpirits, that have no bodies, can be mafters of their own thoughts, and communicate or conceal them at pleafure, though we cannot but neceffarily fuppofe they have fuch a power. Recapitula- §. 37. And thus we have feen, what kind of ideas we have of fubftances of all kinds, tion. wherein wherein they confift, and how we came by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident, First, That all our ideas of the feveral forts of fubftances are nothing but collections of fimple ideas, with a fuppofition of fomething to which they belong, and in which they fubfift; though of this fuppofed fomething we have no clear diftinct idea at all. Secondly, That all the fimple ideas, that thus united in one common fubftratum make up our complex ideas of feveral forts of fubftances, are no other but fuch as we have received from fenfation or reflection. So that even in those which we think we are most intimately acquainted with, and that come nearest the comprehenfion of our most enlarged conceptions, we cannot go beyond thofe fimple ideas. And even in those which feem moft remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely furpass any thing we can perceive in ourselves by reflection, or discover by fenfation in other things, we can attain to nothing but thofe fimple ideas, which we originally received from fenfation or reflection; as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels, and particularly of God himself. Thirdly, That most of the fimple ideas, that make up our complex ideas of fubftances, when truly confidered, are only powers, however we are apt to take them for pofitive qualities; v. g. the greateft part of the ideas that make our complex idea of gold are yellownefs, great weight, ductility, fufibility and folubility in aqua regia, &c. all united together in an unknown fubftratum: all which ideas are nothing elfe but fo many relations to other fubftances, and are not really in the gold, confidered barely in itself, though they depend on those real and primary qualities of its internal conftitution, whereby it has a fitnefs differently to operate, and be operated on by feveral other fubftances, СНАР One idea. §. I. ESIDES thefe complex ideas of feveral fingle substances, as of man, horse, gold, violet, apple, &c. the mind hath alfo complex collective ideas of substances; which I fo call, because such ideas are made up of many particular fubftances confidered together, as united into one idea, and which fo joined are looked on as one; v. g. the idea of fuch a collection of men as make an army, though confifting of a great number of diftinct fubftances, is as much one idea, as the idea of a man: and the great collective idea of all bodies whatsoever, fignified by the name world, is as much one idea, as the idea of any the least particle of matter in it; it fufficing to the unity of any idea, that it be confidered as one reprefentation or picture, though made up of ever fo many particulars. Made by the §. 2. These collective ideas of fubftances the mind makes by its power of compofipower of compofing tion, and uniting feverally either fimple or in the mind. complex ideas into one, as it does by the fame faculty make the complex ideas of particular fubftances, confifting of an aggregate of divers fimple ideas, united in one fubftance: and as the mind, by putting together the repeated ideas of unity, makes the collective mode, or complex idea of any number, as fcore, or a grofs, &c. fo by putting together feveral particular fubftances, it makes collective ideas of fubstances, as a troop, an army, a fwarm, a city, a fleet; each of which, every one finds, that he reprefents to his own mind by one idea, in one view; and fo under that notion confiders thofe feveral things as perfectly one, as one ship, or one atom. Nor is it harder to conceive, how an army of ten thousand men fhould make one idea, than how a man should make one idea: it being as eafy to the mind to unite into one the idea of a great number number of men, and confider it as one, as it is to unite into one particular all the diftinct ideas that make up the compofition of a man, and confider them all together as one. All artificial things are collective ideas. S. 3. Amongst fuch kind of collective ideas, are to be counted moft part of artificial things, at leaft fuch of them as are made up of diftinct fubftances: and, in truth, if we confider all these collective ideas aright, as army, conftellation, univerfe, as they are united into fo many fingle ideas, they are but the artificial draughts of the mind; bringing things very remote, and independent on one another, into one view, the better to contemplate and discourse of them, united into one conception, and fignified by one name. For there are no things fo remote, nor fo contrary, which the mind cannot, by this art of compofition, bring into one idea; as is visible in that fignified by the universe. CHA P. XXV. Of Relation. §. 1. BESIDES the ideas, whether fim ple or complex, that the mind Relation what. has of things, as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their comparifon one with another. The understanding, in the confideration of any thing, is not confined to that precife object: it can carry any idea as it were beyond itfelf, or at least look beyond it, to fee how it ftands in conformity to any other. When the mind fo confiders one thing, that it does as it were bring it to and fet it by another, and carry its view from one to the other: this is, as the words import, relation and refpect; and the denomi nations given to pofitive things, intimating that refpect, and ferving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the fubject itself denominated to fomething diftinct from it, are what we call relatives: and the things, fo brought together, together, related. Thus, when the mind confiders Caius as fuch a pofitive being, it takes nothing into that idea, but what really exifts in Caius; v. g. when I confider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the fpecies, man. So likewise, when I fay Caius is a white man, I have nothing but the bare confideration of a man who hath that white colour. But when I gave Caius the name hufband, I intimate fome other perfon; and when I give him the name whiter, I intimate fome other thing: in both cafes my thought is led to fomething beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into confideration. And fince any idea, whether fimple or complex, may be the occafion why the mind thus brings two things together, and as it were takes a view of them at once, though ftill confidered as diftinct; therefore any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation. As in the above-mentioned inftance, the contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia is the occafion of the denomination or relation of hufband; and the colour white the occafion why he is faid to be whiter than free-ftone. Relations relative terms not cafily perceived. §. 2. Thefe, and the like relations, exwithout cor- preffed by relative terms, that have others anfwering them, with a reciprocal intimation, as father and fon, bigger and lefs, caufe and effect, are very obvious to every one, and every body at first fight perceives the relation. For father and fon, hufband and wife, and fuch other correlative terms, feem fo nearly to belong one to another, and through custom do fo readily chime and anfwer one another in people's memories, that, upon the naming of either of them, the thoughts are prefently carried beyond the thing fo named; and no-body overlooks or doubts of a relation, where it is fo plainly intimated. But where languages have failed to give correlative names, there the relation is not always fo eafily taken notice of. Concubine is, no doubt, a relative name, as well as wife: but in languages where this, and the like words, have not a correlative term, there people are not fo apt to take them гр |