and the proportion increases. No doubt the tendency of any maritime war would be to raise the price of food, especially corn, to check the astonishing wastefulness of the people in this respect, and to drive an immense number of recruits into the army from inability to provide for themselves otherwise. This last result deserves consideration which has not yet been given to it. destined as officers for the higher ranks | free from this difficulty. In spite of her of the army. The system is that of "one- protective tariffs, France imports about a year volunteers." By paying a certain fifth of the grain which she consumes, sum (it was fifteen hundred francs in France), and passing examinations, educated youths could insure for themselves a comparatively refined life during their active service, which service would close at the end of the first year. The French Deputies lately carried by large majorities the committee stage of a bill which will, if finally passed, put an end to the "one year voluntariat," and oblige every son of France, not an officer, to serve three years in the active army, however inconvenient it may be or destructive to his chances in his contemplated profession. This is the direction taken by democracy. It can hardly be said to be the way of peace. Mr. Mathew Arnold, in his "Culture and Anarchy," tells a story of a manager of works at Clay Cross, who said during the Crimean war that, "sooner than submit to conscription, the population of that district would flee to the mines and lead a Robin Hood life under ground." Yes, but he meant, "sooner than be enlisted forcibly by aristocrats." Are we quite sure that in this " 'epoch of expansion we may not see the proletariat forcibly enlisting the wealthy classes as one means of producing equality? A naval Sedan might make some of us acquainted with strange bed-fellows. There is, however, one development of our modern commercial life which has had a direct tendency towards peace, and would expand that tendency into a great European force if other nations would, as they do not, follow our lead. The adoption of free trade, while increasing our wealth and favoring the existence of a population greater than could have lived in these islands on any other conditions, has made us dependent on places beyond sea for a considerable portion of our food supply, and would hamper us to a certain extent in case of war with one or more great maritime powers. But the effect of this is commonly exaggerated. It has been shown above that we grow meat enough for ourselves if calculated on the Continental scale of consumption; and though we should be pinched for corn if blockaded for a considerable period, it is impossible to conceive that no supplies would reach us. A permanent blockade could only take place if our naval power were destroyed, and in that case the whole empire would be tumbling to pieces and we should have to make the best terms we could. Other nations are not quite But a blockade of our coasts is inconceivable. People talk of the naval power of France because she has of late years been active in providing new iron and steel built ships to take the place of her old wooden ironclads which are fast falling to pieces. But naval power does not rest on the number of ironclads afloat, though even in this respect we are considerably superior. It depends on power of adding rapidly to existing fleets, keeping them on the ocean by means of numerous centres of supply and the exertions of a mercantile navy, and, above all, upon the seafaring genius of the people. Now it so happens that we are by far the greatest ship-builders, that we have the greater part of the coal-fields of the world at our disposal, harbors for refuge and refitment scattered all over the navigable ocean, and not only at home but almost everywhere the pick of seafaring population. France is just beginning to set about acquiring a few of the useful spots left untouched by England. Her carrying trade by sea is only about one-tenth of ours, and her navy is recruited by the same means as her army-conscription. The simplest statement of facts is so enormously in our favor that it appears as if it must be exaggerated. Judged according to the laws which from time immemorial have governed power at sea, a French fleet acting anywhere out of reach of France would be like a flying column in an enemy's country as Admiral Courbet, who knows that between Toulon and Saigon there is not a ton of French coal to be had, is now beginning to find out. It is to supply this want that costly expeditions to Tonquin and Madagascar are sent forth, but it may be predicted with some certainty that whatever life may hereafter be visible in the new ports will be greatly due to the presence of ships flying the British flag. It would be quite as easy to show that our best course would be to join the peace alliance of Continental Europe against France and Russia, and we all know that | French were threatening_invasion, and this was the idea of Lord Beaconsfield to Admiral Byng caused our English fleet to a certain extent. It might be said that show its back to the enemy near Minorca. because our interests touch and cross It is true that Continental armies were not those of France everywhere, because Rus- so great as they are now, but the disprosia will soon be our close neighbor on the portion was even greater. To match the continent of Asia, and because we have a three English battalions, Prussia had one small army while the great central Euro- hundred and fifty thousand men and the pean powers have enormous land forces, allied armies intended to act against we should do well to ally ourselves with Frederick numbered about iour hundred those who are strong where we are weak, and thirty thousand. Yet no one can and to whom we could offer the immense doubt that the support of England was advantage of