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twelve months, the dry rot will have made a considerable progress; if put together in the usual manner, as described by Mr. Pering, in two years she will be sufficiently shrunk to play pretty freely on her fastenings, and to let in "oozing drip;" and at the end of five years, she will require what is called a thorough repair" to put her into a state of service. Mr. Pering asserts positively, "that no ship ever received a thorough repair, without costing more money than when she was built, and in some instances half as much again." It may thus happen that a 74 gun ship, without performing one day's service, may, some five or six years after launching, be brought forward from the ordinary, at an expense to the public of 150,000l.

Instead, then, of building new ships, to rot in ordinary, we should recommend the opposite plan of bringing those already in ordinary forward for service, as the surest means of saving them from decay. For this purpose we should select those whose repairs would not exceed one third, or, at the most, one half of the original cost, and after providing sufficiently for guard, receiving, prison, hospital, and convalescent ships, break up the remainder; taking care to preserve the sound parts for the repair of other ships, and to dispose of the rest for fire wood: we should thus get rid of much trouble and encumbrance, and save the interest of money on a dead and decaying capital.

We are fully aware of the difficulty of repairing the ordinary in the manner proposed. We know that the present accommodations of our dock-yards are by no means correspondent with the extended scale of the naval establishment; yet we still believe, that under a well regulated system of management, much of the difficulty might be overcome. But if ships are allowed to remain in dock for three or four years, waiting for timber or for hands-if small frigates or sloops are suffered to occupy docks for first rates, ten or twelve months-then, indeed, not even the magnificent scale of the projected naval arsenal at Northfleet, of which we have heard so much, would be sufficient to repair the ordinary. There are no less than 18 docks in the six naval yards, into which ships of the line can be taken, besides seven others for frigates, &c. and we think it has been satisfactorily shown that, by a due appropriation of them, there might be constantly brought forward eight or ten sail of the line from the ordinary, which are more than are wanted, as we shall now proceed to show.

* In a letter to Lord Melville respecting troop-ships, and the general state of the navy-a pamphlet supposed to be written by his late secretary, Mr. Budge, and well deserving the attentive perusal of every man connected with naval concerns.

Assuming it as a fact, that 400,000 tons of shipping are in a state of ordinary, of which 80 or 100,000 tons may consist of ships of the line; that one fourth of these, or, which amounts to the same thing, that twenty 74 gun ships may advantageously be repaired, and that twenty more are actually on the stocks; we would propose that two new and two old ships should be brought forward for service every year; that two sail of the line should be built annually at Bombay, and the timbers of two others prepared at the same time, to be brought home in their holds. By these means we have at once the eight ships of the line necessary to keep up the efficiency of the fleet. The sixteen frigates might be procured by building one at Bombay, one at Trincomalle, one at Bengal, one at Prince of Wales's Island, and one at Trinidad, each of which should bring home her duplicate, or, at least, a considerable part of it; the remaining six might be provided at home, either from the ordinary, or by building them of fir. The sloops, gun-brigs, tenders, and other small vessels might be built of fir or larch; or, as we have already observed, if built in India, from the refuse of the timber employed in the large ships, they would cost little more than the price of labour.

There are others, however, who would go a readier way to work, and reduce our present naval establishment, as unnecessarily large to cope with that of the enemy. It was ob served by the late Lord Melville in the house of lords in 1800, (and the same sentiments have been uttered in the other house,)" that the naval establishment of this country was then upon a scale considerably exceeding what in wisdom, in sound policy, and on every principle of economy it ought to be." He admitted that our naval superiority ought at all times to be decisive and commanding; but that, considering the scarcity of naval timber, and the high price of naval stores of every description, it was not a time for the country to give way to an ostentatious and prodigal expenditure. He thought that about ninety sail of the line would be amply sufficient for home and foreign service, and therefore recommended keeping as many ships of the line as possible sound and entire to meet future exigencies-in other words, to lay them up in ordinary. The effect of this we have already explained. On the other point we are not much disposed to differ from his lordship, considering the enemy's force then afloat, and supposing a suspension of farther preparations on

Printed Speech of the late Lord Melville, made in the house of lords on the subject of employing troop-ships.

his part. We agree with him that, between the period of the victory of Trafalgar and that of his lordship's speech, a considerable reduction might have been made; but we totally dissent from any such reduction now. Our navy, it is true, rides triumphant on the ocean without a rival, because the only one with which it has, of late years, had to contend, does not now venture to leave its ports-at least, with any intention to meet us. But, are we to consider this conduct of the enemy as altogether the effect of fear, or of a premeditated system? Is he inactive in his naval preparations? Does he show, either in words or measures, that he has finally yielded the point of naval superiority? Are the maritime peace, to which he has so often pledged himself, and the maritime rights about which so much clamour has been raised, meant only as "windy words" to bully us out of those rights obtained by the blood and treasure of our ancestors, and sanctioned by time and treaties? Or, do not the active preparations in all his ports, rather indicate a determined perseverance in some settled plan which, he fondly hopes, will tend to our destruction? and ought they not to convince us that the great battle is yet to be fought which must firmly establish our naval superiority? We have "scotched the snake, not killed it." Before, then, we talk of reducing our navy, let us examine the present state of that of the enemy. If our researches are at all correct, it will be found pretty nearly as under :

