Response to Questions From the House Subcommittee on Office of Massachusetts Governor Michael S. Dukakis 1) What is and should be the responsibility of State government, if any, in offsite emergency planning and preparedness activities for nuclear power plants? The responsibility of State government ought to be in developing effective emergency plans and certifying their adequacy before construction permits are issued for new nuclear power plants. This was not the case at Seabrook. In the Seabrook case, potential problems regarding emergency planning were raised early and often in the NRC licensing process, by the Commonwealth and others, only to be largely dismissed as superfluous to the "defense-in-depth" strategy of nuclear reactor design. Only with the Three Mile Island Accident, and the resulting creation of the NRC/FEMA emergency planning rules, was the issue of offsite emergency planning given the priority it had always deserved in nuclear plant licensing. The creation of the new emergency planning rules has subjected the Seabrook plant to a regrettable double-jeopardy in licensing. Nevertheless, we believe strongly that the NRC/FEMA regulations mean what they say: that no plant should receive an operating license unless the appropriate governors have found that emergency response plans are adequate to protect the public health and safety. Admittedly, the NRC/FEMA regulations also provide several avenues for the approval of plans without a governor's certification as to their adequacy. Nevertheless, none of these avenues have yet been used successfully, and we doubt that anything short of radical amendment of the regulations will allow a plant's licensure on such a basis. The burden will fall to the NRC to demonstrate a credible basis for such amendments. In the meantime, public trust in the nuclear program can only be maintained by adherence to what we believe is a strong and appropriate role reserved for state governments in the existing regulations; that is, the role of devising and certifying adequate emergency plans before an operating license is granted. 2) What is and should be the responsibility of local governments, if any, in offsite emergency planning and preparedness activities for nuclear power plants? Local governments are essential partners to state government in devising emergency effective emergency response plans, for the simple fact that local government agencies (police, fire, etc.) are the first line of defense in almost every kind of emergency. Over the last few months we have disagreed with many good people about whether local governments ought to be given absolute approval or veto power over emergency plans for their own towns. Governor Dukakis believes very strongly that governors ought to retain control over the ultimate approval or disapproval. The governors have a broader responsibility and a broader authority than local officials. The governors are often called on to make decisions regarding important and controversial non-nuclear facilities that may serve the general public while imposing burdens on their immediate neighbors. Nuclear power plants are much the same kind of facility, and the governors ought to exercise the same kind of authority over radiological emergency response plans. Nevertheless, common sense tells us that the effectiveness of emergency plans will be directly related to the degree of cooperation and involvement that local governments put into those plans. The recommendations of local government must always be given serious consideration by a responsible governor. 3) What is and should be the role of State government, if any, in the implementation of radiological emergency response plans for nuclear power plants? If emergency response plans are found adequate and approved by the governor, then those plans ought to be implemented in good faith by state and local government. Implementation should not be at issue, as long as emergency plans have met a meaningful standard of adequacy. We cannot foresee any plan that will meet such a standard without the full participation of state government, since in our opinion state government must play an absolutely central in any effective emergency plan. Only state government has the ability to mobilize emergency resources quickly over a wide area. There is no other credible substitute for a strong state role, if plans are to be truly effective. 4) What is and should be the role of local governments, if any, in the implementation of radiological emergency response plans for nuclear power plants ? If State government is the central player in effective emergency response, then local governments and their agencies form the critical first line of defense. In most situations during an emergency, local police and fire departments and related agencies will be the first on the scene to render assistance. Local governments have a responsibility to implement emergency plans in good faith once they have been deemed adequate; the determination of adequacy will rest in some considerable measure on local government's ability and willingness to respond. 