exceed a total linear increase of 15 percent. Under this criteria the maximum volumetric increase in missile size permitted cannot exceed approximately 32 percent.

As an example assume, if you will, that the current dimensions of a Soviet ICBM are:

diameter (d)=8 feet.

length (7)=64 feet

The volume (V) of the ICBM under these assumptions, then, would be:

If the variable d which would result in the maximum increase in volume were changed to the maximum limit (15 percent) permitted under the Interim Agreement the new diameter would be 9.2 feet and the enlarged ICBM would have a volume as follows:

The increase in volume of the enlarged missile over the original missile would be

4,254 -3,217

1,037 cu. ft. for an increase in volume of approximately 32 percent.

Mr. NITZE. Mr. Chairman, we would be delighted, as we said, to supply something for the record in full on this. Before that, I want to correct a misunderstanding. I did not ever say that I took lightly any increase as much as 10 or 30 percent.

Mr. RANDALL. I thought you said it was unsubstantial.

Mr. NITZE. I did not say that. I was not trying to say that I looked with favor upon increases beyond any given level. What I was trying to do was to be precise as to what the agreement means.

agree

Mr. RANDALL. There is quite a bit of imprecision, it appears here. Mr. NITZE. I don't think there is an imprecision on what the agreement means. I was trying to make clear what the intent of the ment was. I wasn't expressing approval of their increasing silo dimensions. We made our position clear, and that is we don't think there should be any increase beyond that which is specified in our unilateral statement.

Mr. RANDALL. Then I guess earlier in the week we have had the question asked again and again and again of other witnesses. Are we really talking about dimension or dimensions?

Mr. NITZE. We are talking about dimensions. In other words, depth and diameter. But the intent of the agreement is that not both depth and diameter be increased by 10 to 15 percent, but only one, or possibly a combination of the two in which the aggregate increases of the two would not exceed 10 to 15 percent.

Mr. RANDALL. Then the Secretary is saying even though the word "dimensions" is used, that is not the intent of the agreement?

Mr. NITZE. I say the clear background of the negotiations was that the two dimensions which were under discussion were depth and diameter. It was also the intent of the agreement that not both be increased by 10 to 15 percent.

Mr. RANDALL. Then if not both, only one?

Mr. NITZE. That is in essence right.

Mr. RANDALL. The word is "dimension"?

Mr. NITZE. No, the word is "dimensions," because you could increase depth, say, by 5 percent, and diameter by 10.

Mr. RANDALL. And dimensions, when the variables are put together, I think I understand what you are saying, you are contending the results in one dimension, one final figure?

Mr. NITZE. That is the maximum. The maximum which would be consistent with the intent of the agreement would be a 15-percent increase in the diameter. This translates through the square of the diameter to an increase in the volume of the silo of 32 percent.

Mr. STRATTON. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. RANDALL. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, could Secretary Nitze also be asked to present us in writing the record where this is spelled out? It disturbs me that he is giving us all of these statements, but the only thing we have is what is included in the message from the President of the United States.

Mr. NITZE. I think, in addition to that

Mr. PRICE. Supply us whatever you can.

Mr. NITZE. We will supply whatever we can.

(The following information was received for the record:)

On July 18, 1972, Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, Chairman of the U.S. SALT Delegation, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, made the following statement:

"In Helsinki an ad referendum agreement was reached that there would be no significant increase in silo dimensions. It was clear from the record that dimensions meant internal diameter and depth. In Moscow, this agreement was discussed and confirmed and a further agreement was reached that 'significant increase' means an increase greater than 10 to 15 percent. This understanding was read into the record in Helsinki on May 26.

"The Moscow discussions support the interpretation that either diameter or depth could be increased up to 15 percent but not both."

Mr. PRICE. Admiral Moorer, the committee is in receipt of a letter from the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Froehlke, dated July 26, which advises that the Army, on the basis of fiscal year 1973 Continued Resolution, Public Law 92-334, is going to speed up the site defense program and incur costs commensurate with what would be allowed with the revised request for $140 million for this year.

