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regard to the lisière, Russia desiring the mountain range as a boundary and Great Britain insisting upon the conditional limitation which she had proposed. He reiterated this statement when the ratification of the treaty was forwarded to London for exchange, desiring Count Lieven to call the attention of Secretary Canning to the magnanimous course of the Emperor in yielding this point."

Mr. Canning, to whom the Russian minister read this latter dispatch,' excused the insistence of Great Britain by again referring to the dispute with the United States concerning their boundaries on the eastern side of the continent, and stated "that it arose solely from a sincere desire to prevent the recurrence of any disagreeable discussion in future, and not from any intention of acquiring an increase of territory or limiting the extension of the Russian possessions." This statement is of much importance, since the British Secretary was fully cognizant that Russia had obtained the lisière as a means of protecting the interests of the Russian American Company on the shores of the inland waters.

Although Mr. Stratford Canning does not appear, from the correspondence available, to have placed in writing any interpretation upon the treaty which he had signed, he gave a verbal explanation of it which, on March 1, 1825, Mr. Middleton reported in detail to the American Secretary of State. On that day, which was the day following the signature of the treaty, the British envoy had an interview with the American minister. From the latter's report it is apparent that a copy of the convention was not shown him, but its contents were explained to him by Mr. Canning, and, therefore, in repeating Mr. Canning's language he gave the latter's understanding of its terms. Mr. Canning's version of the third article, which defined the boundary line agreed upon, Mr. Middleton reported as follows:

"The third article of this convention establishes the line of demarkation between the possessions of the two powers upon the Continent and Islands, as follows: It begins at the southernmost point of Prince of Wales' Island (about 54° 40′), leaving the whole of that island to Russia. It follows the strait called Portland Passage up to the fifty-sixth degree; then turns eastward upon that latitude until it touches the Appendix, p. 230.

a Appendix, p. 226.

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highest ridge of the chain of mountains lying contiguous to and nearly parallel with the coast; it follows that ridge up to the sixtieth degree, and then takes the direction of that degree of latitude until its intersection with the one hundred and forty-first degree of longitude west of Greenwich; thence it follows that meridian north to the Icy Sea. But in case the ridge of the mountain lying parallel with the coast shall be more than 10 marine leagues from the shores of the continent, then the distance of 10 marine leagues from the shore is to be considered as the boundary of the Russian possessions upon the continent." "

The interpretation placed upon this article by its negotiator shows clearly the course of the line intended by the terms of the treaty, as well as the extent of the lisière which it established. The notable features of Mr. Canning's statement are, that the line from the head of Portland Canal turns easturard to the range of mountains; that the word "shores," in describing the width of the lisière, supplants the word "coast" used in the treaty, although the latter is retained in referring to the mountain range; and the statement that the boundary line follows the mountain ridge up to the 60th parallel of north latitude and then takes the direction of that degree until it intersects the 141st parallel of west longitude.

This explanation of the article fixing the boundary, while it differs in language from the treaty, agrees with it if it is interpreted naturally and with knowledge of the discussions which had preceded its signature, and were explanatory of the protective character of Russia's possessions on the continent.

RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

The negotiations, the progress of which has been traced herein from the promulgation of the ukase of September 4 16, 1821, to their culmination in the treaties of April 5 17, 1824, and of February 16 28, 1825, disclose: (1) The motive which impelled the Imperial Government to issue the ukase; (2) the respective interests of the United States, Great Britain, and Russia on the Northwest Coast of America; (3) the objects sought by each of the three powers in the negotiations; and (4) to what extent each nation secured its objects.

(1) The ukase of September 4, 1821, was promulgated just prior to the rechartering of the Russian American Company, for the purpose

a Appendix, p. 224.

of preventing the infringement of the monopoly of the company by prohibiting the visitation of vessels, other than those of the company, to the coast and islands granted to it as far south on the American side of the Pacific Ocean as 51° north latitude, and by forbidding such vessels from approaching within 100 Italian miles of the continent or islands. The immediate cause was the presence of trading vessels of the United States, which had for many years resorted to these regions in large numbers to trade in furs.

(2) The interests of Russia upon the Northwest Coast were those of the Russian American Company, which possessed under its charter the rights of exclusive trade, colonization, and governmental administration in the regions covered by the grant. The interests of the Russian American Company were confined to the extension and prosecution of the fur trade.

The interests of the United States and Great Britain were of two sorts, the first related to navigation in the Pacific Ocean, Bering Sea, and the Arctic Ocean; the second, to the fur trade. The American industry was carried on by independent traders who in vessels visited the coast and islands claimed by Russia. The British fur trade in these regions was prospective of the extension westward of the operations of the Hudson's Bay Company, which had been granted a monopoly of the trade in all the American territory of Great Britain not included within the crown provinces. This company at the time of the negotiations had three trading stations upon the western slopes of the Rocky Mountains between 54° and 56° north latitude, and it was to its interest to secure egress to the Pacific Ocean which would afford an opportunity to establish posts on its shores in the future.

