media, or to mistakes committed by the reporters themselves. We examined what sources were most influential on the people who needed immediate information, and how well the public was served by the abundant coverage that was provided. We also attempted to evaluate whether the coverage tended to exaggerate the seriousness of the accident either by selectively using alarming quotes more than reassuring ones, or through purposeful sensationalism. Finally, we spent a great deal of time on the agency that had a major role in all of the above: the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The President gave us a very broad charge concerning this agency. therefore tried to understand its complex structure and how well it functions, its role in licensing and rulemaking, how well it carries out its mission through its inspection and enforcement program, the role it plays in monitoring the training of operators, and its participation in the response to the emergency, including the part it played in providing information to the public. We took more than 150 formal depositions and interviewed a significantly larger number of individuals. At our public hearings we heard testimony under oath from a wide variety of witnesses. We collecte voluminous material that will fill about 300 feet of shelf-space in a library. All of this material will be placed into the National Archives. The most important information extracted from this in each of the areas will appear in a series of "Staff Reports to the Commission." Based on all of this information, the Commission arrived at a number of major findings and conclusions. In turn, these findings led the Commission to a series of recommendations responsive to the President's charge. At the beginning of this volume will be found an overview of our investigation, followed by those findings and recommendations which commanded a significant consensus among the members of the Commission. Each recommendation was approved by a majority of Commissioners. WHAT WE DID NOT DO It is just as important for the reader to understand what the Commission did not do. Our investigation centered on one accident at one nuclear power plant in the United States. While acting under the President's charge, we had to look at a large number of issues affecting many different organizations; there are vast related issues which were outside our charge, and which we could not possibly have examined in a 6-month investigation. We did not examine the entire nuclear industry. (Although, through our investigation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, we have at least some idea of the standards being applied to it across the board.) We have not looked at the military applications of nuclear energy. We did not consider nuclear weapons proliferation. We have not dealt with the question of the disposal of radioactive waste or the dangers of the accumulation of waste fuel within nuclear power plants adjacent to the containment buildings. We made no attempt to examine the entire fuel cycle, starting with the mining of uranium. And, of course, we made no examination of the many other sources of radiation, both natural and man-made, that affect all of us. We have not attempted to evaluate the relative risks involved in alternate sources of energy. We are aware of number of studies that try to do this. We are also aware that some of these studies are subjects of continuing controversy. We did not attempt to reach a conclusion as to whether, as a matter of public policy, the development of commercial nuclear power should be continued or should not be continued. That would require a much broader investigation, involving economic, environmental, and political considerations. We are aware that there are 72 operating reactors in the United States with a capacity of 52,000 megawatts of electric energy. An additional 92 plants have received construction permits and are in various stages of construction. If these are completed, they will roughly triple the present nuclear capacity to generate electricity. This would be a significant fraction of the total U.S. electrical generating capacity of some 600,000 megawatts. In addition, there are about 200 nuclear power plants in other countries throughout the world. Therefore, the improvement of the safety of existing and planned nuclear power plants is a crucial issue. It is this issue that our report addresses, those changes that can and must be made as a result of the accident -- the legacy of Three Mile Island. OVERVIEW OVERALL CONCLUSION In announcing the formation of the Commission, the President of the United States said that the Commission "will make recommendations to enable us to prevent any future nuclear accidents." After a 6-month investigation of all factors surrounding the accident and contributing to it, the Commission has concluded that: - To prevent nuclear accidents as serious as Three Mile This conclusion speaks of necessary fundamental changes. We do not claim that our proposed recommendations are sufficient to assure the safety of nuclear power. Given the nature of its Presidential mandate, its time limitations, and the complexity of both energy and comparative "risk-assessment" issues, this Commission has not undertaken to examine how safe is "safe enough" or the broader question of nuclear versus other forms of energy. The Commission's findings with respect to the accident and the regulation of the nuclear industry particularly the current and potential state of public safety in the presence of nuclear power have, we believe, implications that bear on the broad question of energy. But the ultimate resolution of the question involves the kind of economic, environmental, and foreign policy considerations that can only be evaluated through the political process. Our findings do not, standing alone, require the conclusion that nuclear power is inherently too dangerous to permit it to continue and expand as a form of power generation. Neither do they suggest that the nation should move forward aggressively to develop additional commercial nuclear power. They simply state that if the country wishes, for larger reasons, to confront the risks that are inherently associated with |