SERMON XIX. AGAINST DETRACTION. JAMES iv. 11. Speak not evil one of another, brethren. λεῖτε ἀλλή φοί. ONE half of our religion consisteth in charity to- SERM. ward our neighbour; and of that charity much the_XIX. greater part seemeth exercised in speech; for as Marahaspeaking doth take up the greatest part of our life, y, dia(our quick and active mind continually venting its thoughts, and discharging its passions thereby; all our conversation and 'commerce passing through it, having a large influence upon all our practice,) so speech commonly having our neighbour and his concernments for its objects, it is necessary, that either most of our charity will be employed therein, or that by it we shall most offend against that great duty, together with its associates, justice and peace. And all offences of this kind (which transgress charity, violate justice, or infringe peace) may perhaps be forbidden in this apostolical precept; for the word kataλaλe, according to its origination, and according to some use, doth signify all kind of obloquy, and so may comprise slander, harsh censure, reviling, scoffing, and the like kinds of speaking against our neighbour; but in stricter acceptation, and according to peculiar use, it denoteth that particular sort of obloquy, which is called detraction, or SERM. backbiting: so therefore we may be allowed to unXIX. derstand it here; and accordingly I now mean to describe it, and to dissuade from its practice. There is between this and the other chief sorts of obloquy (slander, censuring and reviling) much affinity, yet there is some difference; for slander involveth an imputation of falsehood; reviling includeth bitter and foul language; but detraction may be couched in truth, and clothed in fair language; it is a poison often infused in sweet liquor, and ministered in a golden cup. It is of nearer kin to censuring, and accordingly St. James here coupleth it thereto : He that detracteth from a brother, and he that censureth his brother, backbiteth the law, and censureth the law: yet may these two be distinguished; for censuring seemeth to be of more general purport, extending indifferently to all kinds of persons, qualities, and actions, which it unduly taxeth; but detraction especially respecteth worthy persons, good qualities, and laudable actions, the reputation of which it aimeth to destroy, or to impair. This sort of ill practice, so rife in use, so base in its nature, so mischievous in its effects, it shall be my endeavour to describe, that we may know it; and to dissuade, that we may shun it. It is the fault (opposite to that part of charity and goodness, which is called ingenuity or candour) which, out of naughty disposition or design, striveth to disgrace worthy persons, or to disparage good actions, looking for blemishes and defects in them, using care and artifice to pervert or misrepresent things to that purpose. An honest and charitable mind disposeth us, when we see any man endued with good qualities, and XIX. pursuing a tenor of good practice, to esteem such a SERM. person, to commend him, to interpret what he doeth to the best, not to suspect any ill of him, or to seek any exception against him; it inclineth us, when we see any action materially good, to yield it simply due approbation and praise, without searching for, or surmising any defect in the cause or principle, whence it cometh, in the design or end to which it tendeth, in the way or manner of performing it. A good man would be sorry to have any good thing spoiled; as to find a crack in a fair building, a flaw in a fine jewel, a canker in a goodly flower, is grievous to any indifferent man; so would it be displeasing to him to observe defects in a worthy person, or commendable action; he therefore will not easily entertain a suspicion of any such, he never will hunt for any. But, on the contrary, it is the property of a detractor, when he seeth a worthy person, whom he doth not affect, or whom he is concerned to wrong, to survey him throughly, and to sift all his actions, with intent to descry some failing, or any semblance of a fault, by which he may disparage him; when he vieweth any good action, he peereth into it, labouring to espy some pretence to derogate from the commendation apparently belonging to it. This in general is the nature of this fault. But we may get a fuller understanding of it, by considering more distinctly some particular acts, wherein it is commonly exercised, or the several paths in which the detracting spirit treadeth; such are these following. 1. A detractor is wont to represent persons and actions under the most disadvantageous circumstances he can, setting out those which may cause them to appear odious or despicable, slipping over SERM. those which may commend or excuse them. There ὑπακοῦον, ovdi dižu Theoph. νον τὸ εὖ. stances forced to omit some things, which would become him to do, if he were able; to perform some things lamely, and otherwise than he would do, if he could reach it; no action so worthy, but may have some defect in matter, or manner, incapable of redress; and he that representeth such person or acTroux tion, leaving out those excusing circumstances, doth tend to beget a bad or mean opinion of them, robbing them of their due value and commendation: thus to charge a man of not having done a good work, when he had not the power or opportunity to perform it, or is by cross accidents hindered from doing it according to his desire; to suggest the action was not done exactly, in the best season, in the rightest mode, in the most proper place, with expressions, looks, or gestures most convenient, these are tricks of a detractor; who when he cannot deny the metal to be good, and the stamp true, he clippeth it, and so would reject it from being current. 2. He is wont to misconstrue ambiguous words, or to misinterpret doubtful appearances of things: let a man speak never so well, or act never so fairly, yet a detractor will say his words may bear this ill sense, his actions may tend to that bad purpose; we may therefore suspect his meaning, and cannot yield him a full approbation. 3. He is wont to misname the qualities of persons or things, assigning bad appellations or epithets to good or indifferent qualities: the names of virtue and vice do so nearly border in signification, that it is easy to transfer them from one to another, and to XIX. give the best quality a bad namea. Thus by calling SERM. a sober man sour, a cheerful man vain, a conscientious man morose, a devout man superstitious, a free man prodigal, a frugal man sordid, an open man simple, a reserved man crafty, one that standeth upon his honour and honesty proud, a kind man ambitiously popular, a modest man sullen, timorous, or stupid, is a very easy way to detract, and no man thereby can scape being disparaged. 4. He doth imperfectly characterize persons, so as studiously to veil or faintly to disclose their virtues and good qualities, but carefully to expose, and fully to aggravate or amplify any defects or failings in them. The detractor will pretend to give a character of his neighbour, but in so doing he stifleth what may commend him, and blazoneth what may disgrace him; like an envious painter he hideth, or in dusky colours shadoweth, all the graceful parts and goodly features, but setteth out all blemishes in the briskest light, and most open view. Every face hath in it some mole, spot, or wrinkle; there is no man that hath not, as they speak, some blind place, some blemishes in his nature or temper, some faults contracted by education or custom, somewhat amiss proceeding from ignorance, or misapprehension of things: these (although they be in themselves small and inconsiderable, although they are some of them involuntary, and thence inculpable, although they be much corrected or restrained by virtuous discipline, although they are compensated by greater virtues, a At nos virtutes ipsas invertimus, atque Sincerum cupimus vas incrustare. Probus quis Nobiscum vivit? multum est demissus homo. Illi Tardo cognomen pinguis damus, &c. Hor. Serm. i. 3. |