I would like to read Secretary Froehlke's letter into the record, and then request some comment from you on this.

Admiral MOORER. All right.

Mr. PRICE (reading). "On 28 February 1972 I advised you of Army plans concerning the site defense program, formerly referred to as site defense of Minuteman. This letter is to advise you of the change in the Department of Defense's planned funding to this program through use of fiscal year 1973 R.D.T. & E. funds under the fiscal year 1973 Continuing Resolution (Public Law 92–334).

"As background for this change, I should point out that when the fiscal year 1973 budget was prepared, we did not know the outcome of SALT I and thus were faced with funding both the ongoing Safeguard deployment program and the site defense research and development program. Since the four-site Safeguard program would have provided adequate protection of Minuteman into the late 1970's, the

site defense program was deliberately rescheduled so that the system could be deployed shortly after completion of the four-site Safeguard Minuteman defense should it be needed to augment the Safeguard capability. This slower-than-normal schedule permitted site defense. R.D.T. & E. funding for fiscal year 1973 to be decreased to $80 million. "Now, with curtailment of the Safeguard deployment under the ABM Treaty, the site defense program should be brought back to a normal schedule to preserve the option to add to the protection of Minuteman on a timing consistent with the expiration of the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms. Restoration of the site defense program schedule is needed because, with the qualitative improvements and the number of launchers permitted the Soviets in the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, our Minuteman force could be seriously threatened.

"To preserve the option to deploy site defense responsively to have a strategically significant terminal defense of our ICBM force, the contract effort of the prime contractor (McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co.) and that of the Sprint missile developer (Martin Marietta. Corp.) must be increased early in fiscal year 1973 to restore the schedule as nearly as possible to that contemplated before the program was slowed. It is feasible to do this by accomplishing the effort scheduled over the next 18 months in a 12-month period. This action will place the contractors on a normal schedule as early as practical and will avoid undesirable concurrency between development, testing, and production that would result from compressing the schedule later in the program.

"Therefore, we plan to authorize the contractors to proceed on the revised schedule effective August 1, 1972, and to incur costs on the basis of the continuing resolution commensurate with the revised budget request of $140 million for fiscal year 1973. Should the additional $60 million not be authorized and appropriated by the Congress, the program can be retarded as late as October 1 without serious effect; however, if return of the fiscal year 1973 program to the $80 million level is deferred until as late as December, there will be a severe impact and the schedule may be delayed as much as a full year.

"Since this proposed step represents a departure from earlier testimony given on the site defense fiscal year 1973 program, I wish to advise you of our current planning in this regard."

Now, would you comment on that, particularly Mr. Froehlke's statement where he states that the restoration of the site defense program schedule is needed because, with the qualitative improvements and the number of launchers permitted the Soviets in the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, our Minuteman force could be seriously threatened?

Admiral MOORER. I interpret that to mean, Mr. Chairman, that in the event there is no progress in SALT II and at the end of 5 years the Soviet build up to the numbers that are permitted, they could pose a threat to the Minuteman.

So, I think he is making this statement as simply a hedge, assuming no further restraints are imposed on the Soviet offensive forces by SALT II. But I would ask your permission to comment in detail for the record, sir, since I have never had an opportunity to study this letter.

Mr. PRICE. Will you supply all you can for the record on that?
Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir; I will be glad to.

(The following information was received for the record.)

As I have pointed out in recent congressional testimony, the momentum of the Soviet strategic weapons growth has been slowed by the Interim Agreement. However, while this agreement is acceptable as an interim freeze, and is of mutual advantage to both the US and USSR, there are many issues remaining to be worked out during SALT II. Further, in order to guard against a degradation of our national security posture in a SAL environment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that specific assurances be adopted. These assurances include a broad range of intelligence capabilities and operations to verify Soviet compliance in a SAL environment, aggressive improvements and modernization programs, and vigorous research and development programs. With respect to our research and development efforts, while analyses conducted within DOD using Soviet force levels comparable to those constrained by SAL indicate that sufficient MINUTEMAN missiles would survive to accomplish a retaliatory mission, it is still necessary to maintain a hedge against possible Soviet qualitative improvements or abrogation of the agreement. In this regard, the Site Defense Program offers a significant opportunity to counter future ballistic missile threats to our nation.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Slatinshek, do you have any questions?
Mr. SLATINSHEK. A couple of questions, Mr. Chairman.

