General ALLISON. It might be useful if I were to comment in some detail. As has been placed into the record, I am a direct representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and assistant to Admiral Moorer for strategic arms negotiations. This is my sole duty. I spend full time working on these matters. During the onsite negotiations, I am, as Mr. Nitze has so correctly described, a full member of the delegation, coequal to the other delegates, working under Ambassador Gerard Smith. During the preparatory phases, the early phases in Washington, and during the interims between phases of negotiations, I worked actively in Washington as a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on those interdepartmental bodies or groups concerned with preparing U.S. positions for the negotiations. I reported, of course, regularly and frequently to Admiral Moorer and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I sat with the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they considered these matters. I was in a position to put the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directly into the work in preparation for negotiation. I was in a position to put the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military views, into the activities of the delegation in arriving at judgments as to what steps we should take and what decisions we should make in the negotiating process. I want to observe, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, that I had been aware before I became involved in this process of the view that has just been expressed the military had not in the past had an opportunity to perhaps express fully their views. I found in the work I have done the opportunity has been given to present the military view. The question of the degree to which a view is accepted, or the conditions, is a separate matter, but I think we have had an opportunity to put forward the military view on a continuing basis. Admiral MOORER. I might add, too, if I may, Mr. Chairman, the interdepartmental group in Washington which provides guidance to the delegation is called the verification panel, of which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a member. In addition to that, I have attended all of the National Security Council meetings where the arms limitation was on the agenda. Mr. PRICE. I might point out here at this time, the delegation also kept the Congress pretty well informed on the matters. I know you did it with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The negotiations were cooperated in. Mr. SLATINSHEK. Mr. Chairman, one final question. If you could provide this for the record, Admiral Moorer. You have emphasized the fact that although we appear to be frozen in a relative position of inferiority on the basis of delivery vehicles, we have other qualitative advantages. You have reference to megatonnage and warheads. I realize to get into finite numbers would involve a classification problem. Could you present some material for the record which would speak to the two questions, the additional comparisons of megatonnage and warheads vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, so that we could treat them in an unclassified manner? Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. PD 2.34 (The following information was received for the record:) The Soviet edge in numbers of launchers, within the delivery vehicle total, and in megatonnage is a strategic fact of life. In the most important characteristics of our offensive forces-MIRVs, force efficiency and system quality-we have and plan to maintain a clear sufficiency in our strategic posture. To maintain the strategic balance, modernization programs are underway. We are currently deploying MIRVS on MINUTEMAN and POSEIDON and SRAMS on bombers. MINUTEMAN silos are undergoing a hardness upgrade program and satellite basing is being provided for bombers. Programs currently in Research and Development include the B-1 bomber, SCAD, Hound Dog II and TRIDENT. Hedges in the production base include deploying more MIRV warheads on POSEIDON, deploying more SRAM on bombers, deploying more MINUTEMAN IIIs and expanding the satellite basing of bombers. Additional hedges are available through changes in current operational practices, if required. These programs and other assurance measures recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will maintain the clear sufficiency in our strategic posture. Mr. PRICE. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance and testimony here today. Thank you very much. Admiral MOORER. Thank you, sir. Mr. PRICE. The committee will adjourn, subject to the call of the Chair. (Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m. the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.) CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS Tuesday, July 25, 1972. Thursday, July 27, 1972___ PRINCIPAL WITNESSES Allison, Lt. Gen. Royal B., USAF, Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for Strategic Arms Negotiations__ 15067 15113 Page 15150 Duckett, Hon. Carl, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency. 15113 Nitze, Hon. Paul, Deputy Head, U.S delegation to strategic arms limitation talks (SALT).... 15120 et seq. Sammet, Maj. Gen. George, Jr., Deputy Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army. Smith, Hon. Gerard, Head, U.S. delegation to strategic arms limitation talks, and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--- 15083 (15153) |