being attached to the assertion, is this; that we would not be under moral obligation to perform any action, unless it were productive of the greatest amount of happiness, thus making moral obligation rest upon this other idea, that of the greatest amount of happiness.

Now, if this be asserted, it is, surely, from what has been said above, not self evident; for we manifestly do not instinctively and universally, as soon as this connexion is asserted, yield our assent to it, nor is it absurd to deny it; and, therefore, the assertion capable of proof, and we may justly demand the proof before we believe it. Let us then examine the proof on which it rests.

It is, however, to be remarked, that, if the assertion be true, that we are under obligation to perform an action only on the ground, that it is productive of the greatest good, the assertion must be taken in its widest sense. It must apply to actions affecting our relations, not only to man, but, also, to God, for these are equally comprehended within the notion of moral obligation. And thus, the assertion is, that we are not under obligation to perform any action whatever, under any circumstances, unless it be productive of the greatest happiness.

1. It is said, that these two always coincide; that is, that we always are under obligation to do whatever is productive of the greatest amount of happiness; and that, whatever we are under obligation to do, is productive of the greatest amount of happiness. Now, granting the premises, I do not see that the conclusion would follow. It is possible to conceive, that God may have created moral agents under obligations to certain courses of conduct, and has so arranged the system of the universe, that the following of these courses shall be for the best, without making the obligation to rest at all upon the tendency to produce the greatest amount of happiness.

A parent may require a child to do that which will be for the good of the family, and yet there may be other reasons besides this, which render it the duty of the child to obey his parent.

2. But, second, how do we know that these premises are true, that, whatever we are under obligation to do, is productive of the greatest amount of happiness. It never can be known, unless we know the whole history of this universe from everlasting to everlasting. And besides, we know that God always acts right, that is, deals with all beings according to their deserts; but whether he always acts to promote the greatest happiness, I do not know that he has told us. His government could not be more perfectly right than it is; but whether it could have involved less misery, or have produced more happiness, I do not know that we have the means of ascertaining. As, therefore, the one quantity, so to speak, is fixed, that is, is as great as it can be, while we do not certainly know that the other is as great as it can be, we cannot affirm that right and the greatest amount of happiness always coincide; nor, that we are under obligation to do nothing, unless it would tend to produce the greatest amount of happiness.

3. Besides, suppose we are under no obligation to do any thing unless it were productive of the greatest amount of happiness, it would follow that we are under no obligation to obey God, unless the production of the greatest amount of happiness were the controlling and universal principle of his government. That is, if his object in creating and governing the universe, were any other, or, if it were doubtful whether it might not be any other, our obligation to obedience would either be annihilated, or would be contingent; that is, it would be inversely as the degree of doubt which might exist. Now, as I have before remarked, this may, or may not, be the ultimate end of God's government; or it may be his own pleasure, or his own glory, or some

other end, which he has not seen fit to reveal to us; and, therefore, on the principle which we are discussing, our obligation to obedience seems a matter yet open for discussion. Now, if I mistake not, this is wholly at variance with the whole tenor of Scripture and reason. I do not know that the Scriptures ever give us a reason why we ought to obey God, aside from his existence and attributes, or ever put this subject in a light susceptible of a question.

To this view of the subject, the following remarks of Bishop Butler manifestly tend. "Perhaps divine goodness, with which, if I mistake not, we make very free in our speculations, may not be a bare single disposition to produce happiness, but a disposition to make the good, the faithful, the honest man happy. Perhaps an infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with seeing his creatures behave suitably with the nature which he has given them; to the relations which he has placed them to each other, and to that in which they stand to himself; that relation to himself, which during their existence, is ever necessary, and which is the most important one of all. I say, an infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with this moral piety of moral agents in and for itself, as well as upon account of its being essentially conducive to the happiness of his creation. Or the whole end for which God made, and thus governs the world, may be utterly beyond the reach of our faculties: there may be somewhat in it, as impossible for us to have any conception of, as for a blind man to have a conception of colors." Analogy, part 1, ch. 2.

Again. "Some men seem to think the only character of the Author of nature, to be that of single, absolute benevolence. This, considered as a principle of action, and infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest possible happiness, without regard to persons' behaviour, other

wise than as such regard would produce the highest degrees of it. And, supposing this to be the only character of God, veracity and justice in him, would be nothing but benevolence, conducted by wisdom. Now surely this ought not to be asserted, unless it can be proved; for we should speak with cautious reverence upon such a subject. There may possibly be, in the creation, beings, to whom the Author of nature manifests himself under this most amiable of all characters, this of infinite, absolute benevolence; for it is the most amiable, supposing it is not, as perhaps it is not, incompatible with justice; but he manifests himself to us under the character of a righteous Governor. He may, consistently with this, be simply and absolutely benevolent, in the sense now explained; but he is, for he has given us a proof, in the constitution and government of the world, that he is, a Governor over servants, as he rewards and punishes us for our actions." Analogy, ch. 3.

For these reasons, I think it is not proved, that an action is right, because it is productive of the greatest amount of happiness. It may be so, or it may not, but we ought not to believe it to be so, without proof; and it may even be doubted whether we are in possession of the media of proof, that is, whether it is a question fairly within the reach of the human faculties; and, so far as we can learn from the Scriptures, I think their testimony is decidedly against the supposition. To me, the Scriptures seem explicitly to declare, that the will of God alone is sufficient to create the obligation to obedience in all his creatures; and that this will, of itself, precludes every other inquiry. This seems to be the view of St. Paul, in the passage which we have quoted, as well as in several other places, in his Epistle to the Romans. To the same import is the prayer of our Saviour, "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of Heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes; even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight."

It seems, therefore to me, that these explanations of the origin of our moral sentiments, are unsatisfactory. I believe the idea of a moral quality in actions, to be ultimate, to arise under such circumstances as have been appointed by our Creator, and that we can assign for it no other reason, than that such is his will concerning us.

If this be true, our only business will be, to state the circumstances under which our moral notions arise. In doing this, it would be presumption in me, to expect that I shall be able to give an account of this subject, more satisfactory to others, than theirs has been to me. I merely offer it, as that, which seems to me, most accurately to correspond with the phenomena.

The view which I take of this subject, is briefly as follows:

1. It is manifest to every one, that we all stand in various and dissimilar relations to all the sentient beings, created and uncreated, with which we are acquainted. Among our relations to created beings, are those of man to man, or that of substantial equality of parent and child, of benefactor and recipient, of husband and wife, of brother and brother, citizen and citizen, and citizen and magistrate, and a thousand others.

2. Now, it seems to me, that, as soon as a human being comprehends the relation in which two human beings stand to each other, there arises in his mind a consciousness of moral obligation, connected, by our Creator, with the very conception of this relation. And the fact is the same, whether he be one of the parties, or not. The nature of this feeling is, that the one ought to exercise certain dispositions towards the others to whom he is thus related; and to act towards them in a manner corresponding with those dispositions.