that our love and hatred of inanimate infenfible beings, is commonly founded on that pleasure and pain which we receive from their ufe and application any way to our fenfes, though with their deftruction: but hatred or love, to beings capable of happinefs or mifery, is often the uneafinefs or delight, which we find in ourfelves arifing from a confideration of their very being or happiness. Thus the being and welfare of a man's children or friends, producing conftant delight in him, he is faid conftantly to love them. But it fuffices to note, that our ideas of love and hatred are but the difpofitions of the mind, in refpect of pleasure and pain in general, however caufed in us.

§. 6. The uneafinefs a man finds in him- Defire. felf upon the abfence of any thing, whose prefent enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it, is that we call defire; which is greater or lefs, as that uneasiness is more or lefs vehement. Where, by the by, it may perhaps be of fome ufe to remark, that the chief, if not only fpur to human industry and action, is uneafinefs. For whatfoever good is propofed, if its absence carries no difpleasure or pain with it, if a man be easy and content without it, there is no defire of it, nor endeavour after it; there is no more but a bare velleity, the term used to fignify the lowest degree of defire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is fo little uneafinefs in the abfence of any thing, that it carries a man no farther than fome faint wishes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous ufe of the means to attain it. Defire alfo is ftopped or abated by the opinion of the impoffibility or unattainablenefs of the good propofed, as far as the uncafinefs is cured or allayed by that confideration. This might carry our thoughts farther, were it feasonable in this place.

§. 7. Joy is a delight of the mind, from Joy. the confideration of the prefent or affured approaching poffeffion of a good: and we are then poffeffed of any good when we have it fo in our power, that we can use it when we pleafe. Thus a man almost ftarved has joy at the arrival of relief, even before he has the pleasure of ufing it: and a father, in whom the

very well-being of his children caufes delight, is always' as long as his children are in such a state, in the poffeffion of that good; for he needs but to reflect on it, to have that pleasure.

Sorrow.

§. 8. Sorrow is uneafinefs in the mind, upon the thought of a good loft, which might have been enjoyed longer; or the fenfe of a pre-. fent evil.

Hope.

§. 9. Hope is that pleasure in the mind, which every one finds in himself, upon the thought of a profitable future enjoyment of a thing, which is apt to delight him.

Fear.

fal us. Despair.

§. 10. Fear is an uneafinefs of the mind, upon the thought of future evil likely to be

§. 11. Despair is the thought of the unattainableness of any good, which works differently in men's minds, fometimes producing uneafinefs or pain, fometimes reft and indolency.

Anger.

§. 12. Anger is uneafinefs or difcompofure of the mind, upon the receipt of any injury, with a prefent purpose of revenge. Envy.

§. 13. Envy is an uneasiness of the mind, caufed by the confideration of a good we defire, obtained by one we think should not have had it before us.

What paf$. 14. These two laft, envy and anger, fions all men not being caufed by pain and pleasure, fimhave. ply in themfelves, but having in them fome mixed confiderations of ourfelves and others, are not therefore to be found in all men, because those other parts of valuing their merits, or intending revenge, is wanting in them: but all the reft terminating purely in. pain and pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all men, For we love, defire, rejoice, and hope, only in respect of pleasure; we hate, fear, and grieve, only in respect of pain ultimately in fine, all thefe paffions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the causes of pleasure and pain, or to have pleasure or pain fome way or other annexed to them. Thus we extend our hatred ufually to the fubject (at least if a fenfible or voluntary

voluntary agent) which has produced pain in us, because the fear it leaves is a conftant pain: but we do not fo conftantly love what has done us good; becaufe pleafure operates not fo ftrongly on us as pain, and because we are not fo ready to have hope it will do fo again. But this by the by.

Pleasure and

pain, what.

§. 15. By pleafure and pain, delight and uneafinefs, I must all along be understood (as I have above intimated) to mean not only bodily pain and pleasure, but whatfoever delight or uncatinefs is felt by us, whether arifing from any grateful or unacceptable fenfation or reflection.

§. 16. It is farther to be confidered, that in reference, to the paffions, the removal or leffening of a pain is confidered, and operates as a pleasure: and the lofs or diminishing of a pleasure, as a pain.

