which Mr. Stewart has made throughout his writings to his master, and his distinctive opinions, leave no ground of doubt. Ferguson's course, as was usual at that period in the Scottish Universities, embraced Ethics and Politics. He brought to bear on those subjects considerable speculative power, great knowledge of the world, and the results of a long study of ancient history and philosophy. No one was better skilled than Ferguson in duly blending the abstract and the concrete, and modifying the deductions of speculation by the facts of history and observation. With him Ethics, Politics, and History, went hand in hand, in turn illustrating and borrowing light from each other. His politics are, indeed, but his ethical doctrines applied to society; while in the masterly sketches of character scattered over the pages of his Roman Republic, the same moral doctrines stand out in all the relief and interest of individual portraiture.1 As a moral teacher Ferguson was great. He conjoined the simplicity, elevation, and ethical hardihood of the early Roman with Grecian refinement and eloquence. He had an instinctive sympathy for the grand and ennobling in moral doctrine; and guided by his own lofty nature and feelings, more than by profound speculative insight, he sketched an ideal of human virtue that approached the dignity and grandeur of the ancient Stoical model. His ethical doctrine was one, indeed, hardly to be looked for in the existing state of abstract speculation in Scotland, and but little in harmony with the temper of the times. But Ferguson drew his inspiration from the past. sympathies were with the nobler minds of antiquity. speculation in spirit, form, and results, is that of an ancient moralist of the best school. An early life spent in camps and on battle-fields, had, moreover, taught many stirring lessons to the meditative moralist. Experience of the changing fortunes, and the varied contingencies of war, strengthened his natural leaning to a morality severe and self-sufficient. His teaching was in great measure an inculcation of the need of the warrior His His 1 See, for example, the contrasted characters of Cæsar and Cato; Roman Republic, book iii. cap. iv. spirit in the moral life, where a higher end than military glory, and less perishable laurels than are gathered on the bloody field, are within reach, provided only they be sought with a will and bearing as resolute and unflinching as are demanded in the service of the lower ambition. The Ethics of Ferguson formed a marked contrast to the utilitarian doctrine which issued legitimately from the principles of Locke. His prelections undoubtedly contributed to cherish, in the Metropolitan University, that better spirit of speculation which was now rising in Scotland. With his colleague Stevenson, he fully appreciated the importance of the doctrines of Reid's Inquiry. He formed an able and influential, while independent coadjutor of the latter, in advancing the cause of a deeper and purer moral doctrine than was compatible with the approved speculative principles of the times.1 The only detail of any interest recorded of Mr. Stewart's career as a student in the University of Edinburgh, is the fact that his taste and capacity for purely philosophical studies was regarded both by Stevenson and Ferguson as the most marked 1 Ferguson's ethical system is fully and eloquently expounded in the digest of his lectures published under the title of Principles of Moral and Political Science. See also his Institutes for the use of students. The Principles were translated into French; Paris, 1821, 2 vols. 8vo. The moral and political doctrines of Ferguson are ably reviewed by M. Cousin in his Histoire de la Philosophie Morale,-Ecole Ecossaise. Leçons x. xi. (Paris, 1840.) See also Revue Encyclopéd. vol. xi. p. 289. Ferguson's restriction of the sphere of Moral Philosophy to the proper ethical problems was worthy of the closer imitation of succeeding speculators. Principles, vol. i. Introduction, part i. cap. ii. 8 14. Ferguson, while holding with Reid that the notion of Rightness is not resolvable into utility, or to be derived from sympathy or a moral sense, goes a step beyond both Reid and Stewart in the inquiry which he raises regarding the definite nature and ground of Rightness itself. His solution of this question, by the theory of activity and perfection, must, in a speculative point of view, be admitted to want precision, though, regarded practically, it is eminently valuable. Ferguson, however, it should be noticed, has the merit, among Scottish philosophical writers, of recognising the place and importance in ethical speculation of the Aristotelic doctrine of the pleasurable-a grand and fertile, but little illustrated principle. The applications which he makes of this doctrine, though by no means exhaustive, are both numerous and valuable. Before Ferguson, Alexander Gerard of Aberdeen, an accomplished thinker, had to some extent applied the same luminous principle to Esthetics, in his Essay on Taste, first published in 1759. b feature of his intellectual character. This natural tendency was more fully developed and confirmed, as we shall presently see, after the termination of his studies in Edinburgh, by attendance on another and more distinguished philosophical instructor in a different university. Mr. Stewart, at one period of his college studies, appears to have entertained the design of seeking an appointment in India, in the Company's corps of engineers. This purpose was, however, early abandoned, as we find that, about the year 1771, his thoughts were turned towards the Church of England.1 The University of Glasgow, then, as at present, afforded facility to young men of talent and application, for pursuing a course of study at Oxford. Stewart went to study at Glasgow, (1771-2,) partly with a view to the Snell foundation, but also, influenced by the recommendation of Ferguson, that he might enjoy the privilege of the prelections of Thomas Reid-a name destined. to become familiar among reflective men of his own and other lands, and already respected in Scotland. Reid's philosophical position in Scotland is so closely connected with the main work of the life of his most illustrious pupil, that it is necessary to say a few words respecting the elder thinker and his teaching. During the first half of the eighteenth century, and before the appearance of the Inquiry, Scotland was not without original thinkers, who aimed at positive speculative results, though labouring within comparatively narrow spheres. At an early period of the century, Gerschom Carmichael ably commented on Puffendorf, and taught with much success in Glasgow.2 1 From brief notice (in MS.) of Mr. Stewart's early life by his brother-inlaw, and through life one of his most valued and attached friends, the late Dugald Bannatyne, Esq., Glasgow. 