There has been a great deal of discussion of light and heavy missiles, and to clarify the record, it is my understanding that the sub-launched missiles are not included in the categorization light or heavy. In other words, the limitations that do apply, do not apply to them, is that correct?

Admiral MOORER. That is my understanding. There was really a separation of the SS-11 and SS-9.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. But categorically the distinction light and heavy does not apply to SLBM's?

Admiral MOORER. That is my understanding.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. Is that correct?

Admiral MoORER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. Why does that circumstance apply? In other words, why were they not included in the limitations? Was it because of the problem of verification?

Admiral MOORER. No, I don't think it would be feasible to put a missile the size of the SS-9, which is classified as a heavy missile of which they are allowed 313, in a submarine.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. I realize that, but we categorized our light as the Minuteman, as far as the ICBM is concerned, and the Titan as far as the heavy is concerned.

Ambassador Gerard Smith in his appearance before the committee, mentioned there could be a trade-off of the 54 Titans for an increase in our submarine force, and by inference therefore you could gather that they were considering them as heavy missiles. This is the reason for the question.

Admiral MOORER. Of course, you could get into the same discussion with respect to the SS-7's and SS-8's, but the purpose of classifying missiles as heavy missiles was to restrict the deployment of the SS-9 type.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. The ICBM's. But the question I am raising here, does this not put a premium on the ability to put a missile with heavy throw weight capability into an undersea vehicle?

Mr. Nitze perhaps can comment on that.

Mr. NITZE. As I said earlier, the entire purpose of the interim agreement was that it should be a short-term freeze, not longer than 5 years, hopefully substantially less than 5 years. The freeze was to be on those programs in the offensive field being conducted by the U.S.S.R. which might, if not limited, upset the climate in which you could negotiate a follow-on treaty.

The things that concerned us most about the on-going Soviet programs were their heavy missiles, the SS-9 program, and a follow-on program perhaps to build a new missile of that class. The other thing that seriously concerned us was the momentum of their SLBM program.

We did not think it likely or probable that within this short time period that either side would want to deploy a missile, within an SLBM force, as large as 70 cubic meters, which was the cutoff point we had in mind between light and heavy missiles.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. More specifically then, Mr. Secretary, ULMS-II would not be considered a heavy missile by your definition?

Mr. NITZE. That is correct. It would not be a heavy missile by any definition that has been under discussion.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. Right; the negotiations were long and protracted and very complex. They obviously impacted on military planning.

Could you elaborate, Mr. Secretary, and General Allison, on the degree to which the JCS were kept abreast of negotiations and had an input into the actual decisionmaking process? There are those who would suggest you were pretty much insulated from the negotiating process, in that the decisions were essentially civilian in nature and emanated from the White House.

Would you comment on that-perhaps Mr. Nitze speaking for the Secretary of Defense, and General Allison speaking for Admiral Moorer?

Mr. NITZE. The JCS were full participants in all the preparatory work in Washington, and full participants in the negotiating process in Helsinki and in Vienna. General Allison was a full member, appointed by the President, of the delegation. Certainly all of us operated under the eventual decision of the President. That was true of everybody, JCS, Defense Department, State Department, everybody else. The entire delegation operated obviously under the final decisionmaking authority of the President of the United States.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. It might be difficult, but could you perhaps put something in the record which would indicate the frequency of this dialog that had been created between the JCS, the negotiators, and the other people involved? The purpose of this question is the concern of many members of this committee that in years gone by the JCS has been ignored a great deal in the planning process, particularly at the upper echelon. As a matter of fact, a statement was made to this committee some years ago that the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body had not had any opportunity to discuss and present their views to the President for over a year in one particular period of our concern, and so it would be helpful if you could put something into the record which elaborates on this subject of concern.

General Allison?