5) What is and should be the role of State government in the development and establishment of safety standards for nuclear power plants ? Historically, the role of State government in developing and establishing safety standards for nuclear plants has been virtually non-existent, given the strong, pre-emptive authority delegated to Federal regulators under the Atomic Energy Act. State governments should be able to play a strong role in the development of safety standards through the licensing process, but at this point in time the issue is secondary, since no new nuclear plant has been ordered in several years, and it is unlikely that any will be ordered in the foreseeable future. The relevant issue concerns the role State governments ought to play in establishing standards for existing plants. Ideally, this authority should be centralized in a Federal agency, where the highest level of expertise can be concentrated. The most significant safety issues in nuclear plant design and construction are of a far more specialized nature than those that ordinarily confront State environmental and safety agencies in the implementation of their programs. For that reason we believe that our national effort in ensuring nuclear plant safety ought to be focused on making the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or a successor agency- as effective as possible. States ought to have an automatic right to intervene in NRC proceedings concerning safety issues that are pertinent to nuclear plants in or near their borders, however. Moreover, the States ought to be afforded the right to trigger such proceedings at the NRC whenever the States present the NRC with credible evidence that safety issues regarding these plants have not been fully addressed by the NRC and its staff. We are concerned that such rights not only because such rights are not currently afforded the States, but because of what appears to be sentiment prevailing at the NRC to limit the ability of States and other intervenors to participate in NRC proceedings as they are currently structured. 6) Should State governments be allowed to enact more stringent safety standards or requirements than those imposed by the Federal government ? In general, State governments ought to be accorded the right to advocate the adoption of more-stringent-than-required safety standards at nuclear plants, and a State's advocacy should be accorded some automatic standing, even if rebuttable, in NRC proceedings. If granted the authority, the States' ability to enforce more-stringent-than-required standard would probably be limited by their relative lack of expertise in this area. For this reason we believe that a more effective assertion of State authority would be through proceedings at the NRC level. 7) What role, if any, should States have in monitoring utility compliance with Federal safety standards and regulations ? Governor Dukakis has supported the National Governors Association resolution in favor of expanding the authority of the states to monitor not only utility compliance with Federal safety standards, but NRC findings and subsequent follow-up on safety violations. Safety is best served by maintaining the best force of regulators possible. This is most easily accomplished at the Federal level. However, the guiding philosophy of the American nuclear power program from its inception has been one of industry self-regulation. There is no question that this philosophy has often inhibited Federal regulators, and cast them in a reactive role. Self-regulation ought to be abandoned in favor of straightforward safety enforcement. This ought to be a matter of the highest national priority; after all, even if no new reactors are ordered and licensed for the remainder of this century, over one hundred commercial reactors will be operating throughout the U.S., and in need of subsequent decommissining, in the decades ahead. We are not sure that State governments can wait for the necessary change in national policy to take place. Public confidence in existing nuclear power plants has been undermined by discoveries that plants have been allowed to conduct business-as-usual even after numerous safety violations have been cited by regulators. For that reason we believe that it is essential that states be allowed full rights to participate in safety investigations, and to monitor both utility compliance and NRC follow-up. 8) Should the size of the emergency planning zone for the Seabrook nuclear power plant be reduced? Why or why not? No. We know of no accepted technical basis by which a reduction of the emergency planning zone could be justified. Emergency planning is properly based on the premise that very serious accidents could happen, however unlikely. Given this presumption, we cannot foresee how a a reduction in the emergency planning zone makes sense. Indeed, one lesson that the Chernobyl disaster underscores is that the proper area of concern for emergency planning runs well beyond the mandated ten-mile radius. In the future, we must be prepared to take protective actions at greater distances in the event of radiation emergencies, even though it will always be true that effective emergency planning will focus intensive efforts on persons who live within short distances from a nuclear plant. In any event, the notion of reducing the emergency planning zone at this point in time seems unsupportable to us. 9) What discussions have you had with Public Service of New Hampshire regarding the development of a utility emergency response plan ? New Hampshire Yankee announced early in the summer that it would undertake to draft its own emergency response plans for Massachusetts. We expect New Hampshire Yankee to submit those plans to the NRC as a compensatory measure, now that the Commonwealth has permanently suspended its emergency planning for Seabrook. New Hampshire Yankee has initiated no discussion with the Commonwealth concerning compensatory plans, other than to advise the Governor and his staff that such plans are being drafted. The Commonwealth will oppose the submission of such plans, and any subsequent approval by the NRC and its licensing boards. |