the United States over those of Russia between 51° and 61° north latitude, and the right of the former to navigate and trade along the coasts at such places as had not been actually occupied and settled by Russia. The question of maritime jurisdiction to the extent of 100 miles from the coasts, which had been the principal cause of the negotiations, had been practically eliminated by the modification of the regulations of the ukase by the Russian Government. So far as that subject was concerned, a treaty provision insuring freedom of navigation in the North Pacific and Bering Sea to the citizens and subjects of both powers would be a sufficient formal renunciation of the Russian pretension. To such an article in the treaty to be negotiated Russia, in view of her withdrawal from her maritime claim, would presumably offer no objection. The real subject of negotiations, therefore, became the trade privileges which American citizens should in the future have along the coasts of the Russian possessions. The negotiations, of which this memorial formed the basis, did not commence until February 21, 1824," twelve days after Mr. Middleton had received a letter from Mr. Rush, dated January 9, informing him that Great Britain had declined to treat conjointly with the United States at St. Petersburg, a fact confirmed by Sir Charles Bagot, who received the same day a dispatch to that effect from the Foreign Office." This change of attitude by Great Britain may be credited to two causes: the territorial claims advanced by the United States, and the declaration of President Monroe in his annual message to Congress in 1823 that the continents of America were not considered subjects for future European colonization. Mr. Rush, who had received his instructions of July 22, 1823, toward the end of September, was unable to obtain an interview with Mr. Canning until December 17, at which time the latter had been apprised by Sir Charles Bagot that the United States Government was prepared to assert a territorial claim as far north as 61°, which was based upon the succession to the rights of Spain, and that Mr. Middleton had been furnished with a draft of a tripartite convention covering both the maritime and territorial questions. In the interview between Mr. Rush and Mr. Canning the former presented Mr. Adams's plan for a joint treaty of the three powers, Appendix, p. 231. a Appendix, p. 68. d Appendix, pp. 52, 129. Appendix, p. 130. providing for freedom of trade in the territory and waters westward of "the Stony Mountains" during a term of ten years, and, further, that the United States should make no settlements north of 51, Russia none south of 55, and Great Britain none south of 51 or north of 55. Mr. Canning expressed no opinion upon the questions involved, but Mr. Rush concluded from his remarks that he would strongly object to the limitations to British territory proposed, and that "in treating of this coast he had supposed that Britain had her northern question with Russia, as her southern with the United States." In the course of his remarks Mr. Rush said "that the United States no longer regarded any part of that coast as open to European colonization, but only to be used for purposes of traffic with the natives and for fishing in the neighboring seas." Thus Mr. Canning was informed of the policy of the United States in regard to future colonization in America by European nations, of which he was to learn more when the post should bring copies of the annual message of President Monroe, submitted to Congress two weeks before this interview. On January 15, 1824, Mr. Canning sent an instruction to Sir Charles Bagot, in which he declared that it was for the interest of Great Britain to proceed separately in the negotiation. He stated that the limits placed upon British dominion seemed to have been proposed by the United States for the purpose of avoiding any collision between itself and Russia, and of gratifying Russia at the expense of Great Britain; that he understood the proposition of joint occupancy made by the United States was objectionable to Russia, and Great Britain had no desire to press it so far as that Empire was concerned; and that, under such circumstances, there would be some awkwardness in a tripartite negotiation." These reasons Mr. Canning said had induced the British Government to hesitate as to the expediency of acceding to the proposal of the United States "when the arrival of the speech of the President of the United States at the opening of the Congress supplied another reason at once decisive in itself * *. I refer to the principle declared in that speech, which prohibits any further attempt by European powers at colonization in America."e * Mr. Canning also informed Sir Charles that Mr. Rush seemed to acquiesce in the impossibility of joint action through this "new prin Appendix, p. 144. a Appendix, p. 65. c Appendix, pp. 146-147. ciple of the President's" and that it only remained to direct Sir Charles to resume his negotiation with the Court of St. Petersburg at the point at which it was suspended in consequence of the expected accession of the United States, and to endeavor to bring it as speedily as possible to an amicable and honorable conclusion."a In a memorandum dated January 7, 1824, also sent to the British minister by Mr. Canning, the following language indicates the reason why the doctrine of the President was "decisive" in determining the British Government not to proceed jointly: "But the principle laid down with respect to colonization in the speech of the President of the United States (to which Great Britain does not assent) must be so particularly displeasing to Russia that it may be expected to create some difficulty in the negotiation between Russia and the United States. At all events, it must interpose a difficulty to that union of counsels between the United States and Great Britain without which concert would not be advantageous. Under