(3) The United States and Great Britain, the two leading maritime powers of the period, were equally interested in preserving the free navigation of the high seas, and it was, therefore, important for their commercial interests that the extensive maritime jurisdiction assumed. by the Russian ukase should be renounced.

The United States sought to maintain for its citizens the freedom of trade with the natives which they had enjoyed for thirty years prior to the issuance of the ukase; and as their operations were carried on by means of vessels, to secure their free access to the inland waters of the Northwest Coast and its islands. It was also for the interest of the United States in case freedom of trade and navigation of the inland

waters was restricted, to fix the southern boundary of Russia at as high a parallel of latitude as was possible.

Great Britain, acting solely on behalf of the Hudson's Bay Company, had no object in obtaining liberty to enter the territorial waters and trade with the natives of the Russian possessions, since her subjects did not approach those regions from the seaward side. But, as the accepted rule of international law at that period granted to the nation possessing by occupation a continental coast the drainage basins of all rivers entering the ocean through its possessions, it was, therefore, of first importance to Great Britain to confine the Russian territory as far to the north as possible on the coast, and thus secure a large area for the future operations of the Hudson's Bay Company and an uninterrupted outlet for its furs to the Pacific. It was, moreover, an object of Great Britain to limit the territory which would accrue to Russia from extensive littoral possessions by establishing its eastern boundary to the westward of the Rocky Mountains, thereby giving an opportunity for the Hudson's Bay Company to operate northward from its western posts, and preventing the approach of Russia to the company's stations on the Mackenzie River. "We must not on any account admit the Russian territory to extend at any point to the Rocky Mountains" is the central idea of the instructions sent to Sir Charles Bagot. Grant to her "50 or 100 miles from the coast," but do not permit her boundary to be drawn nearer to those mountains.

The object of Russia in the negotiations was the same as that which she had sought by the ukase of September 4, 1821, the efficient protection of the Russian American Company in its monopoly of the fur trade. The chief menace to the interests of the company was in the establishment on the islands or the neighboring mainland of foreign settlements, to which the natives who carried on trade with the Russian American Company might take their furs, or from which rival hunters and trappers could be sent out to capture the fur-bearing animals. The first purpose, therefore, was to prevent such settlements, whether established by Americans coming from the sea or by the Hudson's Bay Company approaching from the land. To avoid this danger it was necessary to obtain a boundary south of the archipelago and coast where the Russian American Company carried on its operations, to the north of which no foreign settlements should be established, either on the islands or mainland; and also to fix upon a 21528-03-5

boundary at a sufficient distance from the continental shores inhabited by the natives, or to which they were accustomed to resort in hunting, to prevent the Hudson's Bay Company from reaching the coast and erecting rival posts there.

While the principal dangers to be guarded against were settlements as bases of trade operations, the presence of foreign trading vessels caused an undesirable competition, and the traffic in firearms and liquor demoralized the natives. To suppress, or at least restrict, trade of this character was another of the objects sought by Russia.

(4) In the negotiations and resulting treaties the United States and Great Britain obtained the abandonment of the maritime pretensions of Russia and an acknowledgment of the freedom of the high seas for the navigation of vessels of all nations.

The United States, by agreeing to a line of demarcation at 54° 40′ north latitude as the southern limit of the Russian possessions, secured the continuance of the fur trade of its citizens north of that line for a term of ten years; and Russia obtained a further stipulation that citizens of the United States should not establish settlements within the Russian territory or trade in firearms or liquor with the natives. By the acceptance of the limitation of trading privileges to a fixed term of ten years the American Government also acknowledged the sovereignty of Russia over the coast and islands north of the line of demarcation.

The object of the British Government, to prevent the extension of Russia's dominion as far eastward as the Rocky Mountains, was attained; but as to the limitation of the latter's territory to the section of coast desired and suggested by the Hudson's Bay Company, that government entirely failed. Each of the four lines proposed by Sir Charles Bagot (see Map No. 3 in the Atlas accompanying this Case) and the fifth one proposed by Secretary Canning in his treaty draft of July 12, 1824, is a nearer approach to the Russian proposal than the one immediately preceding it, until at last Great Britain assented to the boundary demanded by the Imperial Government.

From the first to the last conference of the plenipotentiaries at St. Petersburg the Russian representatives insisted upon a line beginning at the two southern points of Prince of Wales Island, and running up Portland Canal to the mountain chain appearing upon the maps, and thence "along those mountains, parallel to the sinuosities of the

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