be very little doubt that the secrecy of | tainty and vagueness. Some persons apthe Cabinet is its strength. A great part pear to think that the House of Lords of the weaknesses of democracy spring ought not to reject or postpone a constitufrom publicity of discussion, and nobody tional measure which affects the powers who has had any share in public business of the House of Commons, or its relation can have failed to observe, that the to the constituencies, or the constituencies chances of agreement among even a small themselves. Others seem to consider that number of persons increase in nearly ex- the power of rejection might be exercised act proportion to the chances of privacy. on such a measure, if the majority by If the growth in power of the Cabinet is which it has passed the House of Comchecked, it will probably be from causes mons is small, but not if it exceeds a of very recent origin. It is essentially a certain number. Lastly, little can be excommittee of the men who lead the party tracted from the language of a certain which has a majority in the House of number of controversialists, violent as it Commons. But there are signs that its is, except an opinion that the House of authority over its party is passing to other Lords ought not to do wrong, and that it committees, selected less for eminence in has done wrong on one particular occadebate and administration than for the sion. adroit management of local political busi ness. The House of Lords, as a matter of strict law, has the right to reject or amend any measure which is submitted to it; nor has this legal right in either of its forms been disused or abandoned, save as regards money bills. But it has lately become evident that, when the right is exerted over measures amending the Constitution, strong differences of opinion exist as to the inode and condition of its exercise; and, as is not uncommon in this country, it is very difficult to gather from the violent language of the disputants, whether they contend that the law should be altered, or that the exertion of power with which they are quarrelling is forbidden by usage, precedent, conventional understanding, or mere expediency. The varieties of doctrine are many and wide apart. On the one hand, one extreme party compares the rejection of a bill by the House of Lords to the veto of a bill by the crown; and insists that the first power should be abandoned as completely as the last is believed to have been. Conversely, the most influential* members of the House of Lords allow that it would act improperly in rejecting a constitutional measure, of which the electoral body has signified its approval by the result of a general election. Between these positions there appear to be several intermediate opinions, most of them, however, stated in language of the utmost uncer The power of the House of Commons over legislation, including constitutional legislation, might seem at first sight to be complete and unqualified. Nevertheless, as we have pointed out, it some time ago surrendered the initiative in legislation, and it is now more and more surrendering the conduct of it, to the socalled ministers of the crown. It may further be observed from the language of those who, on the whole, contend for the widest extension of its powers, that a new theory has made its appearance, which raises a number of embarrassing questions as to the authority of the House of Commons in constitutional legislation. This is the theory of the mandate. It seems to be conceded that the electoral body must supply the House of Commons with a mandate to alter the Constitution. It is asserted that a mandate to introduce household suffrage into the counties was given to the present House, but not a mandate to confer the suffrage on women. What is a mandate? As used here, the word has not the meaning which belongs to it in English, French, or Latin. We conjecture that it is a fragment of a French phrase, mandat impératif, which means an express direction from a constituency which its representative is not permitted to disobey, and we imagine the mutilation to imply that the direction may be given in some loose and general manner. in what manner? Is it meant that, if a candidate in an election address declares that he is in favor of household suffrage or woman suffrage, and is afterwards elected, he has a mandate to vote for it, but not otherwise? And, if so, how many election addresses, containing such references, and how many returns, constitute a mandate to the entire House of Commons? Again, assuming the mandate to have been ob But 1 Article 13 of the Constitution of New York, which is still in force, runs as fol lows: tained, how long is it in force? The House | tract from the Constitution of the great of Commons may sit for seven years under State of New York. the Septennial Act; but the strict law has hardly ever prevailed, and in the great majority of cases the House of Commons has not lasted for nearly the whole period. May it give effect to its mandate in its fourth, or fifth, or sixth session, or must an alteration of the Constitution be the earliest measure to which a Parliament commissioned to deal with it must address itself? These unsettled questions form the staple of the controversy which has been raging among us for months, but the prominence which they have obtained is not in the very least arbitrary or accidental. The question of the amount and nature of the notice which