accidental notice of a fact, without any attempt to comprehend it in its scientific relations, ever constitute a discovery in philosophy? But, finally, if the experiment were necessary, the credit of having first made it belongs to D'Alibard, and not to Franklin. This assertion is a conclusion from the principle, assumed for the occasion, that the honor of a work belongs not to the head that devised it, but to the hand that executed it. Let us apply this principle in some other cases, and show its absurdity. A geologist, reasoning from observation and analogy, assures a miner that by digging through certain strata of rocks he will find coal; the miner follows the instructions of the geologist, and the coal is found. The miner is the discoverer of the coal-bed! A chemist, from his knowledge of the effect of small metallic tubes in preventing the communication of flame, instructs an artisan to cover a lamp with wire-gauze, and see if it may not be placed in explosive gases without setting them on fire. The artisan is the inventor of the safety-lamp! A mathematician concludes, from a laborious and complicated analysis, that a planet, hitherto undiscovered, must be in a particular place in the heavens, and he requests a star-gazer to turn his telescope in that direction, and forthwith a star is seen which is not found in any of the catalogues. The star-gazer is the discoverer of the new planet of 1846! But it is useless to dwell longer upon this point. If Arago denies the honor of the discovery to Franklin, he must, for the same reason, if he would be consistent, deny it to D'Alibard, for neither Franklin nor D'Alibard was the first actually to perform the experiment. He must accord it to the poor discharged dragoon, Coiffier, who probably never had a philosophical idea in his life, but who obeyed the instructions of Franklin, received at second-hand from D'Alibard, and drew down, with his own hand, the first spark from the fiery magazine of the clouds!

That we may not seem to do injustice to D'Alibard, it is proper to state, that, in his Memoir to the Academy, he attributes the honor of the discovery entirely to Franklin. He commences the paper thus:"Following the direction which Franklin has marked out for us, I have been completely successful." He concludes the paper by saying,-" The idea which Franklin has entertained, ceases to be a conjecture. Behold it a reality; and I dare believe that the more attentively any one will examine what he has published upon electricity, the more one will perceive how much physical science is indebted to him for that part."*

Memoire de M. D'Alibard; Lu á l'Academie Royale des Sciences, le xiii, Mai, 1752.

VOL. VII.-8

We might here submit the case to the judgment of impartial men; but we are unwilling to pass by the characteristic remarks of Professor Whewell on the same question without a brief notice

66

Franklin, about 1750, had offered a few somewhat vague conjectures respecting the existence of electricity in the clouds; but it was not till Wilke and Epinus had obtained clear notions of the effect of electric matter at a distance, that the real condition of the clouds could be well understood. In 1752, however, D'Alibard, and other French philosophers, were desirous of verifying Franklin's conjecture of the analogy of thunder and electricity. This they did by erecting a pointed iron rod at Marli; the rod was found capable of giving out electrical sparks when a thunder-cloud passed over the place. This was repeated in various parts of Europe, and Franklin suggested that a communication with the clouds might be formed by means of a kite." -History of the Inductive Sciences, vol. iii, p. 18.

Is this all that a cultivator of science, and a man of learning, who undertakes to write a history of the progress of the inductive sciences, can tell us of one of the most brilliant discoveries of modern times, and of the philosopher who made it? If his purpose had been, under the semblance of historical impartiality, to "damn with faint praise," while he kept Franklin's real merits out of sight, he could hardly have framed a paragraph better suited to his aim. The passage is erroneous in several particulars, and conveys erroneous impressions in others. What with its sins of omission and of commission, it is about as sinful as anything, claiming to be history, that we have ever seen. The conjectures were published, as we have shown, in 1749. vague as to the existence of electricity in the clouds, but as to its origin, and the mode of its existence. Franklin's letter of 1750 is remarkable for definiteness and precision. It is not a "conjecture of the analogy of thunder and electricity," but an argument to prove their identity, sustained by a multitude of analogies, not hypothetical, but well established. Professor Whewell informs us that D'Alibard verified Franklin's conjecture; why does he not tell us that Franklin devised the apparatus by which D'Alibard did this, and described the manner of using it? Professor Whewell knows that Franklin suggested the kite, does he not know that Franklin did somewhat more?

They were not

In the following extract the historian instructs his own, and future ages, what estimate to place upon the American philosopher :

"Franklin's real merit as a discoverer was, that he was one of the first who distinctly conceived the electrical charge as a derangement

of equilibrium. The great fame which, in his day, he enjoyed, arose from the clearness and spirit with which he narrated his discoveries; from his dealing with electricity in the imposing form of thunder and lightning; and partly, perhaps, from his character as an American and a politician; for he was already, in 1736, engaged in public affairs as clerk to the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, though it was not till a later period of his life that his admirers had the occasion of saving of him,—

Eripuit cœlis fulmen, sceptruinque tyrannis.”

399

History of the Inductive Sciences, vol. iii, p. 33.

