it. Nor, indeed, does 'motion any otherwise conduce to the measuring of duration, than as it constantly brings about the return of certain sensible ideas, in seeming equidistant periods. For if the motion of the sun were as unequal as of a ship driven by unsteady winds, sometimes very slow, and at others, irregularly very swift; or if being equally swift, it yet was not circular, and produced not the same appearances, it would not at all help us to measure time, any more than the seeming unequal motion of a comet does.

§. 23. Minutes, hours, days, and years, not necessary measures of duration. Minutes, hours, days, and years, are then no more necessary to time or duration, than inches, feet, yards, and miles, marked out in any matter, are to extension. For though we, in this part of the universe, by the constant use of them, as of periods set out by the revolutions of the sun, or as known parts of such periods, have fixed the ideas of such lengths of duration in our minds, which we apply to all parts of time, whose lengths we should consider; yet there may be other parts of the universe, where they no more use these measures of ours, "than' in Japan they do our inches, feet, or miles. But yet something analogous to them, there must be; for without some regular periodical returns, we could not measure ourselves, or signify to others the length of any duration, though, at the same time, the world were as full of motion as it is now, but no part of it disposed into regular and apparently equidistant revolutions. But the different measures that may be made use of for the account of time, do not at all alter the notion of duration, which is the thing to be measured, no more than the different standards of a foot and a cubit, alter the notion of extension to those who make use of those different measures.

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§. 24. One measure of time applicable to duration before time. The mind having once got such a measure of time, as the annual revolution of the sun, can apply that measure to duration, wherein that measure itself did not exist, and with which, in the reality of its being, it had nothing to do: for should one say, that Abraham was born in the 2712 year of the Julian period, it is altogether as intelligible, as reckoning from the beginning of the world, though there were so far back no motion of the sun, nor any motion at all. For though the Julian period be supposed to begin several hundred years before there were really either days, nights, or years, marked out by any revolutions of the sun, yet we reckon as' right, and thereby measure durations as well, as if really at that time the sun had existed, and kept the same ordinary motion it doth now. The idea of duration equal to an annual revolution of the sun, is as easily

applicable in our thoughts to duration, where no sun nor motion was, as the idea of a foot or yard taken from bodies here, can be applied in our thoughts to distances beyond the confines of the world, where are no bodies at all.

§. 25. For supposing it were 5639 miles, or millions of miles, from this place to the remotest body of the universe (for being finite, it must be at a certain distance), as we suppose it to be 5639 years from this time to the first existence of any body in the beginning of the world, we can, in our thoughts, apply this measure of a year to duration before the creation, or beyond the duration of bodies or motion, as we can this measure of a mile to space beyond the utmost bodies; and by the one, measure duration, where there was no motion; as well as by the other, measure space in our thoughts, where there is no body. :

§. 26. If it be objected to me here, that in this way of explaining of time, I have begged what I should not, viz., that the world is neither eternal nor infinite; I answer, that to my present purpose, it is not needful, in this place, to make use of arguments to evince the world to be finite, both in duration and extension; but it being, at least, as conceivable as the contrary, I have certainly the liberty to suppose it, as well as any one hath to suppose the contrary; and I doubt not but that every one that will go about it, may easily conceive in his mind the beginning of motion, though not of all duration; and so may come to a stop, and non ultra, in his consideration of motion; so, also, in his thoughts, he may set limits to body, and the extension belonging to it; but not to space, where no body is, the utmost bounds of space and duration being beyond the reach of thought, as well as the utmost bounds of number are beyond the largest comprehension of the mind, and all for the same reason, as we shall see in another place.

§. 27. Eternity. By the same means, therefore, and from the same original that we come to have the idea of time, we have also that idea which we call eternity, viz., having got the idea of succession and duration, by reflecting on the train of our own ideas, caused in us either by the natural appearances of those ideas coming constantly of themselves into our waking thoughts, or else caused by external objects successively affecting our senses; and having, from the revolutions of the sun, got the ideas of certain lengths of duration, we can, in our thoughts, add such lengths of duration to one another, as often as we please, and apply them, so added, to durations past or to come and this we can continue to do on, without bounds.or limits, and proceed in infinitum, and apply thus the length of the annual motion of the sun to duration, supposed before the sun's,

or any other, motion had its being; which is no more difficult or absurd, than to apply the notion I have of the moving of a shadow, one hour to day upon the sun-dial, to the duration of something last night; v. g. the burning of a candle, which is now absolutely separate from all actual motion; and it is as impossible for the duration of that flame for an hour last night, to co-exist with any motion that now is, or for ever shall be, as for any part of duration, that was before the beginning of the world, to co-exist with the motion of the sun now. But yet this hinders not, but that having the idea of the length of the motion of the shadow on a dial between the marks of two hours, I can as distinctly measure in my thoughts the duration of that candle-light last night, as I can the duration of any thing that does now exist. And it is no more than to think, that had the sun shone then on the dial, and moved after the same rate it doth now, the shadow on the dial would have passed from one hourline to another, whilst that flame of the candle lasted.

