Pelly suggested "either the channel between the islands [Chatham Strait], or that between the islands and the mainland [Stephens Passage] as the most desirable line of demarcation to the eastward." "a

Another feature of Mr. Pelly's letter is the statement, "the Russians not to trade either on the coast or in the interior south of the boundary, and the British not to trade on the coast north of it." This is indicative of the attitude of the Hudson's Bay Company toward reciprocal trade privileges, which, though ultimately obtained because included in the treaty between the United States and Russia, were neither desired nor sought by the British fur company.

Having reviewed the relations of the three powers on the Northwest Coast, Mr. Canning stated to Sir Charles Bagot: "The Russian ukase contains two objectionable pretentions: First, an extravagant assumption of maritime supremacy; secondly, an unwarranted claim of territorial dominion." As to the first, he said, that all that remained for negotiation was to clothe the disavowal of Russia, already made, in satisfactory terms. As to the second, the line suggested by Mr. Pelly would be most satisfactory, but, if that could not be secured, "then the line must be drawn on the mainland to the north of the northernmost post of the Northwest Company from east to west till it strikes the coast, and thence may ascend to whatever latitude may be necessary for taking in the island on which Sitka stands."

Mr. Canning, still following the suggestions of the Hudson's Bay Company, proposed in a vague way that Russian territory south of the head of Lynn Canal should be confined to "50 or 100 miles from the coast," beyond which the Russian posts should not be extended to the eastward. "We must not on any account," he said, "admit the Russian territory to extend to the Rocky Mountains." While the exact intent of Mr. Canning's proposal is very uncertain, it is important as the first suggestion of a strip of territory along the coast, which strip later developed into the lisière with a width of 10 leagues introduced into the negotiations and the treaty.

This letter of instructions was received, as has been said, by Sir Charles Bagot on February 9, 1824," and one week later he had a con

a Appendix, p. 145. The channels are named, as here stated, in the same paragraph from which the quotation is taken.

Appendix, p. 147.

Appendix, p. 148.

d Appendix, p. 68.

ference with the Russian plenipotentiaries, Count Nesselrode and M.

that the question of strict both sides," and that the

de Poletica. At the outset it was agreed right should be provisionally waived on adjustment of their "mutual pretensions should be made upon the sole principle of the respective convenience of both countries." Having stated that he conceived the wishes and interests of Russia to be to secure her trade on the islands and coasts, and that the chief objects of Great Britain were “to secure the posts upon the continent belonging to the Hudson's Bay Company, the embouchures of such rivers as might afford an outlet for our fur trade into the Pacific, and the two banks of the Mackenzie River," Sir Charles proposed as a "boundary a line drawn through Chatham Straits to the head of Lynn Canal, thence northwest to the one hundred and fortieth degree of longitude west of Greenwich, and then along that degree of longitude to the Polar Sea." (For this proposed line see Map No. 3 in the Atlas accompanying this Case.)

This boundary line proposed by the British minister was substantially the one suggested by the Hudson's Bay Company. It differed from the one proposed by him during his conferences with M. de Poletica in October, 1823", in that it included Chichagof and Baranof islands within the Russian possessions, though transferring the boundary north of the head of Lynn Canal five degrees farther westward, presumably for the purpose of securing to Great Britain the entire valley of the Mackenzie. This oral proposal by Sir Charles was taken under consideration by the Russian plenipotentiaries, and at their next meeting, on February 24, they submitted a counter draft," of which the substance is as follows: The line of demarcation on the coast was to be at 55 north latitude, the boundary of Russian possessions fixed by the ukase of 1799; but, since that would cut through the southern extremity of Prince of Wales Island, it was proposed to include the southern points within Russian territory. "To complete the line of demarcation and render it as distinct as possible, the plenipotentiaries of Russia have expressed the desire to make it follow Portland Channel [le Portland Canal] up to the mountains which border the coast. From this point the boundary would ascend along those mountains, parallel to the sinuosities of the coast, as far as the one hundred and thirty-ninth degree of longitude (meridian of London), the line of Appendix, p. 158.

a Appendix, p. 131.

which degree, prolonged northward, would form the ulterior limit. between the Russian and English possessions, to the north as well as to the east."

From this description of the proposed boundary it is clear that the Russian negotiators had before them a map which delineated a range of mountains following the curvatures of the coast from Portland Canal to 139 west longitude. Upon the charts of Vancouver, covering this region (see Maps Nos. 4 and 5 in the Atlas accompanying this Case), such a mountain range is laid down, and the cartographers, who followed his surveys closely, reproduced this feature also.

