and sensation a general term for every pleasure and pain felt at the organ of sense. 11. Conception is different from perception. The latter includes a conviction of the reality of its object: the former does not; for I can conceive the most extravagant stories told in a romance, without having any conviction of their reality. Conception differs also from imagination. By the power of fancy I can imagine a golden mountain, or an ebony ship with sales and ropes of silk. When I describe a picture of that kind to another, the idea he forms of it is termed a conception. Imagination is active, conception is passive. 12. Feeling, beside denoting one of the external senses, is a general term, signifying that internal act by which we are made conscious of our pleasures and our pains; for it is not limited, as sensa❤ tion is, to any one sort. Thus, feeling being the genus of which sensation is a species, their meaning is the same when applied to pleasure and pain felt at the organ of sense: and accordingly we say in differently, "I feel pleasure from heat, and pain "from cold," or, "I have a sensation of pleasure "from heat, and of pain from cold." But the meaning of feeling, as is said, is much more extensive: It is proper to say, I feel pleasure in a sumptuous building, in love, in friendship; and pain in losing a child, in revenge, in envy sensation is not properly applied to any of these. The term feeling is frequently used in a less proper sense, to signify what we feel or are conscious of; and in that sense it is a general term for all our passions and emotions, and for all our other pleasures and pains. 13. That we cannot perceive an external object till an impression is made upon our body, is proba ble from reason, and is ascertained by experience. But it is not necessary that we be made sensible of the impression: in touching, in tasting, and in smelling, we are sensible of the impression; but not in seeing and hearing. We know indeed from experiments, that before we perceive a visible object, its image is spread upon the retina tunica ; and that before we perceive a sound, an impression is made upon the drum of the ear: but we are not conscious either of the organic image or of the organic impression; nor are we conscious of any other operation preparatory to the act of perception: all we can say is, that we see that river, or hear that trumpet.* 14. Objects once perceived may be recalled to the mind by the power of memory. When I recal an object of sight in that manner, it appears to me * Yet a singular opinion, that impressions are the only objects of perception, has been espoused by some philosophers of no mean rank; not attending to the foregoing peculiarity in the senses of seeing and hearing, that we perceive objects without being conscious of an organic impression, or of any impression. See the Treatise upon Human Nature; where we find the following passage, book 1. p. 4. sect. 2. " Properly speaking, it is "not our body we perceive when we regard our limbs and "members; so that the ascribing a real and corporeal existence "to these impressions, or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain," &c. precisely the same as in the original survey, only less distinct. For example, having seen yesterday a spreading oak growing on the brink of a river, I endeavour to recal these objects to my mind. How is this operation performed? Do I endeavour to form in my mind a picture of them or representative image? Not so. I transport myself ideally to the place where I saw the tree and river yesterday; upon which I have a perception of these objects, similar in all respects to the perception I had when I viewed them with my eyes, only less distinct. And in this recollection, I am not conscious of a picture or representative image, more than in the original survey; the perception is of the tree and river themselves, as at first. I confirm this by another experiment. After attentively surveying a fine statue, I close my eyes. What follows? The same object continues, without any difference but that it is less distinct than formerly.* This in *This experiment, which every one may reiterate till entire satisfaction be obtained, is of greater importance than at first view may appear; for it strikes at the root of a celebrated doctrine, which for more than two thousand years has misled many philosophers. This doctrine as delivered by Aristotle is in substance, "That of every object of thought there must be in the "mind some form, phantasm, or species; that things sensible "are perceived and remembered by means of sensible phan"tasms, and things intelligible by intelligible phantasms; and "that these phantasms have the form of the object without the "matter, as the impression of a seal upon wax has the form of "a seal without its matter." The followers of Aristotle add, "That the sensible and intelligible forms of things, are sent "forth from the things themselves, and make impressions upon distinct secondary perception of an object, is termed an idea. And therefore the precise and accu "the passive intellect, which impressions are perceived by the "active intellect." This notion differs very little from that of Epicurus, which is, "That all things send forth constantly "and in every direction, slender ghosts, or films of themselves, " (tenuia simulacra, as expressed by his commentator Lucre"tius ;) which striking upon the mind, are the means of per"ception, dreaming," &c. Des Cartes, bent to oppose Aristotle, rejects the doctrine of sensible and intelligible phantasms ; maintaining however the same doctrine in effect, namely, That we perceive nothing external but by means of some image either in the brain or in the mind: and these images he terms ideas. According to these philosophers, we perceive nothing immediately but phantasms or ideas; and from these we infer, by reasoning, the existence of external objects. Locke, adopting this doctrine, employs almost the whole of his book about ideas. He holds, that we cannot perceive, remember, nor imagine any thing, but by having an idea or image of it in the mind. He agrees with Des Cartes, that we can have no knowledge of things external, but what we acquire by reasoning upon their ideas or images in the mind; taking it for granted, that we are conscious of these ideas or images, and of nothing else. Those who talk the most intelligibly explain the doctrine thus: When I see in a mirror a man standing behind me, the immediate object of my sight is his image, without which I could not see him in like manner, when I see a tree or a house, there must be an image of these objects in my brain or in my mind; which image is the immediate object of my perception; and by means of that image I perceive the external object. : One would not readily suspect any harm in this ideal system, other than the leading us into a labyrinth of metaphysical errors, in order to account for our knowledge of external objects, which is more truly and more simply accounted for by direct perception. And yet some late writers have been able to extract from it death and destruction to the whole world, levelling all down to a mere chaos of ideas. Dr Berkeley, upon rate definition of an idea, in contradistinction to an original perception, is, "That perception of a real authority of the philosophers named, taking for granted that we cannot perceive any object but what is in the mind, discovered, that the reasoning employed by Des Cartes and Locke to infer the existence of external objects, is inconclusive; and upon that discovery ventured, against common sense, to annihilate totally the material world. And a later writer discovering that Berkeley's arguments might with equal success be applied against immaterial beings, ventures still more boldly to reject by the lump the immaterial world as well as the material; leaving nothing in nature but images or ideas floating in vacuo, without affording them a single mind for shelter or support. When such wild and extravagant consequences can be drawn from the ideal system, it might have been expected, that no man who is not crazy would have ventured to erect such a superstructure, till he should first be certain beyond all doubt of a solid foundation. And yet, upon inquiry, we find the foundation of this terrible doctrine to be no better than a shallow metaphysical argument, namely, "That no being can act but where it is; and, consequently, that it cannot act upon any "subject at a distance." This argument possesses indeed one eminent advantage, that its obscurity, like that of an oracle, is apt to impose upon the reader, who is willing to consider it as a demonstration, because he does not clearly see the fallacy. The best way to give it a fair trial, is to draw it out of its obscurity, and to state it in a clear light, as follows. "No subject can be perceived unless it act upon the mind, but no distant subject can act upon the mind, because no being can act but where "it is and, therefore, the immediate object of perception "must be something united to the mind, so as to be able to act "upon it." Here the argument is completed in all its parts; and from it is derived the supposed necessity of phantasms or ideas united to the mind, as the only objects of perception. It is singularly unlucky, that this argument concludes directly against the very system of which it is the only foundation; for how can phantasms or ideas be raised in the mind by things at 66 |