PART SECOND.

SECTION II.

Continuation of the fame Subject.

HE remarks which have been hitherto made, on

TH

the utility of the philofophy of the human mind, are of a very general nature, and apply equally to all defcriptions of men. Befides, however, these more obvious advantages of the ftudy, there are others, which, though lefs ftriking, and lefs extenfive in their application, are nevertheless, to fome particular claffes of individuals, of the highest importance. Without pretending to exhaust the subject, I fhall offer a few detached obfervations upon it, in this section.

I already took notice, in general terms, of the common relation which all the different branches of our knowledge bear to the philofophy of the human mind. In confequence of this relation, it not only forms an interesting object of curiofity to literary men of every denomination; but, if fuccessfully profecuted, it cannot fail to furnish useful lights for directing their inquiries; whatever the nature of the fubjects may be, which happen to engage their attention.

In order to be fatisfied of the juítnefs of this obfervation, it is fufficient to recollect, that to the philofophy of the mind are to be referred, all our inquiries concerning the divifions and the claffifications of the objects of human knowledge; and alfo, all the various rules, both for the investigation, and the communication,

munication, of truth. These general views of science, and thefe general rules of method, ought to form the fubjects of a rational and useful logic; a study, undoubtedly, in itself of the greatest importance and dignity, but in which lefs progress has hitherto been made than is commonly imagined.

I fhall endeavour to illuftrate, very briefly, a few of the advantages which might be expected to refult from such a system of logic, if properly executed.

I. And, in the first place, it is evident that it would be of the highest importance in all the sciences, (in fome of them, indeed, much more than in others,) to exhibit a precise and steady idea of the objects which they present to our inquiry.- What was the principal circumstance which contributed to mislead the ancients, in their phyfical researches? Was it not their confused and wavering notions about the particular class of truths, which it was their business to investigate? It was owing to this, that they were led to neglect the obvious phenomena and laws of moving bodies; and to indulge themselves in conjectures about the efficient causes of motion, and the nature of those minds, by which they conceived the particles of matter to be animated; and that they so often blended the history of facts, with their metaphyfical fpeculations. In the present state of fcience, indeed, we are not liable to fuch mistakes in natural philofophy; but it would be difficult to mention any other branch of knowledge, which is entirely exempted from them. In metaphyfics, I might almoft fay, they are at the bottom of all our controverfies. In the celebrated dispute, for example, which has been so long carried

on,

on, about the explanation given by the ideal theory of the phenomena of perception, the whole difficulty arose from this, that philofophers had no precife notion of the point they wished to ascertain; and now, that the controversy has been brought to a conclufion, (as I think all men of candour must confess it to have been by Dr. Reid,) it will be found, that his doctrine on the fubject throws no light whatever, on what was generally understood to be the great object of inquiry; I mean, on the mode of communication between the mind and the material world: and, in truth, amounts only to a precife defcription of the fact, stripped of all hypothefis, and stated in such a manner as to give us a diftinct view of the infurmountable limits which nature has in this inftance prefcribed to our curiofity. The fame obfervation may be made, on the reasonings of this profound and original author, with respect to fome metaphyfical queftions that had been started on the subject of vision; in particular, concerning the caufe of our feeing objects fingle with two eyes, and our feeing objects erect, by means of inverted images on the retina.

If we were to examine, in like manner, the present state of morals, of jurifprudence, of politics, and of philofophical criticism; I believe, we should find, that the principal circumftance which retards their progrefs, is the vague and indiftin&t idea, which those who apply to the study of them have formed to them. felves of the objects of their refearches. Were thefe objects once clearly defined, and the proper plan of inquiry for attaining them illuftrated by a few unexceptionable models, writers of inferior genius would

be

be enabled to employ their industry to much more advantage; and would be prevented from adding to that rubbish, which, in confequence of the ill-directed ingenuity of our predeceffors, obftructs our progress in the pursuit of truth.

As a philofophical system of logic would assist us in our particular scientific investigations, by keeping fteadily in our view the attainable objects of human curiofity; fo, by exhibiting to us the relation in which they all stand to each other, and the relation which they all bear to what ought to be their common aim, the advancement of human happiness, it would have a tendency to confine industry and genius to inquiries which are of real practical utility; and would communicate a dignity to the most fubordinate pursuits, which are in any refpect fubfervient to fo important a purpose. When our views are limited to one particular science, to which we have been led to devote ourselves by taste or by accident, the course of our studies resembles the progress of a traveller through an unknown country; whofe wanderings, from place to place, are determined merely by the impulse of occafional curiofity; and whofe opportunities of information must neceffarily be limited to the objects which accidentally present themselves to his notice. It is the philofophy of the mind alone, which, by furnishing us with a general map of the field of human knowledge, can enable us to proceed with fteadiness, and in an useful direction; and while it gratifies our curiofity, and animates our exertions, by exhibiting to us all the various bearings of our journey, can conduct us to thofe eminences from whence the eye may wander

over the vast and unexplored regions of science. Lord Bacon was the first person who took this comprehenfive view of the different departments of study; and who pointed out, to all the claffes of literary men, the great end to which their labours should confpire; the multiplication of the fources of human enjoyment, and the extenfion of man's dominion over nature. Had this object been kept steadily in view by his followers, their discoveries, numerous and important as they have been, would have advanced with ftill greater rapidity, and would have had a much more extenfive influence on the practical arts of life *.

From fuch a system of logic, too, important affiftance might be expected, for reforming the established plan of public or academical education. It is melancholy to reflect on the manner in which this is carried on, in most, perhaps, I might fay, in all the countries of Europe; and that, in an age of comparative light and liberality, the intellectual and moral characters of youth fhould continue to be formed on a plan devised by men who were not only ftrangers to the business of the world, but who felt themselves interested in oppofing the progress of useful knowledge.

Omnium autem graviffimus error in deviatione ab ultimo doctrinarum fine confiftit. Appetunt enim homines fcientiam, alii ex infitâ curiofitate et irrequietâ; alii animi caufâ et delectationis, alii exiftimationis gratiâ : alii contentionis ergo, atque ut in differendo fuperiores fint plerique propter lucrum et victum: pauciffimi, ut donum rationis, divinitus datum, in ufus humani generis impendant.

-Hoc enim illud eft, quod revera doctrinam atque artes condecoraret, et attolleret, fi contemplatio, et actio, arctiore quam adhuc vinculo copularentur. De Aug. Scicat. lib. i.

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