the electoral body shall receive of an intended change in the Constitution; the question whether any thing like a mandate shall be given by that body to the legislature; the question whether existing constituencies shall have full jurisdiction over proposed constitutional innovation; the question of the majority which shall be necessary for the decision of the legislature on a constitutional measure; all these questions belong to the very essence of constitutional doctrine. There is no one of them which is peculiar to this country; what is peculiar to this country is the extreme vagueness with which all of them are conceived and stated. The Americans of the United States, feeling on all sides the strongest pressure of democracy, but equipped with a remarkable wealth of constitutional knowledge inherited from their forefathers, have had to take up and solve every one of them. We will endeavor to show what have been their methods of solution. We will not go for an example to the Constitution of the United States, abounding as it does in the manifold restrictions thought necessary by its framers for the purpose of securing in a probably democratic society the self-command without which it could not become or remain a nation. It will be sufficient for our object to quote the provisions respecting the procedure to be followed on constitutional amendments, contained in the constitutions of individual States, which, we need not say, can only legislate within the limits permitted to them by the Federal Constitution. One of the subjects, however, on which the powers of the several States were till lately exclusive and are still most extensive, is the franchise; and this gives a peculiar value and interest to the provisions which we will proceed to exVOL. XLVIII. 2476 LIVING AGE. Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed to the Senate and Assembly; and if the same be agreed to by a majority of the members elected to each of the two Houses, such amendment or amendments shall be entered on their journals with the "yeas " and "nays" taken thereon, and referred to the Legislature to be chosen at the next general election, and shall be published for three months previous to the time of making such choice; and if, in the Legislature so next chosen as aforesaid, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each House, then it shall be the duty of the Legislature to subto the people in such manner and at such time mit such proposed amendment or amendments as the Legislature shall prescribe; and if the people shall approve and ratify such amendment or amendments by a majority of the electors qualified to vote for members of the Legislature voting thereon, such amendment or amendments shall become part of the Constitution. Section 2 of the article provides an alternative mode of amendment. At the general election to be held (in each twentieth year), and also at such time as the Legislature may by law provide, the question "Shall there be a Convention to revise the Constitution and amend the same?" shall be decided by the electors qualified to vote for members of the Legislature, and in case a majority of the electors so qualified voting at such election shall decide in favor of a Convention for such purpose, the Legislature at the next Session shall provide by law for the election of delegates to such Convention. These provisions of the Constitution of New York, regulating the procedure to be followed in constitutional amendments, and therefore in measures extending or altering the electoral franchise, are substantially repeated in the constitutions of nearly all the American States. Where there are variations, they are generally in the direction of greater stringency. The Constitution of Ohio, for example, requires that there shall be at the least a three-fifths majority in each branch of the Legislature proposing an amendment, and a two-thirds majority is necessary if it is sought to summon a convention. When an amendment is proposed in Massachusetts, a two-thirds majority is demanded in the lower house, and the same majority must be obtained in both houses before the Constitution of Louisiana can be the considerations upon which it has amended. The Constitution of New Jer-turned. All of us know, for instance, that sey gives greater precision to the provis- the House of Lords has been threatened ion of the New York Constitution for the with extinction or mutilation for a certain ultimate ratification of the proposed offence. Yet when the offence is examamendment by the constituencies, by in- ined, it appears to consist in the violation serting, after the words "the people shall of some rule or understanding, never exratify and approve," the words "at a spe- pressed in writing, at variance with the cial election to be held for that purpose strict law, and not perhaps construed in only." The same constitution declares precisely the same way by any two thinkthat "no amendment shall be submitted ing men in the country. Political history to the people more than once in five shows that men have at all times quar years; and, like the constitutions of relled more fiercely about phrases and several other States, it gives no power to formulas, than even about material intersummon a revising convention. ests; and it would seem that the discussion of British constitutional legislation is distinguished from the discussion of all other legislation by having no fixed points to turn