ESSAY IX.

OF THE COMMUNICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.

IN what manner would reason, independently

of the received modes and practices of the world, teach us to communicate knowledge?

Liberty is one of the most desirable of all fublunary advantages. I would willingly therefore communicate knowledge, without infringing, or with as little as poffible violence to, the volition and individual judgment of the perfon to be inftructed.

Again; I defire to excite a given individual to the acquifition of knowledge. The only poffible method in which I can excite a fenfitive being to the performance of a voluntary action, is by the exhibition of motive.

Motives are of two forts, intrinfic and extrinfic. Intrinfic motives are those which arife from the inherent nature of the thing recommended. Extrinfic motives are those which have no conftant and unalterable connection with the thing recommended, but are combined

with it by accident or at the pleasure of fome individual.

Thus, I may recommend fome fpecies of knowledge by a difplay of the advantages which will neceffarily attend upon its acquifition, or flow from its poffeffion. Or, on the other hand, I may recommend it defpotically, by allurements or menaces, by showing that the pursuit of it will be attended with my approbation, and that the neglect of it will be regarded by me with difpleasure.

The firft of these claffes of motives is unqueftionably the bett. To be governed by fuch motives is the pure and genuine condition of a rational being. By exercife it ftrengthens the judgment. It elevates us with a fenfe of independence. It caufes a man to ftand alone, and is the only method by which he can be rendered truly an individual, the creature, not of implicit faith, but of his own understanding,

If a thing be really good, it can be shown to be fuch. If you cannot demonftrate its excellence, it may well be fufpected that you are no proper judge of it. Why fhould not I be admitted to decide, upon that which is to be acquired by the application of my labour?

Is it neceffary that a child fhould learn a thing, before it can have any idea of its value? It is probable

objects. It is fufficiently competent to answer the purposes of the laft.

Nothing can be more happily adapted to remove the difficulties of inftruction, than that the pupil should firft be excited to defire knowledge, and next that his difficulties fhould be folved for him, and his path cleared, as often and as foon as he thinks proper to defire it.

This plan is calculated entirely to change the face of education. The whole formidable apparatus which has hitherto attended it, is swept away. Strictly fpeaking, no fuch characters are left upon the fcene as either preceptor or pupil. The boy, like the man, ftudies, because The defires it. He proceeds upon a plan of his own invention, or which, by adopting, he has made his own. Every thing befpeaks independence and equality. The man, as well as the boy, would be glad in cafes of difficulty to confult a perfon more informed than himself. That the boy is accustomed almost always to confult the man, and not the man the boy, is to be regarded rather as an accident, than any thing effential. Much even of this would be removed, if we remembered that the moft' inferior judge may often, by the varieties of his apprehenfion, give valuable information to the most enlightened. The boy however should be confulted by the man unaffectedly,

unaffectedly, not according to any preconcerted scheme, or for the purpose of perfuading him that he is what he is not.

There are three confiderable advantages which would attend upon this species of edu

cation.

First, liberty. Three fourths of the flavery and restraint that are now impofed upon young perfons would be annihilated at a ftroke.

Secondly, the judgment would be strengthened by continual exercife. Boys would no longer learn their leffons after the manner of parrots. No one would learn without a reason, fatisfactory to himfelf, why he learned; and it would perhaps be well, if he were frequently prompted to affign his reafons. Boys would then confider for themfelves, whether they understood what they read. To know when and how to ask a question is no contemptible part of learning. Sometimes they would pafs over difficulties, and neglect effential preliminaries; but then the nature of the thing would speedily recal them, and induce them to return to examine the tracts which before had been overlooked. For this purpose it would be well that the fubjects of their juvenile studies should often be difcuffed, and that one boy fhould compare his progrefs and his competence to decide in

certain points with thofe of another. There is nothing that more ftrongly excites our enquiries than this mode of detecting our ignorance.

Thirdly, to ftudy for ourselves is the true method of acquiring habits of activity. The horfe that goes round in a mill, and the boy that is anticipated and led by the hand in all his acquirements, are not active. I do not call a wheel that turns round fifty times in a minute, active. Activity is a mental quality. If therefore you would generate habits of activity, turn the boy loofe in the fields of fcience. Let him explore the path for himself. Without increafing his difficulties, you may venture to leave him for a moment, and fuffer him to ask himself the queftion before he afks you, or, in other words, to afk the question before he receives the information. Far be it from the fyftem here laid down, to increase the difficulties of youth. No, it diminishes them a hundred fold. Its office is to produce inclination; and a willing temper makes every burthen light.

Laftly, it is the tendency of this fyftem to produce in the young, when they are grown up to the ftature of men, a love of literature. The eftablished modes of education produce the oppofite effect, unless in a fortunate few, who, by the celerity of their progrefs, and the diftinc