§. 28. The notion of an hour, day, or year, being only the idea I have of the length of certain periodical regular motions, neither of which motions do ever all at once exist, but only of the ideas I have of them in my memory, derived from my senses or reflection, I can with the same ease, and for the same reason, apply it in my thoughts to duration antecedent to all manner of motion, as well as to any thing that is but a minute or a day antecedent to the motion that at this very moment the sun is in. All things past, are equally and perfectly at rest; and to this way of consideration of them are all one, whether they were before the beginning of the world, or but yesterday; the measuring of any duration by some motion, depending not at all on the real co-existence of that thing to that motion, or any other periods of revolution, but the having a clear idea of the length of some periodical known motion, or other intervals of duration in my mind, and applying that to the duration of the thing I would measure.

§. 29. Hence we see, that some men imagine the duration of the world from its first existence, to this present year 1689, to have been 5639 years, or equal to 5639 annual revolutions of the sun; and others a great deal more, as the Egyptians of old, who, in the time of Alexander, counted 23,000 years from the reign of the sun; and the Chinese now, who account the world 3,269,000 years old, or more; which longer duration of the world, according to their computation, though I should not believe it to be true, yet I can equally imagine it with them, and, as truly understand and say one is longer than the other, as I understand

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common reckoning of 5639 should be true (as it may be, as well as any other assigned), it hinders not at all my imagining what others mean, when they make the world 1000 years older, since every one may, with the same facility, imagine (I do not say believe) the world to be 50,000 years old, as 5639; and may as well conceive the duration of 50,000 years, as 5639. Whereby it appears, that to the measuring the duration of any thing by time, it is not requisite that that thing should be co-existent to the motion we measure by, or any other periodical revolution; but it suffices to this purpose, that we have the idea of the length of any regular periodical appearance, which we can in our minds apply to duration, with which the motion or appearance never co-existed.

§. 30. For as in the history of the creation delivered by Moses, I can imagine that light existed three days before the sun was, or had any motion, barely by thinking that the duration of light before the sun was created, was so long as (if the sun had moved then as it doth now) would have been equal to three of his diurnal revolutions; so, by the same way, I can have an idea of the chaos or angels being created before there was either light or any continued motion, a minute, an hour, a day, a year, or 1000 years. For if I can but consider duration equal to one minute, before either the being or motion of any body, I can add one minute more till I come to 60: and by the same way of adding minutes, hours, or years (i. e. such or such parts of the sun's revolutions, or any other period, whereof I have the idea), proceed in infinitum, and suppose a duration exceeding as many such periods as I can reckon, let me add whilst I will, which I think is the notion we have of eternity, of whose infinitywe have no other notion than we have of the infinity of number, to which we can add for ever without end.

§. 31. And thus I think it is plain, that from those two fountains of all knowledge before-mentioned, viz., "reflection and sensation, we get the ideas of duration, and the measures of it.

For, First, By observing what passes in our minds, how our ideas there in train constantly sore vanish, and others begin to appear, we come by the idea of succession.:

Secondly, By observing a distance in the parts of this succession, we get the idea of duration..wo

Thirdly, By sensation, observing certain appearances at certain regular and seeming equidistant periods, we get the ideas of certain lengths or measures of duration, as minutes, hours, days, years; &c.l.ii 765 DP 49'm

Fourthly, By being able to repeat those measures of time, or

ideas of stated length of duration in our minds, as often as we will, we can come to imagine duration, where nothing does really endure or exist; and thus we imagine to-morrow, next year, or seven years hence..

Fifthly, By being able to repeat ideas of any length of time, as of a minute, a year, or an age, as often as we will in our own thoughts, and adding them one to another, without ever coming to the end of such addition, any nearer than we can to the end of number, to which we can always add, we come by the idea of eternity, as the future eternal duration of our souls, as well as the eternity of that infinite being, which must necessarily have always existed.

Sixthly, By considering any part of infinite duration, as set out by periodical measures, we come by the idea of what we call time in general.

CHAPTER XV.

OF DURATION AND EXPANSION, CONSIDERED TOGETHER.

. 1. . Both capable of greater and less. Though we have in the precedent chapters dwelt pretty long on the considerations of space and duration; yet they being ideas of general concernment, that have something very abstruse and peculiar in their nature, the comparing them one with another, may, perhaps, be of use for their illustration; and we may have the more clear and distinct conception of them, by taking a view of them together. Distance or space, in its simple abstract conception, to avoid confusion, I call expansion, to distinguish it from extension, which by some is used to express this distance only as it is in the solid parts of matter, and so includes, or at least intimates, the idea of body: whereas the idea of pure distance includes no such thing, I prefer also the word expansion to space, because space is often applied to distance of fleeting successive parts, which never exist together, as well as to those which are permanent. In both these (viz., expansion and duration), the mind has this common idea of continued lengths, capable of greater or less quantities: for a man has as clear an idea of the difference of the length of an hour and a day, as of an inch and a foot.

§. 2. Expansion not bounded by matter.-The mind, having got the idea of the length of any part of expansion, let it be a 'span, or a pace, or what length you will, can, as has been said,' repeat that idea; and so adding it to the former, enlarge its idea