Had Franklin lived somewhat nearer to Cambridge, and had he not "wrested the sceptre from tyrants," as well as "the lightning from the heavens," perhaps he might have made a different figure in Professor Whewell's octavos. Without mentioning the discovery on which Franklin's reputation as a philosopher chiefly rests, Mr. Whewell makes his merit to consist in being one of the first to propose a mechanical theory of electricity, which, in a subsequent part of his History, he attempts to overthrow. In plain terms, he concedes to Franklin a share with some others in the honor of conceiving a false theory of electricity! Now whether Franklin's theory be true or false, it is his own. In 1748, Sir William Watson did indeed claim that he had suggested the idea of a plus and minus state of electricity in a paper which he read to the Royal Society about the time that Franklin's paper of July, 1747, was written. In that paper he conjectures that there is a simultaneous afflux and efflux to and from an electrified conductor, and that the afflux causes attraction, and the efflux repul

He also suggests that a quantity of electricity, equal to that accumulated in excited bodies, is furnished by the nearest unexcited non-electrics; so that electricity, or what he calls the elastic electrical ether, may be more dense in one body, and less dense in another. But that he did not comprehend the disturbance of the electrical equilibrium, in the Franklinian sense, is plain from the application which he makes of his hypothesis to explain the action of the Leyden jar. He says that when a man holds in one hand a Leyden jar, whose wire communicates with the prime conductor of an electrical machine, and touches the conductor with the other hand, a part of the electricity of his body goes through one arm to the conductor, and through the other arm to the jar. He also supposes that the electricity which the man's body thus parts with, is instantly replaced from the floor; and he ought, therefore, to • History of the Inductive Sciences, vol. iii, pp. 40, 41. † Abridged Transactions of the Royal Society, vol. ix, p. 454.

receive no shock if he stands upon any insulating substance.* Franklin's theory never could have led to a statement so preposterous as this.

Professor Whewell is sorely puzzled to account for the great fame which, in his day, Franklin enjoyed, and taxes his ingenuity to ascribe it to anything rather than to his philosophical discoveries. It is certainly a novel idea that a man's political success is likely to add much to his scientific reputation; and the time seems to have gone by, when being an American citizen could give prestige to a philosopher's name in England. Professor Whewell is determined that Franklin's fame shall extend as little as possible beyond "his day," and therefore attributes it, not to his having matters of importance to narrate, but to his manner of narration! The History of the Inductive Sciences was designed to go down to posterity as a standard book of reference on all questions relating to the progress of physical discovery; but we question strongly whether posterity, with no other source of information than this book, would ever learn that Franklin had contributed anything to the advancement of science, more than to make a lucky guess, and to play a skillful game at the politician's trick of telling more than he knew.

ART. VII.-Biblical Exegesis.-St. Paul's Doctrine of the Law.

VARIOUS definitions have been given of law. According to Blackstone, "law, in its most general and comprehensive sense, signifies a rule of action; and is applied indiscriminately to all kinds of action, whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational. Thus we say, the laws of motion, of gravitation, of optics, or mechanics, as well as the laws of nature and of nations. And it is that rule of action which is prescribed by some superior, and which the inferior is bound to obey." The law with which we have to do at present is the moral law, or that rule of action which God has given to his intelligent creatures, and which is founded in the relations which they sustain to him. When man came from the hands of his Creator, he was necessarily indebted to him for all his powers, and responsible to him for their exercise and improvement. God could not require of him less than he had invested him with ability to perform, and his justice and goodness would preclude his requiring more.

* Transactions of the Royal Society, No. 484,

P. 704.

This law must necessarily be permanent and unchangeable in its nature. For no circumstance could possibly occur to remove the foundation upon which it is based. Man's relation to God as a dependent creature, and as his offspring, must of necessity remain the same to all eternity, unless we suppose the possibility of his annihilation. And, by consequence, the law of God founded upon and growing out of this relation, must remain in full force while man continues in being. No change in the character or circumstances of man, effected by the exercise of his own free agency, could possibly alter his relations to God as his creature; and, consequently, no such change could release him from the obliations of that perfect obedience which the law requires. And hence the original law of God, which he first gave to man, and which he had previously given to angels, still remains, and will continue eternally in all its integrity.

But by this we do not mean to deny that the divine law has been imbodied in various formularies, and combined in different systems. It took one form of outward expression in the garden of paradise, another on Mount Sinai, and still another upon the mount of Olives. These varying forms of expression involve the same great principles of love and obedience to God. The diversity of outward development was designed to suit the different periods in the history of the race and in the great plan of divine government.

There is one essential element of law which is uniform and invariable, and that is, that it furnishes no remedy for past offenses against its requirements, or for the ruined or vitiated character of the offender. It shows no mercy-it knows not to forgive or restore. The terrible penalties of the divine law lie in full force against all offenders, pronouncing upon them the sentence of death for the least departure. It is inexorable and impartial, hurling its thunderbolts against every violator, high and low, rich and poor, learned and ignorant, strong and feeble-all, all transgressors are under its withering curse.

St. Paul has treated the subject of the divine law specifically, and of set purpose, in his Epistles to the Romans and the Galatians. It shall be our object in this paper to endeavor to ascertain the views which he has presented upon this important topic in these two epistles.

The purpose which the apostle has in view in discussing this subject, is to exhibit the true ground of salvation, and to explode and refute the vain notion of justification and sanctification upon the principles of legal obedience. He first meets and refutes the