our naval power. There the one thing needful to enable the king would be as much sense in such a pro- to struggle on through the terrible seven gramme as in the proposed effacement of years' strife. Pitt said that he intended Great Britain in Europe. The objection to conquer America in Germany, which to the one course is, however, the same meant, as Professor Seeley has pointed as to the other. We should be volunta- out, that "he saw how, by subsidizing rily placing ourselves in an unnatural Frederick, to make France exhaust herposition, and tying our hands when we self in Germany, while her possessions ought to preserve the greatest freedom. in America passed defenceless into our No one, except here and there a very full-hands." History repeats itself, and more flavored Jingo, desires that we should mix ourselves unnecessarily in the quarrels of the Continent, and, on the other hand, to proclaim ourselves indifferent to anything that may happen would be to assert a position which Englishmen will never accept, or, accepting, will throw to the winds under several conceivable circumstances. Suppose, for example, that in a general European war Germany and Austria were crushed and treated as Poland was in 1772. Could we see with equanimity a new Napoleon with a doubled fleet close all the ports of the Continent to English trade? Such things are possible. The close of the Seven Years' War left France apparently exhausted and on the highroad to revolution. In less than half a century all Europe was at the feet of the emperor. Surely our best course is to avoid entanglements and keep our powder dry. unlikely things may happen than that France may now build up a colonial empire of the second class and see all that is valuable in it pass hereafter into English hands. If we now multiply by ten the figures just given of the Continental armies in Frederick's time we shall not be far from the truth; but if we multiply the English force by a hundred the number will still fall far short of the present standard for home defence. Exclusive of India and all the colonies, but including the Mediterranean fortresses and Egypt, it will be within the mark to put the regular army, with its immediate reserves, at Freder ick's strength when he began the Seven Years' War, that is, one hundred and fifty thousand. Roughly speaking, we may put the militia at one hundred thousand, not forgetting that the right of conscription for the militia is still extant; and we may count the volunteers at two hundred thousand, for if some of them now in the force would be unable to serve in war, others would soon come to take their places. There are, then, no less than four hundred and fifty thousand men * It is quite true that we are not in a state of preparation to face alone on the Continent the armies of any single great European power. But as a matter of fact we never were during the whole period of our greatest life. To quote many instances would be wearisome and useless: one example may stand for all. At the beginning of the Seven Years' War during which England obtained the freedom of the seas, chased France out of America, and established herself firmly in India, there were just three battalions in this country, and so divided were we politi. Total available for general service at cally that the Duke of Newcastle could not have colonels for new ones because the patronage would be in the hands of his rival, the Duke of Cumberland. The These rough figures are within the mark. The numbers actually present in the United Kingdom, as stated by Lord Hartington in the House on the 7th Regular Army, N. C. officers and once, exclusive of Mediterranean Carried forward • 84,900 37,493 28,482 150,875-150,875 90,985 150,875 available for defence, and of them prob- | buy a bigger boat instead of supplying ably two hundred thousand might be law-oars for the small one. The expedition fully used, or would readily volunteer, for to Egypt two years ago was on a small general service in a European war. Now scale compared with what might be rethis is a greater number of men than quired, and could easily be provided so fought on the German side at the battle far as men are concerned. Yet we have of Gravelotte, and quite sufficient, if prop- lately heard from the witnesses before erly organized, to turn the scale in any the Committee of Investigation that the European contest during our time. Half arrangements for transport were so bad the number would have raised the siege that the force could not have moved forof Paris during the Franco-German war. ward at all if Arabi Pacha had thought of It is true that, taking the regular army that obvious measure, the cutting of the without its reserves, hampered as it is Sweet-water Canal. We were saved from with the necessity for foreign reliefs, there humiliation because he only dammed it, is still need of a small increase for that and the dam leaked or was able to be particular purpose of relief. But, regarded broken. Clearly the oars were wanting, as a whole, England could put a very sub- but we found a chance plank wherewith stantial force of men into the field, even to paddle. A scheme was prepared some if all the volunteers were left at home. years ago for the movement of troops by How comes it, then, that we are in diffi- sea, and the main principle of it was that culties whenever we enter upon such a each body, whether cavalry, infantry, or trifling business as the Egyptian cam- artillery, should embark complete with its paign of 1882? It arises from the preva- own regimental transport and so on, medlence of a belief that England is effaced ical and other departments, with their from the list of great European powers, own stores. Yet no sooner do we come and has no need to be prepared for war. to practice than, from want of preparation The result is as simple as shameful. The or some strange idea of economy, we find men are present with their arms - this is the old errors of the Crimea revived. all that the public asks; but everything Regiments land without means of motion, else is absent, or present in such small and medical stores or other necessaries proportion as to leave the army practically are buried under ammunition or rotten useless for the field. We want organiza hay, or something of that kind. These tion, proper distribution, and preparation. | faults have been pointed out again and There is a true story told of a man whose wife had fallen into a stream which would carry her over a cataract. She was caught by a friendly rock, and might be rescued. Her husband rushed to a boat which was near, launched it on the swift waters, sprang in, and then found that there were no oars. Such would be the position of England if she were called upon to mobliize an army in time of great danger. We have a costly boat on which we spend immense sums of money annually for repairs, but in time of trial it would be found that there were no oars. To carry this illustration a little farther, we must suppose that the proprietor of the estate is anxious that the boat should always be ready to save life, and the boatmen are constantly asking the steward for oars, but he replies that he has no money for them, and meanwhile the proprietor is being adjured to again by experts. Probably Lord Wolseley has called attention to them. The answer is the same. The Treasury will not give the money. An Intelligence Department was formed under Lord Cardwell to investigate the state of affairs and draw up a scheme of mobilization. The only scheme produced was one for a case of invasion. It showed a plethora of infantry, and a striking deficiency in everything else. Not a step was taken to correct the proportions or sup ply the auxiliary services. The monthly Army List contained the absurd skeleton corps for a while, and then the whole scheme was laughed out of existence. It had only shown what might be and ought to be. The steward would not provide the oars. Such facts as these explain the feeling expressed by Mr. Delane when he said that the country would grudge nothing to have a good army, but disbelieved in the skill or good faith of the adminis trators. We may say, then, of the land forces that there are men enough if they were all put in their proper places, and 310,985-310,985 the whole organized with an eye to the requirements of war rather than to make 461,860 a show in blue-books. 90,585 • I1,400 • 209,000 Total available for home service, a portion of whom would be sure to volunteer in war Grand Total exclusive of troops in 150,875 that mastery of the outer world which had been taken from France by England. His attempt to expand France led to all his European conquests and to our long strug bitten with the same mania, and it is not sweet words which will prevent collision, nor only a consciousness that we are too strong to be meddled with. As a matter of fact we are strong, but our groans make the world count us as weak. And our own disbelief in war has bred a careless acceptance of unreadiness in organ. ization and that preparation which is the chief feature of Continental armies and navies. It is here that the shoe pinches, and the naval and military authorities cannot but be aware of the fact. And what of the navy? Here, at least, there is no question what the wishes of the country are. Our first line must be strong, or all our strength is shorn, our position even as a colonial power endan-gle with him. France seems again to be gered, and our very liberties at the mercy of others. Nothing is more improbable than a duel at sea between England and any one Continental power. But in such a case, none are so strong in ships as we, though it would be well to push on the changes in armament a little faster. | And if it came to "Alabama" work, we could put ten swift ocean steamers in cruising trim for every one which the next greatest maritime power could provide; that is to say, we could find the ships at once. It is by no means so certain that we could find the suitable guns. Here, again, it is much to be feared that we are unready, and we are receiving business lessons from abroad, even in naval matters. Quite lately the German fleet at Kiel was the subject of an experiment which may yet be famous. A telegram arrived from Berlin to mobilize the force as quickly as possible. In a few hours all the crews were on board, and the ships, ready for action, steamed out of the harbor. Since then landings and other useful manœuvres have been practised. Again, torpedo boats now form one of the most important parts of a fleet. But the use of them needs to be practised in peace, not left to be improvised in war. The Italians have constant practice with them, and on a definite system. An enemy's ship approaching an Italian harbor might, perhaps, expect to see a small group of the dangerous little craft pushing out from the port. But it would not see them. The practice is for the torpedo boats to slip outside as early as possible and creep round, advancing at last from different points of the compass, some even following the course of the big ship. A keen interest is taken by every European power in the preparation of their ships and their naval tactics, and schemes are ready for different eventualities, just as they were for the Prussian army when it astonished Europe in 1880. It has been pointed out earlier in this article that we are vastly stronger at sea than any other power, but it is much to be feared that some of them are stealing a march upon us in training, because our country is lulled to sleep by the sweet promise of perpetual freedom from European war. Professor Seeley has lately shown in "The Expansion of England," that Napoleon always had in mind the recovery of There are, however, certain