2 S. Puffendorfii De Officio Hominis et Civis Juxta Legem Naturalem, Libri Duo. Supplementis et Observationibus in Academicæ Juventutis usum auxit et illustravit Gerschomus Carmichael, Philosophiæ in Academia Glasguensi Professor. Ed. sec. Edinburgi, 1724. Carmichael was originally an alumnus and regent of St. Andrews, and for some time minister of Monimail in Fife. Carmichael was also the author of a System of Natural Theology-the outlines of prelections for the use of his students. It is entitled, "Synopsis Theologic Naturalis, sive Notitia de Existentia, Attributis, et Operationibus Summi Numinis, ex ipsa rerum Natura Francis Hutcheson, Professor of Moral Philosophy, in the same University, from 1729 to 1747, was distinguished by the refinement and elevation of his ethical and æsthetical doctrines. He sought his conclusions by observation of facts, not in the way of deduction from abstract principles vulgarly accepted. Hutcheson appears to have been the first Scottish thinker who, by substituting observation for a purely formal method of philosophical inquiry, fairly raised the current thought above the region of merely technical definition, and placed men with awakened sympathies in contact with life and reality. Without openly disclaiming the received metaphysical principles of the time, his analysis yet revealed elements that, if fairly weighed, were subversive of a sensuous theory of knowledge. Hutcheson struck with firm hand the key-note of Scottish speculation. His teaching, distinguished by freshness of thought, loftiness of moral tone and eloquence, was a great power in Scotland for nearly twenty years. While Hutcheson was teaching in Glasgow, amid wide and well-deserved renown, Andrew Baxter, an obscure private tutor, was cultivating reflective science, with little stimulus to the study beyond his natural love of it. His Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul2 displays much metaphysical power. In this work he acutely contends for the immateriality of the soul, opposes Locke on certain important points, and offers a polemic against the idealism of Berkeley. Henry Home, (1696-1782,) better known as Lord Kames, an acute hausta. Auctore Gerschomo Carmichael, Philosophiæ in Academia Glasguensi Professore. Edin. 1729, (pp. 94). Carmichael's course of lectures was divided into two parts; the one portion embraced Moral Philosophy-for the sphere of Natural Jurisprudence, as defined in the Manual of Puffendorf, is nearly identical with that of Ethics; the other was devoted to Natural Theology. Compare Stewart's Works, vol.i., Dissertation, i. sect. 3. 1 The Town-Council of Edinburgh offered the chair of Moral Philosophy to Hutcheson, when vacant by the resignation of Pringle, in 1745. The honour was declined. 2 Second Edition in 1737. 3 Baxter's critique of Berkeley shows much acuteness, and considerable appreciation of the legitimate results of his doctrine. See Baxter's Inquiry, pp. 308, 309; compare Reid, Int. Powers, Essay ii. p. 285; where his criticism of Berkeley is identical with that of Baxter, except that Reid restricts his inference from the scheme to the non-reality of the intelligences around us; whereas and original thinker, in his Essays upon the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, (1751,) made close approximation to the special doctrines of Reid. Home had the advantage of writing subsequently to the Treatise of Human Nature. He controverts the theory of human knowledge which that work assumes, contending for a deeper source of knowledge than mere experience, and asserting the simple, ultimate, and intuitive character of our beliefs regarding a material world, substance, cause, the uniformity of nature, selfexistence, personal identity, and the existence of Deity.1 Adam Smith, the immediate predecessor of Reid in the Chair of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow, greatly contributed to the diffusion of a taste for mixed philosophical studies. In Smith were conjoined qualities rarely found together. In addition to highlycultivated taste and no mean speculative talent, Smith possessed practical wisdom, which, applied to political science, left results that progressing civilisation was alone able fully to appreciate. His Lectures on Morals are embodied in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759)—a work which, despite its slight and im Baxter maintains that its fair issue is absolute egoism. Baxter, moreover, in two passages, touches very closely, if, indeed, he does not positively state, the doctrine of an immediate perception of matter, and that in its latest and most refined form. As percipient of parts, we are, according to Baxter, conscious at once of our own reality as intelligences, and of the existence of matter in the form of an extended sensory.-"If our ideas have no parts, and yet if we perceive parts, it is plain we perceive something more than our own perceptions. But both these are certain: we are conscious that we perceive parts, when we look upon a house, a tree, a river, the dial-plate of a clock or watch. This is a short and easy way of being certain that something exists without the mind. We are certain of this from consciousness itself; since we are as certain that we perceive parts as that we have perceptions at all. And this argument proves at once, and from the same perceptions, the existence of both the parts of our composition; and, therefore, makes the existence of both equally certain. Our ideas, as they are in the mind, are without parts; and as they make us conscious of perceiving parts, we are conscious that an extended object exists without the mind, where the extended image is exhibited, viz., an extended sensory. Our very sensa tions, and the faculty of imagination, as much prove the existence of the sensory, as they prove the existence of the sensitive being."-Inquiry, p. 333; Cf. p. 319, N. S.; and Hamilton's Reid, p. 881. 1 Essays, &c., part ii.; especially Essays i, ii., iii., iv., vi., vii. Home has been justly censured on the ground of an excessive multiplication of first principles. |