Strategy and Arms ControlPergamon-Brassey's, 1985 - 149 pagina's This benchmark study in the field of national security and weapons control was first published in 1961. Republished with a new preface providing the perspectives of 1985, it focuses on the world's military environment and analyzes how that environment may or may not be improved through political arms control efforts. The authors begin with a framework for understanding security, defense and arms control relationships. They also provide a framework for evaluating arms control proposals and for determining whether these proposals are in the security interests of the United States. ISBN 0-08-032391-X : $14.95 ; ISBN 0-08-032390-1 (pbk.) : $9.95. |
Vanuit het boek
Resultaten 1-3 van 17
Pagina 17
... produce nuclear weapons and long - range missiles ; an agreement could , however , aim at reducing the amount of ... production , such an agreement could have some effect of reducing future capability for destruction in general war ...
... produce nuclear weapons and long - range missiles ; an agreement could , however , aim at reducing the amount of ... production , such an agreement could have some effect of reducing future capability for destruction in general war ...
Pagina 67
... produce undetected an extra 20 missiles , an extra 50 , an extra 200 , and so on . The factors that go into this estimate are many , and include hidden stock- piles , clandestine production and assembly , and production of parts for ...
... produce undetected an extra 20 missiles , an extra 50 , an extra 200 , and so on . The factors that go into this estimate are many , and include hidden stock- piles , clandestine production and assembly , and production of parts for ...
Pagina 68
... production of clandestine weapons ; in this case the object might be attack out of the blue . But evasion might be carried on in more subtle ways . One side might cheat on production of parts and components , then declare the agreement ...
... production of clandestine weapons ; in this case the object might be attack out of the blue . But evasion might be carried on in more subtle ways . One side might cheat on production of parts and components , then declare the agreement ...
Inhoudsopgave
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Arms Control and the Arms Race | 32 |
Copyright | |
8 andere gedeelten niet getoond
Overige edities - Alles bekijken
Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interest interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine substantially surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems