First of all, I would like to stress, that the people at all levels in the Department of Energy, starting with Headquarters and down to the laboratories themselves, have already proven that they really do represent some of the most creative and competent scientists in the nation, that they make a contribution that goes well beyond nuclear weapons to many aspects not only for SDI but in many other areas as well. It has been a great, very gratifying experience for me to deal with these people and to see just what can be done with the foundations and with the practices that you have established here with the wisdom of this committee and certainly with the wisdom of the Department of Energy. So I value their contribution to this program very, very highly. I think that is important for you to know from somebody who has been outside of this community in the past. [Slide follows:] • CONDUCT A COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM TO • PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR AN INFORMED FULL SCALE • PROTECT A NEAR-TERM DEPLOYMENT OPTION FOR • EMPHASIZE NON-NUCLEAR KILL MECHANISMS • COORDINATE SDI WITH OTHER DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND 1010C 24(1) STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE Our primary objective in the SDI program, as directed by the President, is, of course, to conduct a comprehensive research prir gram to examine the feasibility of ballistic missile defence. I think it is key that the product of that research program is twofola. (me is the decision reached at the end of a sufficient amorant of research so that the nation can make a judgment whether we should go ahead with a defensive system, and secondly, to have the Henkzology available so, should that decision be made, it can be made in an expeditious way and people then can go forward in develope ment not only with confidence in the technical féasily,ity of a shea gc defense program, but also confident about the onele and the implications for stability and security. The real shjentive of Sme je no buld weapons nor to even militariba ojana # Manly (Ban nave aiket about. The real thyeative is tá de dile ja pujdour & different strategy, a different kind of defarvanda ina hut 4 we Createning an our present reliance on offensive vatajang Ins doesn't mean that what we have today e la Fe na mly inny that has seen avalane is. But & he fiture. Shot quæstion snow ung ran that concent really serve his iation and all of your alies gveer tre angen ezanology Sonde and ao angsari, joinca rents and most of al. what he saving ma thing and pare 12 tong Tuse are the red fundamental ssues shind. +hæ þession of th veon and replay valistic missile tefecisses. Ve friv eleve that we to 10. Tave a meat, until hot fuelsinel ime n one amort and it assist. ha pine writvi). Jehabeo. 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Intesailas Spc ovišti gede inuma hasa wake kaft upzzame of Sem exiting ofacobus engaDitsy Tuɛ italiugelice eritriog i bat erzurinalat va juca inbat kutu selj、sel we are now working on in every case, but they could very quickly change the whole fundamental equation of our present deterrent structure. Should the Soviet Union deploy even a partial defense, even a limited, older technology defense of the broader area of the Soviet Union, particularly including their heavy ballistic missile offensive installations, it would alter the present strategic balance. Therefore, one of our responsibilities is to try to ensure that as we explore defensive technologies that we can use to respond to a Soviet breakout or perhaps more accurately, creepout-which is a very real possibility, one that you cannot clearly pinpoint and identify-of the ABM Treaty. Obviously, those are not the only means by which the nation might respond. There are many other responses that include a broader array of our offensive and conventional capabilities. People have often been confused by the fact that the President's clear direction is to emphasize non-nuclear technologies. I think we have been very straightforward in our testimony in Congress, before the DOD committees as well as in discussions that I am aware have occurred in this committee and others, that there is an important nuclear component of our program. I will come back to emphasize that when we are finished. As we develop the technologies here for SDI, we have a responsibility to identify where those technologies really have relevance to the many Department of Defense security programs. Those are programs in conventional defense and certainly many support programs even for our national civilian space program. Therefore, it is important that we identify those so that they can be utilized properly and, in that regard, many of these technologies are funded only in the SDI program. We have taken all the redundancy out, and so where we need a technology, we are carrying that technology in either the DOD program or in some cases in the DOE program for the entire Department of Defense. Those are the objectives, and I would like to use that as a framework for the program as we go ahead. [Slide follows:] |