consolations when we study the condition of the powers whose interests cross ours in so many directions. Take France as a type of modern military organization, and let us see what she has lately done. The force present in Tonquin, including the troops which were there before the seri ous concentration took place and the rein. forcements sent at different times, was under twenty thousand men. Yet to obtain even these she was obliged to draw upon the cadres of the home army, partly deranging her scheme of mobilization, and she could not furnish more without seriously weakening her whole system. An armed nation is good for great wars, but it cannot put one hundred thousand men in the field without completely throwing out the whole system of organization and weakening the country for defence. Vast as is her land army compared with ours, she dare not engage us unless she had first made sure of the neutrality of all her neighbors. The Tunis expedition, unop. posed as it was, placed her for the time completely at the mercy of Germany, because it pulled many of the bolts and nuts out of her military machinery for great wars, though the great machine itself stood idle. Or suppose the case of Russia desiring to invade India. We have there some two hundred thousand troops, English and native together, and our great feudatories have an even larger number. Supposing the Indian forces properly prepared for war as the armies of Continental nations are prepared, what sort of force must Russia send through hostile Afghanistan across mountain passes to attack us, what would such an enormous expedition cost, and what would be the result of failure? It is not too much to say that in a general European war En gland could hamper Russia in Asia much more readily than she could hamper us, and we could draw the life-blood out of her through the arteries in her vulnerable heel. In short, France is vulnerable in her navy and her foreign possessions, Russia is vulnerable in Asia and, as formerly, in the Black Sea. If she became a Mediterranean power she would be still. more vulnerable. Even without attacking her we could neutralize a large contingent of her forces. Probably it would never be worth our while, but since the possibility exists, why suppose that England is not still a great European power? Granted that in the present state of foreign politics there seems no likelihood of a war in which it would be worth our while to meddle. Granted that the perpetual nagging at Russia is undignified and absurd, because her interests are much more likely to clash with those of Austria than with English interests in the East. Granted most heartily that a good understanding with both Russia and France is a wise policy. But all this does not hinder us us from having an equally good understanding with other powers; still less does it require the abdication of our place as a great European power. On the contrary, our wisest posture is one of quiet observation, and our words to Continental nations should be: "Our first and greatest interest is general peace; you are all at liberty to break it if you please; in that case we know not which side we should take, or whether we should even take any side at all. But of this be well assured, we could not see with equanimity either despotism or anarchy triumphant in Europe, and we demand that our right and our power to throw a heavy sword into the scale be recognized and acknowledged." We still need a great deal of preparation and organization, but the people which has the carrying trade of the world, the greatest force at sea, and, including India and the colonies, little short of three quarters of a million of armed men, with limitless resources to draw upon at home and in the East, can never be counted otherwise than as a great European power. MARIANNE DUGDALE. ANY faint hopes of amnesty which Iris might have entertained were extinguished, her face fell and was dyed with a crimson blush of shame and confusion, at the reception she met with from Marianne Dugdale. The young lady had been riding with some country companions who had turned up in town, opportunely for her. She had come back alınost simultaneously with her grandmother and Iris, so that Miss Dugdale was still standing in the hall, holding up her habit with one hand and releasing herself from the burden of her hat in the hot weather with the other, when Lady Fermor called out, "Are you there, Marianne? Come here, I have brought you Iris Compton. Let me see if you two cousins bave any look of each other." Marianne turned round and showed a short but well-balanced, well-carried figure, a face from which all the dusky, not particularly tidy hair, was swept back from the good forehead, a pair of the darkest brown, keenly inquiring, nay, haughtily challenging eyes, an ivory complexion, as if pale with passion, a straight nose, a mouth so shaped to pout that one could hardly conceive it pacifically straight, or drooping lugubriously at the corners. Marianne Dugdale was one of the pale roses so much in fashion, well set in thorns, if ever rose were so set. She made a queer, half-mocking little bow, touched the tips of Iris's fingers with her own, and saying decidedly, "There's not a shade of likeness between us, granny," turned away and ran lightly up a flight of stairs. "How she detests me, at first sight! Though I cannot help it, I need not wonder at it." Iris took the manner of the reception to herself, in distress and humiliation, and asked in nervous apprehen- . sion with what show of friendship and enjoyment the two could live together, and go out together, certainly for the next month or two, possibly for years? For half a week Iris remained disabused of the impression that she was an object of half-righteous, half-vindictive abhorrence to Marianne Dugdale, who was watching everything Iris did and said with a hawk |