and therefore Dr. Reid's argument does not, in the leaft, invalidate the doctrine of the Nominalists, that, without the use of language, (under which term I comprehend every fpecies of figns,) we fhould never have been able to extend our fpeculations beyond individuals.

That, in many cafes, we may safely employ in our reasonings, general terms, the meaning of which we are not even able to interpret in this way, and confequently, which are to us wholly infignificant, I had occasion already to demonftrate, in a former part of this section.

SECTION IV.

Continuation of the fame Subject.—Inferences with respect to the Ufe of Language as an Inftrument of Thought, and the Errors in Reasoning to which it occasionally gives rise.

IN the laft Section, I mentioned Dr. Campbell, as an ingenious defender of the fyftem of the Nominalists; and I alluded to a particular application which he has made of their doctrine. The reafonings which I had then in view, are to be found in the seventh chapter of the second book of his Philofophy of Rhetorick; in which chapter he proposes to explain how it happens, "that nonfenfe fo often efcapes being "detected, both by the writer and the reader." The title is fomewhat ludicrous in a grave philofophical work; but the difquifition to which it is prefixed, contains many acute and profound remarks

on the nature and power of figns, both as a medium of communication, and as an inftrument of thought.

Dr. Campbell's fpeculations with respect to language as an inftrument of thought, feem to have been fuggefted by the following paffage in Mr. Hume's Treatife of Human Nature. "I believe, every one "who examines the fituation of his mind in reafon"ing, will agree with me, that we do not annex dif"tinct and complete ideas to every term we make use "of; and that in talking of Government, Church,

66

Negotiation, Conqueft, we feldom fpread out in our "minds all the fimple ideas of which these complex "ones are compofed. It is, however, obfervable, that "notwithstanding this imperfection, we may avoid "talking nonsense on thefe fubjects; and may per"ceive any repugnance among the ideas, as well as "if we had a full comprehenfion of them. Thus if, "instead of saying, that, in war, the weaker have "always recourse to negotiation, we fhould fay, that "they have always recourfe to conqueft; the custom "which we have acquired, of attributing certain re"lations to ideas, ftill follows the words, and makes "us immediately perceive the abfurdity of that pro"pofition."

In the remarks which Dr. Campbell has made on this paffage, he has endeavoured to explain in what manner our habits of thinking and fpeaking, gradually establish in the mind fuch relations among the words we employ, as enable us to carry on proceffes of reafoning by means of them, without attending in every inftance to their particular fignification. With most

of his remarks on this fubject I perfectly agree; but the illuftrations he gives of them, are of too great. extent to be introduced here; and I would not wifh. to run the risk of impairing their perfpicuity, by attempting to abridge them. I must therefore refer fuch of my readers as wish to profecute the fpecu-. lation, to his very ingenious and philofophical treatise.

"In confequence of these circumstances," (says" Dr. Campbell,)" it happens that, in matters which "are perfectly familiar to us, we are able to reafonby means of words, without examining, in every "inftance, their fignification. Almost all the poffible "applications of the terms (in other words, all the acquired relations of the figns) have become cuf

66

tomary to us. The confequence is, that an unusual "application of any term is inftantly detected; this "detection breeds doubt, and this doubt occafions an "immediate recourse to ideas. The recourse of the “mind, when in any degree puzzled with the signs, "to the knowledge it has of the things fignified, is "natural, and on fuch fubjects perfectly eafy. And "of this recourfe the difcovery of the meaning, or of "the unmeaningness of what is faid, is the immediate "effect. But in matters that are by no means fami"liar, or are treated in an uncommon manner, and in "fuch as are of an abftrufe and intricate nature, the "cafe is widely different." The inftances in which we are chiefly liable to be impofed on by words without meaning are, (according to Dr. Campbell,) the three following:

First, Where there is an exuberance of metaphor.

Secondly, When the terms most frequently occurring, denote things which are of a complicated nature, and to which the mind is not fufficiently familiarifed. Such are the words, Government, Church, State, Conftitution, Polity, Power, Commerce, Legislature, Jurifdiction, Proportion, Symmetry, Elegance.

Thirdly, When the terms employed are very abftract, and confequently of very extenfive fignification *. For an illustration of these remarks, I muft refer the reader to the ingenious work which I just now quoted,

To the obfervations of thefe eminent writers, I fhall take the liberty of adding, that we are doubly liable to the mistakes they mention, when we make use of a language which is not perfectly familiar to us. Nothing, indeed, I apprehend, can shew more clearly the use we make of words in reafoning than this, that an obfervation which, when expressed in our own language, seems trite or frivolous, often acquires the appearance of depth and originality, by being tranflated into another. For my own part, at least, I am con

* "The more general any word is in its fignification, it is the more liable to be abused by an improper or unmeaning applica"tion. A very general term is applicable alike to a multitude of "different individuals, a particular term is applicable but to a few. "When the rightful applications of a word are extremely nume "rous, they cannot all be so strongly fixed by habit, but that, "for greater fecurity, we must perpetually recur in our minds "from the fign to the notion we have of the thing fignified; and "for the reafon aforementioned, it is in fuch inftances difficult "precisely to ascertain this notion. Thus the latitude of a word, "though different from its ambiguity, hath often a fimilar effect.” -Philofophy of Rhetoric, vol. ii. p. 122.

scious

feious of having been frequently led, in this way, to form an exaggerated idea of the merits of antient and of foreign authors; and it has happened to me more than once, that a fentence, which feemed at first to contain something highly ingenious and profound, when tranflated into words familiar to me, appeared obviously to be a trite or a nugatory propofition.

The effect produced by an artificial and inverted ftyle in our own language, is fimilar to what we experience when we read a compofition in a foreign one. The eye is too much dazzled to fee diftinctly. "Aliud ftyli genus," (says Bacon,) totum in eo est, "ut verba fint aculeata, fententiæ concifæ, oratio "denique potius verfa quam fufa, quo fit, ut omnia, per hujufmodi artificium, magis ingeniofa videantur 66 quam re vera fint. Tale invenitur in Seneca effufius, in Tacito et Plinio fecundo moderatius."

The deranged collocation of the words in Latin compofition, aids powerfully the impofition we have now been confidering, and renders that language an inconvenient medium of philofophical communication; as well as an inconvenient inftrument of accurate thought. Indeed, in all languages in which this latitude in the arrangement of words is admitted, the affociations among words must be loofer, than where one invariable order is followed; and of confequence, on the principles of Hume and Campbell, the miftakes which are committed in reafonings expreffed in fuch languages, will not be fo readily detected.

The errors in reasoning, to which we are exposed in confequence of the ufe of words as an inftrument of thought, will appear the less furprising, when we con