Shame.

§. 17. The paffions too have most of them in most perfons operations on the body, and caufe various changes in it; which not be ing always fenfible, do not make a neceffary part of the idea of each paffion. For fhame, which is an uneafinefs of the mind upon the thought of having done fomething which is indecent, or will leffen the valued efteem which others have for us, has not always blufhing accompanying it.

Thefe in

ftances to

fhow how our ideas of the, paffions are got from fenfation and

reflection.

§. 18. I would not be mistaken here, as if I meant this as a difcourfe of the paffions; they are many more than those I have here named and thofe I have taken notice of would each of them require a much larger, and more accurate difcourfe. I have only mentioned these here as fo many inftances. of modes of pleasure and pain refulting in our minds from various confiderations of good and evil. I might perhaps have instanced in other modes of pleafure and pain more fimple than these, as the pain of hunger and thirst, and the pleasure of eating and drinking to remove them; the pain of tender eyes, and the pleasure of mufick; pain from captious uninftructive wrangling, and the pleasure of rational converfation with a friend, or of well-directed study in the search and discovery of truth.

But

But the paffions being of much more concernment to us, I rather made choice to inftance in them, and show how the ideas we have of them are derived from fenfation and reflection.

This idea how got.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Power.

§. 1. THE mind being every day in

formed, by the fenfes, of the

alteration of those fimple ideas it obferves in things without, and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and another begins to exist which was not before; reflecting alfo on what paffes within himself, and obferving a conftant change of its ideas, fometimes by the impreffion of outward objects on the fenfes, and fometimes by the determination of its own choice; and concluding from what it has fo conftantly observed to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the fame things by like agents, and by the like ways; confiders in one thing the poffibility of having any of its fimple ideas changed, and in another the poffibility of making that change: and fo comes by that idea which we call power. Thus we fay, fire has a power to melt gold, i. e. to destroy the confiftency of its infenfible parts, and confequently its hardness, and make it fluid; and gold has a power to be melted that the fun has a power to blanch wax, and wax a power to be blanched by the fun, whereby the yellownefs is deftroyed, and whitenefs made to exist in its room. In which, and the like cafes, the power we confider is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas for we cannot observe any alteration to be made in, or operation upon, any thing, but by the obfervable change of its fenfible ideas; nor conceive any alteration to be made, but by conceiving a change of fome of its ideas.

§. 2. Power, thus confidered, is two-fold, Power active viz. as able to make, or able to receive, any and paffive. change: the one may be called active, and

the other paffive power. Whether matter be not wholly deftitute of active power, as its author God is truly above all paffive power; and whether the intermediate ftate of created fpirits be not that alone which is capable of both active and paffive power, may be worth confideration. I fhall not now enter into that inquiry; my prefent business being not to fearch into the original of power, but how we come by the idea of it. But fince active powers make fo great a part of our complex ideas of natural fubftances (as we shall fee hereafter) and I mention them as fuch according to common apprehenfion; yet they being not perhaps fo truly active powers, as our hafty thoughts are apt to reprefent them, I judge it not amifs, by this intimation, to direct our minds to to the confideration of God and fpirits, for the clearest idea of active powers.

Power in

cludes rela

§. 3. I confefs power includes in it fome kind of relation, (a relation to action or change) as indeed which of our ideas, of tion. what kind foever, when attentively confidered, does not? For our ideas of extenfion, duration, and number, do they not all contain in them a fecret relation of the parts? Figure and motion have Lomething relative in them much more vifibly and fenfible qualities, as colours and fmells, &c. what are they but the powers of different bodies, in relation to our perception? &c. And if confidered in the things themfelves, do they not depend on the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of the parts? All which include fome kind of relation in them. Our idea therefore of power, I think may well have a place amongst other fimple ideas, and be confidered as one of them, being one of those that make a principle ingredient in our complex ideas of substances, as we fhall hereafter have occafion to obferve.

§. 4. We are abundantly furnished with the idea of paffive power by almost all forts of fenfible things. In most of them we

The cleareft idea of active power had from fpirit.

cannot