upon, and therefore by its irrational violence. Is it therefore idle to hope that at some calmer moment when the inevitable creation of two million more voters has been accomplished - we may borrow a few of the American securities against surprise and irreflection in constitutional legislation, and express them with something like the American precision ? It appears to have occurred to some that this would entail the conversion of the unwritten constitution of Great Britain into a written constitution. Nothing of the kind would be needed. A great part of our constitution is already written. Many of the powers of the crown, many of the powers of the House of Lords, including the whole of its judicial powers, much of the constitution of the House of Commons and its entire relation to the electoral body, have long since been defined by act of Parliament. There does not seem to be any insuperable objection, first of all, to making a statutory distinc tion between ordinary legislation and legislation which in any other country would be called constitutional; and next, to requiring for the last a special legislative procedure, intended to secure caution and deliberation, and as near an approach to impartiality as a system of party government will admit of. The alternative is to leave unsettled all the questions which the recent controversy has brought to light, and to give free play to a number of tendencies already actively at work. It is quite plain whither they are conducting us. We are drifting towards a type of government associated with terrible events -a single assembly, armed with full powers over the constitution, which it may exercise at pleasure. It will be a theoretically all-powerful convention, governed by a practically all-powerful secret No doubt therefore is possible as to the mode in which these American State constitutions settle the formidable questions which the discussion of the last few months has shown to be unsettled in this country. First of all, it is to be noted that the electoral body recognized by all the constitutions without exception, as having an exclusive jurisdiction over amendments of the constitution, is the existing electoral body, and not any electoral body of the future. Next, the most ample notice is given to it that an amendment of the constitution will be brought before the next legislature which it is called upon to choose; both branches of the outgoing legislature must record a resolution with the numbers of the division upon it, and this resolution must be published three months before a general election. It is quite clear, therefore, that the representatives chosen at this election will have what may be called a "mandate." The amendment must then be agreed to by an absolute majority of the members of both houses of the new legislature; or, as is required in some States, by a two-thirds or three-fifths majority in both houses, or one of them. But there is a final security in addition. The mandate must be ratified. The amendment must be submitted to the people in any way which the legislature may provide; and, as is shown by the Constitution of New Jersey, the ratification is usually placed in the hands of a special legislature specially elected for the purpose of giving or refusing it. Such are the securities against surprise or haste, in conducting the most important part of legislation, which may very well suggest to the English politician some serious reflections. What has been most remarkable in the recent discussion, has been, far less the violent and inflammatory language in which it has been carried on, than the extreme vagueness of THAT old bronze pope has been sitting enthroned just opposite the Cathedral of Perugia for more than three hundred years. One hand is outstretched towards the piazza in the act of blessing the noisy crowd that daily assembles beneath, and as you look at the sagacious old face you fancy that the expression varies. In the morning it beams on the market-sellers as they spread out their quaint wares on the hot stones below; but at eventide it looks pensive, more in keeping with the grassgrown street behind it, and the old grey palaces that surround the piazza. On this summer Sunday evening the pope looks cheerful. The corso in front of the cathedral is thronged; groups of gaily dressed women are walking up and down fanning themselves, they stop now and then to greet neighbors, they make the warm air merry with chat and laughter. The younger women are almost all handsome, and those who wear graceful black lace mantillas look far more picturesque than others with conventional hats and bonnets. Here and there a man is to be seen among the women, but usually the men stand apart and talk together at the street corners. About half a dozen officers in brilliant uniforms swagger up and down the corso and stare and smile at the pret tiest girls, who smile back in return and show their white teeth and fan themselves more vigorously still. Here comes a reinforcement to the crowd. Service is over, and a stream of people pours down the cathedral steps beside the emerald-green pope. Soon the stream lessens, and only twos and threes trickle down the steps. Now comes a tall, dark-eyed woman, with a brilliant complexion and scarlet lips-perhaps her nose is too broad and her mouth rather wide, but she has a winning smile in spite of the pride in her dark, glowing eyes; she moves superbly and her figure is perfect. She