in Ehrenberg and Cuffstein, and these, having no hopes B O O K of being relieved, surrendered, after a short resistance **. VIII. 1546. duct. NOR was the recalling of Schertel the only error of which and ill conthe confederates were guilty. As the supreme command of their army was committed, in terms of the league of Smalkalde, to the Elector of Saxony and Landgrave of Hesse with equal power, all the inconveniences arising from a divided and co-ordinate authority, which is always of fatal consequence in the operations of war, were immediately felt. The Elector, though intrepid in his own persón to excess, and most ardently zealous in the cause, was slow in deliberating, uncertain as well as irresolute in his determinations, and constantly preferred measures which were cautious and safe, to such as were bold or decisive. The Landgrave, of a more active and enterprising nature, formed all his resolutions with promptitude, wished to execute them with spirit, and uniformly preferred such measures as tended to bring the contest to a speedy issue. Thus their maxims, with regard to the conduct of the war, differed as widely as those by which they were influenced in preparing for it. Such perpetual contrariety in their sentiments gave rise, imperceptibly, to jealousy and the spirit of contention. These multiplied the dissentions flowing from the incompatibility of their natural tempers, and rendered them more violent. The other members of the league considering themselves as independent, and subject to the Elector and Landgrave, only x Seckend. lib. ii. 70. Adriani Istoria di suoi Tempi, lib. 335. Seckendorf, the industrious author of the Commentarius Apologeticus de Lutheranismo, whom I have so long and safely followed as my guide in German affairs, was à descendant from Schertel. With the care and solicitude of a German, who was himself of noble birth, Seckendorf has published a long digression concerning his ancestor, calculated chiefly to show how Schertel was ennobled, and his posterity allied to many of the most ancient families in the Empire. Among other curious particulars, he gives us an account of his wealth, the chief source of which was the plunder he got at Rome. His landed estate alone was sold by his grandsons for six hundred thousand florins. By this we may form some idea of the riches amassed by the Condottieri, or commanders of mercenary bands in that age. At the taking of Rome Schertel was only a captain. Seckend. lib. ii. 73. VIII. 1546. BOOK in consequence of the articles of a voluntary confederacy, did not long retain a proper veneration for commanders who proceeded with so little concord; and the numerous army of the Protestants, like a vast machine whose parts are ill compacted, and which is destitute of any power sufficient to move and regulate the whole, acted with no consistency, vigour, or effect. The pope's troops join the empe ror. THE Emperor, who was afraid that, by remaining at Ratisbon, he might render it impossible for the Pope's forces to join him, having boldly advanced to Landshut on the Iser, the confederates lost some days in deliberating whether it was proper to follow him into the territories of the Duke of Bavaria, a neutral Prince. When at last they surmounted that scruple, and began to move towards his camp, they suddenly abandoned the design, and hastened to attack Ratisbon, in which town Charles could leave only a small garrison. By this time the Papal troops, amounting fully to that number which Paul had stipulated to furnish, had reached Landshut and were soon followed by six thousand Spaniards of the veteran bands stationed in Naples. The confederates, after Schertel's spirited but fruitless expedition, seem to have permitted these forces to advance unmolested to the place of rendezvous, without any attempt to attack either them or the Emperor separately, or to prevent their junction. The imperial army amounted now to thirty-six thousand men, and was still more formidable by the discipline and valour of the troops, than by their number. Avila, commendador of Alcantara, who had been present in all the wars carried on by Charles, and had served in the armies which gained the memorable victory at Pavia, which conquered Tunis, and invaded France, gives this the preference to any military force he had ever seen assembled". Octavio Farnese, the Pope's grandson, assisted by the ablest officers formed in the long wars between Charles and Francis, commanded the Italian auxiliaries. His brother, the Cardinal Farnese, accompanied him as Papal legate; and in order to give the war the appearance of a religious enterprise, he ✰ Adriani Istoria de suoi Tempi, lib. v. 340. z Avila, 18. VIII. 1546. proposed to march at the head of the army, with a cross car- BOOK ried before him, and to publish indulgences wherever he came, to all who should give them any assistance, as had anciently been the practice in the Crusades against the Infidels, But this the Emperor strictly prohibited, as inconsistent with all the declarations which he had made to the Germans of his own party; and the legate perceiving, to his astonishment, that the exercise of the Protestant religion, the extirpation of which he considered as the sole object of the war, was publicly permitted in the Imperial camp, soon returned in disgust to Italy". THE arrival of these troops enabled the Emperor to send such a reinforcement to the garrison at Ratisbon, that the confederates, relinquishing all hopes of reducing that town, marched towards Ingoldstadt on the Danube, near to which Charles was now encamped. They exclaimed loudly against the Emperor's notorious violation