ffars at fuch a diftance from our folar fyftem, as that their light should not have had time to reach us, even from the creation of the world to this day. Ver. 234. the neglect Of all familiar prospects, &c.] It is here faid, that in confequence of the love of novelty, objects which at firft were highly delightful to the mind, lose that effect by repeated attention to them. But the inftance of habit is opposed to this obfervation; for there, objects at first diftafteful are in time rendered intirely agreeable by repeated attention. The difficulty in this cafe will be removed, if we confider, that, when objects at first agreeable, lofe that influence by frequently recurring, the mind is wholly paffive and the perception involuntary; but habit, on the other hand, generally fuppofes choice and activity accompanying it: fo that the pleasure arifes here not from the object, but from the mind's conscious determination of its own activity; and confequently increases in proportion to the frequency of that determination. It will ftill be urged perhaps, that a familiarity with difagreeable objects renders them at length acceptable, even when there is no room for the mind to refolve or act at all. In this cafe, the appearance must be accounted for, one of these ways. The pleasure from habit may be merely nega tive. The object at firft gave uneafinefs: this uneafinefs gradually wears off as the object grows familiar: and the mind, finding it at laft entirely removed, rec kons kons its fituation really pleasurable, compared with what it had experienced before. The diflike conceived of the object at first, might be owning to prejudice or want of attention. Confequently the mind, being neceffitated to review it often, may at length perceive its own mistake, and be reconciled to what it had looked on with averfion. In which case, a fort of instinctive justice naturally leads it to make amends for the injury, by running toward the other extreme of fondness and attachment. Or laftly, though the object itself should always continue difagreeable, yet circumftances of pleasure or good fortune may occur along with it. Thus an affociation may arise in the mind, and the object never be remembered without those pleafing circumstances attending it; by which means the disagreeable impreffion which it at first occafioned will in time be quite obliterated. Ver. 240. this defire Of objects new and ftrange] Thefe two ideas are often confounded; though it is evident the mere novelty of an object makes it agreeable, even where the mind is not affected with the leaft degree of wonder whereas wonder indeed always implies novelty, being never excited by common or well-known appearances. But the pleasure in both cafes is explieable from the fame final caufe, the acquifition of knowledge and inlargement of our views of nature: on this account, it is natural to treat of them together. Ver. 374. Truth and good are one, And beauty dwells in them, &c.] "Do you imagine," fays Socrates to Aristippus, "that "what is good is not beautiful? Have you not oba "served that these appearances always coincide "Virtue, for inftance, in the fame refpect as to which we call it good, is ever acknowledged to be beau"tiful also. In the characters of men we always join the two denominations together. The beauty of "human bodies correfponds, in like manner, with "that œconomy of parts which conftitutes them good; "and in every circumftance of life, the fame object "is conftantly accounted both beautiful and good, “inasmuch as it answers the purposes for which it "was defigned." Xenophont. Memorab. Socrat. 1. iii. c. 8. This excellent observation has been illuftrated and extended by the noble restorer of ancient philofophy; fee the Characteristicks, vol. ii. p. 339 and 422, and vol. iii. p. 181. And another ingenious author has particularly fhewn, that it holds in the general laws of nature, in the works of art, and the conduct of the fciences. Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue, Treat. i. § 8. As to the connection between beauty and truth, there are two opinions concerning it. Some philofophers affert an independent and invariable law in nature, in confequence of which "all rational beings must alike perceive beauty in ན This the Athenians did in a particular manner, by the word καλοκαταθὸς, καλοκα[αθία. " fome fome certain proportions, and deformity, in the con“trary.” And this neceffity being supposed the fame with that which commands the affent or diffent of the understanding, it follows of course that beauty is founded on the univerfal and unchangeable law of truth. But others there are, who believe beauty to be merely a relative and arbitrary thing; that indeed it was a benevolent provifion in nature to annex so delightful a fenfation to thofe objects which are best and most per fect in themfelves, that fo we might be engaged to the choice of them at once and without staying to infer their usefulness from their ftructure and effects; but that it is not impoffible, in a phyfical fenfe, that two beings, of equal capacities for truth, fhould perceive, one of them beauty and the other deformity, in the fame proportions. And upon this fuppofition, by that truth which is always connected with beauty, nothing more can be meant than the conformity of any object to those proportions upon which, after careful exami nation, the beauty of that speices is found to depend. Polycletus, for inftance, a famous ancient fculptor, from an accurate menfuration of the feveral parts of the most perfect human bodies, deduced a canon or fyftem of proportions, which was the rule of all fucceeding artists. Suppose a statue modelled according to this: a man of mere natural tafte, upon looking at it, without entering into its proportions, confeffes and admires its beauty; whereas a profeffor of the art applies his measures to the head, the neck, or the hand, and, without attending to its beauty, pronounces the workmanship to be just and true. Ver. 492. As when Brutus rofe, &c.] Cicero him felf defcribes this fact-" Cæfare interfecto-ftatim cruentum altè extollens M. Brutus pugionem, Ci "ceronem nominatim exclamavit, atque ei recupera "tam libertatem eft gratulatus.” Cic. Philipp. ii. 12. Ver. 548. Where Virtue rifing from the awful depth Of truth's myfterious bofom, &c.] According to the opinion of those who assert moral obligation to be founded on an immutable and univerfal law; and that which is ufually called the moral fenfe, to be determined by the peculiar temper of the imagination and the earliest affociations of ideas. Ver. 591. Lycéum.] The fchool of Ariftotle. Ver. 594. Ilyus.] One of the rivers on which Athens was fituated. Plato, in fome of his fineft dialogues, lays the scene of the converfation with Socrates on its banks. NOTES ON BOOK II. Ver. 19. At laft the Mufes rofe, &c.] About the age of Hugh Capet, founder of the third race of French kings, the poets of Provence were in high reputation; a fort of ftrolling bards or rhapfodifts, who went about the courts of princes and noblemen, entertaining them at feftivals with mufic and poetry. They VOL. LXIII. attempted U |