A map which is known to have been examined by Sir Charles Bagot and was undoubtedly used by the Russian plenipotentiaries, since it was issued officially by the Russian Government, was the one prepared by the quartermaster-general's department, and published in 1802. (See Map No. 6 in the Atlas accompanying this Case.) An inspection of this map shows that it is to all intents a copy of the Vancouver charts, with a few names added and changed to correspond with the Russian nomenclature. The coast range of Vancouver is charted in detail, winding along the shores and around the inlets and bays from the 56th degree of north latitude to the 139th of west longitude. It is possible also that the Russian navigators had the French edition of the Vancouver atlas, which would show the mountains as depicted in the original English publication. No other maps of the time were on so large a scale as those, and it is to be presumed that in studying the geography of these regions for the purpose of determining an inland boundary the Russian officials sought the charts which dealt most in detail with the coast and islands. These were the Vancouver maps or those which were reproductions of them.

The natural inference from the circumstances is that the Russian map of 1802, or a subsequent edition of it, was the one before Count Nesselrode and M. de Poletica when they made their counter draft proposing the mountain range winding along the coast as the eastern boundary of the Russian possessions. An examination of this map will explain the meaning of the phrase "the desire to make it [the line of demarcation] follow Portland Channel [le Portland Canal] up to the mountains which border the coast."

"Appendix, pp. 101, 127.

The counter draft states the intent of its authors in making this proposal for an inland boundary in the following paragraph:

The principal motive which constrains Russia to insist upon sovereignty over the alove-indicated lisière (strip of territory) upon the mainland (terre ferme) from Portland Channel to the point of intersection of 60° latitude with 139° longitude is that, deprived of this territory, the Russian American Company would have no means of sustaining its establishments, which would therefore be without any support (point d'appui) and could have no solidity."

The monopoly of the Russian American Company was only of value so long as there were no trading establishments located in the vicinity of the islands and inland waters bordering the coast over which their grant of exclusive trade extended. While independent traders coasting along the shores were an annoyance to the company, they were not so serious a menace as a single trading post would have been, located upon the continental shore, to which the natives could bring their furs and from which white trappers could carry on their industry in the neighboring streams and rivers. It was to prevent this dangerous form of competition that the Russian plenipotentiaries proposed a list which would operate as a barrier to the further advance of the Hudson's Bay Company toward the coast and prevent the establishment of rival factories among the natives with whom the Russian company carried on its trade. The purpose of fixing an inland boundary, which should form such a barrier, had been recognized by M. de Poletica in his conferences with Count de Lambert in November, 1823, as already noted.

Sir Charles Bagot, in the amended proposal which he submitted after rejecting the counter draft of the Russian negotiators, stated of the proposed boundary that "a line of demarcation drawn from the southern extremity of Prince of Wales Island to the mouth of Portland Channel, thence up the middle of this channel until it touches the mainland (terre ferme), thence to the mountains bordering the coast, and thence along the mountains as far as 139 longitude, would deprive His Britannic Majesty of sovereignty over all the inlets and small bays lying between latitudes 56 and 54 45', whereof several (as there is every reason to believe) communicate directly with the establishments of the Hudson's Bay Company and are, consequently, of essential importance to its commerce; while, on the other hand, the Russian American Appendix, p. 137.

a

Appendix, p. 158.

See ante, p. 29.

Company possesses no establishments on the mainland (terre ferme) between the two above-mentioned parallels, or even on Prince of Wales Island, or on the islands located between the latter and the mainland."a

The notable part in this statement by the British minister is that he objected to the proposed line since "it deprived His Britannic Majesty of sovereignty over all the inlets and small bays [de toutes ces anses et de ces petites baies] lying between latitudes 56 and 54° 54'." The reason why he confined his objection to the coast between these parallels becomes apparent upon reading the proposal for a boundary offered by him in the same document in which the foregoing quotation appears. The proposal is as follows: "In order to obviate this difficulty, and to insure to Russia the exclusive sovereignty of these waters, as well as all the islands and coasts where there are really Russian establishments, Great Britain would offer to accept as the line of demarcation between the territories of the two powers a line traced from the west toward the east along the middle of the channel which separates Prince of Wales and Duke of York islands from all the islands situated to the north of the said islands until it touches the mainland (terre ferme). Thence, extending in the same direction on the mainland to a point 10 marine leagues from the coast, the line would run from this point toward the north and northwest, parallel with the sinuosities of the coast, and always at a distance of 10 marine leagues from the shore, as far as the 140 of longitude (Greenwich), the prolongation of which it would then follow to the Polar Sea." a

Sir Charles, following that portion of his instructions which directed him to secure at least a line on the mainland as far north as the northernmost post of the Hudson's Bay Company west of the Rocky Mountains, which, according to Mr. Pelly's letter of September 25, 1822, was "the Rocky Mountain portage in 56 north latitude," proposed a line passing through Sumner Strait and reaching the shore of the continent in the neighborhood of Wrangell, about latitude 56° 30′. The Russian proposition for a lisière, he proposed to modify by limiting it to a fixed width of 10 marine leagues, at which distance the line should run north and northwest "parallel with the sinuosities of the coast, and always at the distance of 10 marine leagues from the shore. a Appendix, p. 159. Appendix, p. 109.