Making a total of 65 51 ready for sea, and 32 36 in such a state of forwardness that, in the course of the next year, we shall have opposed to us, under French colours, ninety-seven sail of the line and eighty-seven frigates. If to these we add twenty-six sail of the line and twelve frigates belonging to Russia, (exclusive of ten sail of the line and as

many frigates in the Black Sea,) twelve sail of the line and six frigates to Sweden, and four sail of the line and one frigate to Denmark, most of which are in a state of service, and all of which were, but a very few months ago, in declared hostility to us, we shall have a force to watch at least, if not to contend with, of one hundred and thirty-nine sail of the line and one hundred and six frigates. The number of ships in commission, in the British navy, fluctuates from one hundred to one hundred and five sail of the line, and from one hundred and forty to one hundred and fifty frigates, with a proportion of smaller vessels and stationary ships. If the enemy would leave his ports and contest with us, as formerly, the point of naval superiority, then, indeed, we might spare a few ships of the line, and reckon upon recruiting our own force, as formerly, from his. But the system of naval warfare has undergone a total change since the unparalleled victory of Trafalgar. If the enemy now steals out by chance, or moves his ships from one port to another, the achievement is hailed as a triumph. The present system of the French government is not to fight, but to keep in port; ours to blockade him there; and, to do this effectually, the blockading squadron must necessarily exceed that of the enemy blockaded. But with this excess, it is not always possible to confine him to his ports. What, then, it may be asked, is the advantage of our blockading system? We shall briefly state what, to us at least, appear to be the inconveniences which attend it, and the good effects by which those inconveniences are counterbalanced. It is the more important to settle these points, because on them hinges the answer to the following questionCan we, consistently with national policy and national security, dismantle a part of our present force (not to preserve it, for that we have shown to be out of the question, but) to effect an annual saving of something short of one million?

In the first place, then, instead of our ships taking a cruise, as in former wars, to look for the enemy at sea, and then return to Spithead to refit and refresh, and to remain in port for the winter months, they now keep the sea in all kinds of weather, and in all seasons of the year, off the enemy's ports. This, it is obvious, cannot be done without an extraordinary wear and tear in the ships, a great expense in sending out provisions and water for their supply, and a great anxiety, on the part of the officer commanding the blockading squadron, lest the enemy should effect his escape. It is well known that the constant watching for an opportunity of getting at the enemy, and frustrating his plans, has so preyed on the spirits and constitution, as to wear out many of our best officers,

The patience, perseverance, and good will with which both officers and men have carried on this most disagreeable and harassing service, are above all praise, and the more so, when it is considered that the success of these extraordinary exertions (exertions, we are persuaded, peculiar to the hardy and intrepid sons of Great Britain) is always uncertain; for it may safely be asserted that, with the exception of five or six of the summer months, there is scarcely another month in the year in which the enemy may not effect his escape unperceived by the blockading squadron. Should his course be tracked, the reduced state of the provisions and water of our squadron may not always allow it to follow him. To obviate this evil effectually, the blockading ships must be frequently relieved; to do which, allowing for casualties, would require, on the home stations, at least one ship in six, and in the Mediterranean, one in four above the enemy. At this low calculation, we ought not to have less for watching the ninetyseven sail of the line and eighty-seven frigates, which the enemy will have fit for sea in the course of next year, than one hundred and sixteen sail of the line and one hundred and four frigates; without any provision for the protection of our numerous colonies in the East and West Indies, the coast of Africa and America, the fisheries of Greenland and Newfoundland, and our exclusive commerce to every part of the world; without any security for the Baltic, which alone requires six or eight ships of the line, to protect our 3,000 merchant vessels trading there against Denmark and Prussia. It is pretty clear, then, that if the blockading system is to be persevered in, instead of reducing, we shall very shortly be under the necessity of augmenting, our naval force.

As a set-off against the disadvantages of a constant blockade, we may reckon the complete security which the trade of this kingdom has experienced in consequence of it. The insurance is now little more than that of a common sea-risk. Single ships run with licenses, and fleets of one hundred sail and more, proceed in safety under the convoy of a frigate or a sloop of war. So unusual is it now for an enemy's ship to venture out, that, when it happens, the mercantile world is thrown into as much alarm as the enemy himself: notices are posted up at Lloyd's; the admiralty is beset with clamorous representations; and the daily papers are filled with lamentations and conjectures as absurd as their expectations are generally unreasonable.

But, great as the benefits are which commerce derives from our naval pre-eminence, they are trifling indeed when compared with the perfect security and tranquillity which every part