worth accepting, if, when my neighbour differs from me, I do not indeed burn him, but I take every occafion to infult him. There could be no freedom of opinion, if every one conducted himself thus. Toleration in its full import, requires, not only that there fhall be no laws to reftrain opinion, but that forbearance and liberality fhall be moulded into the manners of the community.

Suppofing it certain that the man I cenfure is a perfon of depraved character, is this the way to amend him? Is there no conduct that offers itfelf, but that of punishment? How often does the loud cenfure, and the "flow-moving finger of fcorn," drive a man to defpair, who might have been amended, perhaps rendered the ornament of his fpecies? I ought to reclaim bromy ther with kindness and love, not to have recourse to measures of infolence and contumely.

This will be ftill more evident, if we admit the doctrine of a moral neceffity, and believe that there is an uniform and conftant conjunetion between motives and actions. Upon this hypothefis, the man who acts improperly, has a certain train of reasoning on the subject by which his mind is reconciled to the deviation. His understanding is impofed on; there is a * Shakespear.

cloud

of

of fophiftry which refts upon it. How fhall this be difperfed? In what manner fhall truth be inftilled into his mind? Certainly, with the difpaffionateness of argument, and that conciliation. of manners which fhall beft win on his patience. Who ever thought of enlightening his pupil in the truths of geometry, by transports of rage, or by the cool and biting sarcasms of contempt? If perceive my neighbour mistaking in fome important queftion, I may pity him: a madman only would be filled with the bitterness of perfonal refentment.

There is a remark fufficiently memorable which may be deduced from the preceding obs férvations. How far is it compatible with benevolence, that I should speak of a man's character, when he is abfent, and prefent, in the fame terms? In anfwering this queftion it may be premifed that fincerity is a matter of inferior confideration to benevolence. Sincerity is only a means, and is valuable fo far as it anfwers the purpofes of benevolence; benevolence is fubftantive

Perhaps,

:.* What is here faid of fincerity, is equally true of tem perance, activity, perfeverance, and every other quality or habit that tends to promote our own happiness, or the happinefs of others. They are merely fubordinate and minifterial.

Perhaps, in the nature of things, there is no contrariety, as to the common intercourses of life, between the fpecies of fincerity here spoken of, and benevolence. A wife man would fpeak of the qualities of his neighbour as he found them; "nothing extenuate, nor fet down aught in malice*." He would not, even in his neighbour's abfence, indulge in farcaftic remarks at his expence; he would not exaggerate his errors; he would not speak of them with anger and invective. On the other hand, his neighbour, if reasonable, would bear to be told of his errors, in plain terms, without softening or circumlocution. So that the language to be used, when I spoke to him if present, or of him if abfent, might be reduced to one common ftandard..

Great inconveniences arife from the prevailing practice of infincerity in this respect. Its appearances have not failed to be feized by the writers of comedy, as a rich fund of humour; and, with a little exaggeration upon the common modes, nothing can be more irresistibly ludicrous. The variation of tone that a man

to this great purpofe. Sincerity is one of these habits; but, though to benevolence it is only ministerial, it is probably entitled to the very firft place among its minifters.

affumes, when the perfon of whom he was talking unexpectedly makes his entrance, certainly places the fpeaker in a pitiful point of view. Yet this infincerity is in a greater or lefs degree univerfal; and, if we occafionally meet with a man who, detected in the fact, repeats the fame harsh language to the perfon upon his entrance, it be doubted whether this proceeding is not rather dictated to him by the fudden irritation of his pride, than by any fhade or modification of benevolence.

may

From hence it has grown into a commonly received rule of civilifed life, that converfation is not to be repeated, particularly to the perfons who may happen to be the fubject of it. This rule appears at firft fight to be a very strange one. Every man feems to have a juft right to know what his neighbours think, or, to use a more appropriate phrase, how they feel, respecting him; and certainly no information can be more interefting. The judgment of his neighbours, is the glafs in which he should view himself; by this mirror he fhould drefs his mind, and remove his defects. Not that he fhould implicitly conform himself to their judgment, but that, by comparing their opinions with each other and with his own, he will beft arrive at the truth, Ignorance

24

Ignorance in this refpect corrupts the very vitals of human intercourfe. A man frequently does not know what is the opinion entertained of him by his most familiar companion; he is the object of his daily ridicule, and does not fufpect it. Yet the knowledge of this opinion is of high importance, both for correction and confidence. Many men go out of the world, profoundly unacquainted with the unanimous fentiment of all their acquaintance refpecting them.

The rule however, that conversation is not indifcriminately to be repeated, has fomething which may be offered in its behalf. If from knowing what all men faid of him in his abfence, a perfon could learn what they thought of him, it were much to be wifhed he fhould know it, and that man would be a poltroon who would fhrink from the having his remarks divulged. But there are fo many things faid from the merc wantonnefs of the moment, or from a defire to comply with the tone of the company; so many from the impulfe of paffion, or the defire to be brilliant; fo many idle exaggerations which the heart, in a moment of fobriety, would difavow; that frequently the perfon concerned would learn any thing fooner than the opinion entertained of him, and torment himfelf, as injuries of the

deepest