comes out of church fanning herself with a big scarlet fan, and as she bows carelessly in answer to an old woman's greeting, the tall lad who walks | behind says to himself, "My mother is more beautiful than ever." Checco is not at all like "handsome Camilla," as his mother is called. He is a long, thin lad of sixteen, who has outgrown his strength; his arms look too long, and his hands and feet are bony and awkward. He is not ugly, he has his mother's beautiful blue-black hair; his clear, olive skin looks healthy, and his honest dark eyes glisten with feeling; but he seems sad, and the corners of his red lips are drawn down with a hopeless expression, quite out of keeping with his age. He walks behind his mother, but as she reaches the bottom of the steps he comes up with her and as he walks beside her, a button of his dark coat catches in her mantilla. Camilla's eyes flash and her heavy eyebrows meet in a frown as she puts her hand to her head: grows dim with tears he can hardly keep | away to his farm among the hills; it from falling. 66 Any other boy," Camilla says in an ill-used voice, "would call his mother's husband father.' He has been your father six months; you are very unkind only to call him Beppino." Checco's head has drooped again; he is silent. "If he did not make me a good husband, I could understand it," Camilla goes on; "but see how loving he is and how handsome and graceful. Ah! if you were only like him." Checco is silent still. By this time they have crossed the piazza in front of the cathedral and turn towards home. The lad feels he will not have to endure this misery much longer. Checco rarely goes out with his mother. To-day his stepfather had toothache and declared he could not leave the house, so the lad had the enjoyment of going alone with his mother. It is true that she has contrived more than once to snub him, but the pleasure of being with her has made him very happy. He has been able to render her little services too: some one knocked her fan off the prayer-desk at which she knelt, and when Checco picked it up again he was rewarded by a sweet smile. This rare bit of sunshine has made up for many previous snubs, and as he came down the cathedral steps Checco had counted on a happy walk home with his adored mother, and on, perhaps, a peaceful evening. Now his wretched awkwardness has spoilt all. would have been harder for him if he had known how willingly his mother gave him up. It is true Camilla cried and sobbed, and told her brother-in-law she must give up the carpenter's business; but she added she was not fit to train a rough boy of eleven, and she implored Luigi to teach Checco how to earn a living. So Luigi took the lad away and taught him to work hard in the fields, and in the winter months sent him to school. Checco rarely saw his mother; when she did come to the farm the lad thought she looked as sweet and as lovely as the Madonna herself. One day about six months ago news came to the farm that Camilla was going to marry Beppino, a young brazier of Perugia. Poor Checco wrote her an illspelt, tear-stained letter; he begged her not to marry a man younger than she was, but to let him go home and take care of her. This made Camilla furious, and she did not ask Checco to the wedding. She was much more in love with her handsome young Beppino than she had ever been with gentle, grey-haired Francesco. Three months later when Luigi died and Beppino said the lad would be useful to him in his work, Camilla summoned her boy home against her will. His appearance took her by surprise- he had grown very fast of late, and Camilla had been trying to persuade her new husband that she was about his own age. When she saw the tall, awkward lad come in she felt that that delusion was at an end. gether. Past the east end of the cathedral they "He was not so big and old-looking turn under a tall archway, grey with age. when I last saw him," she said to her Within it are two more arches with an-husband as soon as Checco left them tocient houses above them; beyond, a dark street goes down steeply from the outer archway this street is so narrow and has such tall houses on each side that the sun seldom looks in at their windows. Checco is thinking of the happy life he led in this same grey street with his kind, middle-aged father, Francesco the carpenter, and his gay young mother, that beautiful Camilla beside whom he is walking. To Checco his mother will always be beautiful, and in the idolatry with which hs regards her, it seems to him that he is to blame in the troubles that are now so frequent. He firmly believes that in those happy days, she was always a kind and loving mother. It was a hard trial to the boy when his father died and his uncle Luigi took him Beppino smiled contemptuously. "So long as the fellow can work," he said, "I care nothing about looks." At which poor vain Camilla bit her lips with vexation. It did not trouble her how much her cold reception had wounded and disheartened her loving child; Checco had come home bent on showing his mother the affection with which his heart was brimming over, and her coldness stupefied him; he had no spirit left to meet the indifferent greeting bestowed on him by her husband, and he showed himself at his very worst. Beppino was handsome and well-made and the best dancer in Perugia; and he was fully aware of his own merits and personal advantages. He was not clever, but he had that cold sagacity which is |