these circumstances it is not thought advisable to send Sir C. Bagot fresh instructions for a tripartite negotiation." From the time that the determination of the British Government not to act jointly with the United States in the questions with Russia became known to the ministers of the two powers, they carried on negotiations which covered the same period of time, but were entirely distinct and independent of each other, there being no conferences and mutual exchange of views, such as had marked the previous course of the controversy. THE AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS OF 1824. Mr. Middleton, upon receiving the notification that Great Britain would treat separately, at once announced to the Russian minister of foreign affairs and to Sir Charles Bagot that if any attempt was made to negotiate upon the territorial question without the participation of the United States, it would be his duty to protest in the strongest terms. He stated to the British minister that, as Great Britain had "no settlement or possession upon any part of the northwest coast of America," she had no "claims" to convey except such as she derived from the Nootka Sound convention with Spain, signed October 28, Appendix, p. 69. a Appendix, p. 147. 1790: that the United States had succeeded to all the Spanish rights by the treaty of February 22, 1819, which gave the latter concurrent claims with Great Britain whatever her pretensions might be; and that for these reasons any treaty between Great Britain and Russia in which the United States was not a party would be nugatory as to it and could not divest it of the right to enjoy that coast. Having made a declaration of similar intent to Count Nesselrode, Mr. Middleton secured an interview with him on February 21, 1824, at which he submitted a brief paper entitled "State of the Question" and a treaty draft similar to the one sent to him by Mr. Adams in his letter of instructions of July 22, 1823.7 A second conference occurred on March 4, at which Count Nesselrode and M. de Poletica submitted a counter draft to the one Mr. Middleton had presented at the first conference." In this the line of demarcation was changed from 55 to 54 40', and Russia further proposed the exclusion of Americans north of that line except at the port of New Archangel, and of Russians south of it. Mr. Middleton informed the Russian negotiators that their proposal was "utterly inadmissible," and that his instructions were that two points must be obtained before he should enter into a "territorial delimitation for settlements at fifty-five degrees." M. de Poletica replied that he would never sign any instrument allowing American ships free admission to the Russian coasts. Count Nesselrode remained silent. Mr. Middleton then agreed to take the counter draft under consideration. At the third conference on March 8, Mr. Middleton submitted a memorandum upon the counter draft, which accepted the first article proposed by Russia relating to the freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean and the right to resort to unoccupied coasts, modified the second article by limiting the prohibition to visit the possessions of the other power, without consent, to places occupied by settlements, and sub @ Hertslet's Commercial and Slave Trade Treaties, etc., Vol. II, p. 256. Treaties and Conventions between the United States and Other Powers, p. 1016. Appendix, p. 70. stantially agreed that the line of demarcation for future settlement should be 54° 40' instead of 55°. To the latter article Mr. Middleton added the following: "It is at the same time agreed, however, that the vessels of the two powers, or belonging to their citizens and subjects, may, reciprocally, frequent all the interior seas, gulfs, harbors, and creeks of the said coast in order to carry on fishing and trade with the natives of the country without any hindrance or molestation whatever during ten years, to be counted from the date of signing the present convention." a Count Nesselrode and M. de Poletica took Mr. Middleton's proposals under consideration. On March 20 the plenipotentiaries again met. Count Nesselrode stated the last draft of the United States had been considered and but little remained to be done to reach an agreement, and that it only required to strike out the italicized phrase relative to trade, and to change the "ten years" to "five years." To this Mr. Middleton replied that such a change would amount to a stipulation to enjoy for a brief term, and as a privilege, that which the United States was entitled to by the law of nature, “in common with all other independent nations, to wit, the fisheries upon an unoccupied coast." It is evident from this statement that Mr. Middleton deemed a stipulation permitting acts on the part of citizens and subjects of the contracting powers for a fixed term was the grant of a privilege, and necessarily a recognition of sovereignty in the power granting it. Having stated his objections to the proposed changes, the American envoy delivered to Count Nesselrode a brief paper which treated solely of the weakness of Russia's territorial claims." Undoubtedly this action had the effect of inducing the Russian plenipotentiaries to concede the provisions relative to reciprocal trade privileges rather than to open up the question of the legality of the Russian title to the territory, for Count Nesselrode at once seemed inclined to come to an agreement as to these privileges, provided that traffic in firearms and ammunition was prohibited. To this Mr. Middleton objected that other nations might profit by the prohibition, but as it was not formally proposed, its consideration was postponed to another meeting. A delay of two weeks occurred, occasioned, as Mr. Middlton supposed, "to give time for consultation with the directors of the Russian American Company." On April 3 M. de Poletica left with the a Appendix, p. 84. Appendix, p. 74. C Appendix, p. 75. |