of the laws and constitu-tion of the Empire, in having called in foreigners to lay waste Germany, and to oppress its aberties. As in that age, the dominion of the Roman See was so odious to the Protestants, that the name of the Pope alone was sufficient to inspire them with horror to any enterprise which he countenanced, and to raise in their minds the blackest suspicions, it came to be universally believed among them, that Paul, not satisfied with attacking them openly by force of arms, had dispersed his emissaries all over Germany, to set on fire their towns and magazines, and to poison the wells and fountains of water. Nor did this rumour, which was extravagant and frightful enough to make a deep impression on the credulity of the vulgar, spread among them only; even the leaders of the party, blinded by their prejudices, published a declaration, in which they accused the Pope of having employed such Anti-christian and diabolical arts against them. These sentiments of the confederates were confirmed, in some measure, by the behaviour of the Papal troops, who, thinking nothing too rigorous towards heretics anathematised by the church, were guilty of great excesses in VIII. BOOK the territories of the Lutheran States, and aggravated the calamities of war, by mingling with it all the cruelty of bigoted zeal. 1546. The confe derates ad wards the Imperial army. THE first operations in the field, however, did not cor. vance to respond with the violence of those passions which animated individuals. The Emperor had prudently taken the resolution of avoiding an action with an enemy so far superior in number b, especially as he foresaw that nothing could keep a body composed of so many and such dissimilar members from falling to pieces, but the pressing to attack it with an inconsiderate precipitancy. The confederates, though it was no less evident that to them every moment's delay was pernicious, were still prevented by the weakness or division of their leaders from exerting that vigour, with which their situation, as well as the ardour of their soldiers, ought to August 29. have inspired them. On their arrival at Ingoldstadt, they found the Emperor in a camp not remarkable for strength, and surrounded only by a slight intrenchment. Before the camp lay a plain of such extent, as afforded sufficient space for drawing out their whole army, and bringing it to act at once. Every consideration should have determined them to have seized this opportunity of attacking the Emperor; and their great superiority in numbers, the eagerness of their troops, together with the stability of the German infantry in pitched battles, afforded them the most probable expectation of victory. The Landgrave urged this with great warmth, declaring, that if the sole command were vested in him, he would terminate the war on that occasion, and decide by one general action the fate of the two parties. But the Elector, reflecting on the valour and discipline of the enemy's forces, animated by the presence of the Emperor, and conducted by the best officers of the age, would not venture upon an action, which he thought to be so doubtful, as the attacking such a body of veterans on ground which they themselves had chosen, and while covered with fortifications which, though imperfect, would afford them no small advantage in the combat. Notwithstanding his hesitation and remon b Avila, 78, a. VIII. 1546. He The empe excursions or ror declines a battle. strances, it was agreed to advance towards the enemy's camp BOOK in battle array, in order to make a trial whether by that insult, and by a furious cannonade which they began, they could draw the Imperialists out of their works. But the Emperor had too much sagacity to fall into this snare. adhered to his own system with inflexible constancy; and drawing up his soldiers behind their trenches, that they might be ready to receive the confederates if they should venture upon an assault, calmly waited their approach, and carefully restrained his own men from any skirmishes which might bring on a general engagement. He rode along the lines, and addressing the troops of the different nations in their own language, encouraged them not only by his words, but by the cheerfulness of his voice and countenance; he exposed himself in places of greatest danger, and amidst the warmest fire of the enemy's artillery, the most numerous that had hitherto been brought into the field by any army. Roused by his example, not a man quitted his ranks; it was thought infamous to discover any symptom of fear when the Emperor appeared so intrepid; and the meanest soldier plainly perceived, that their declining the combat at present was not the effect of timidity in their general, but the result of a well-grounded caution. The confederates, after firing several hours on the Imperialists with more noise and terror than execution, seeing no prospect of alluring them to fight on equal terms, retired to their own camp. The Emperor employed the night with such diligence in strengthening his works, that the confederates, returning to the cannonade next day, found that, though they had now been willing to venture upon such a bold experiment, the opportunity of making an attack with advantage was lost. AFTER such a discovery of the feebleness or irresolution The Fleof their leaders, and the prudence as well as firmness of the mish troops join the Emperor's conduct, the confederates turned their whole at- emperor. tention towards preventing the arrival of a powerful reinforcement of ten thousand foot and four thousand horse, c Sleid. 395. 397. Avila, 27, a. Lamb. Hortens. ap. Scard. ii. |