shooting is that which tends to give to a man when going into action the fullest opportunity of carrying out his object, which is to kill his enemy and to prevent his enemy killing him. The spade is therefore destined to become an implement second only in importance to the rifle, for by its use a man can place himself in a position of comparative safety which enables him to devote his whole attention to firing. The success of his firing depends of course in great measure upon the quality of his weapon. The regular army are all furnished with the Martini-Henry rifle, while at present that weapon is only issued to the Militia and the Volunteers at the rate of three or four per cent.

The steady advance of troops in line in face of an enemy, as formerly practised, has become a thing of the past. The utmost possible independence to companies or squads under the command of officers, together with liberty to move from covert to covert as circumstances may render expedient, is what Volunteers and marksmen require. The men should know and trust their officers, and follow them with the intelligence and independent action, combined with obedience, which is seen in its most perfect form in foxhounds working under a skilful huntsman. The word of command, which is to be obeyed by several hundreds as though they were acting as one man, is now out of date, and individual intelligence and discretion must now take the place of the machine-like and unreflective obedience of soldiers drilled under the old system.

Like all institutions which have in them the element of permanence, the constitution of the Volunteer force (similar in this to the constitution of the country) has been one of gradual development and change. The attitude of the Government towards the Volunteer force has always been one of reserve, leaving it in a great degree to its own management and to its own resources. Whether this has been due to well-considered policy or to economical convenience, no other system would probably have answered as well.

In 1879 a change, involving an important improvement, was made by the Secretary of State for War under the late Government, whereby the old system, under which the Volunteers had no military chief and were acquainted with the commander of the forces only as the head of the regular army, while their own chief was to be found in the War Office, was superseded. By this new arrangement the Volunteers, like the rest of the forces of the Crown, are now placed directly under the Commander-in-Chief, who appoints an adjutant-general, who is held responsible for their discipline and good conduct. This important change of organisation, which has somewhat escaped public notice, has contributed greatly to the harmonious working of the Volunteer force, as well as to the improvement of operations in the field, and the better manner in which the force is handled by officers of the regular army at field-days and reviews.

The advantage of thus placing the Volunteers directly under the military authorities at the Horse Guards was never more noticeable

than on the occasion of the recent review in Windsor Park, when the best and most complete system of staff organisation that has yet been seen, was in force. The brigades were under the command of officers of the regular army, who were frequently already acquainted with the men and their officers from having known them at home and in the counties and territorial districts where their depôts are placed. But the improvement of the relations subsisting between the brigadiers and the troops under their command was not the only noticeable advantage of the new staff organisation. Greater interest and a wider sense of responsibility were manifest throughout. The orders. of the staff were conveyed with great precision and quietude; while the arrangements for the comfort of the men displayed much care and methodical forethought. Never before have Volunteers been treated with so much consideration as on the occasion of their visit to Windsor, and by their orderly conduct and readiness to carry out orders they proved themselves well worthy of such consideration. Never before have the travelling arrangements been so complete or so comprehensive—a result in great measure due to these combinations having been made by direct communication between the War Office and the railway authorities, instead of (as on previous occasions) between the Volunteer commanders and the railway officials-all orders respecting conveyance by rail being on this occasion issued direct from the War Office. The railway stations were under the charge of experienced officers, whose management of the Volunteers was admirable. In my experience the Horse Guards have never taken so much pains to make a review succeed. That the Horse Guards Staff would have endeavoured to do this under any system no one will deny; but now that the Volunteers are under the immediate control and direction of the Commander-in-Chief, it has been done con amore, as was indeed natural and to be expected. To this improved system of organisation, therefore, do we owe the marked change for the better, and the improved understanding subsisting between the authorities at headquarters and the Volunteers. A further attempt at centralisation was contemplated by the Quartermaster-General's department, who proposed to provide provisions for the troops during the day. This plan was, however, abandoned, leaving each regiment to provide their own food in their own way. Another and more successful attempt may possibly be made on some future occasion, though it may be open to doubt whether, under the unformed system of the Volunteers, the decentralisation system with regard to the commissariat is not the safer plan to rely on.

Having shown some of the various changes and improvements which the Volunteer force have undergone, it will be well now to consider the position which it at present occupies, and to ascertain clearly what it is that the country has to rely upon, and to what extent it can look to the Volunteer army for aid in case of need.

The original Volunteers Act of 1863 remains, in its main features, unchanged, and forms the charter of the institution. By it the active services of the force are available only in case of actual or apprehended invasion. The Crown has no power to call out the force under any other circumstances; neither has the Crown power, even in the event of imminent national danger short of invasion, nor of grave emergency, to accept the offered services of the Volunteers even in the case of their asking to be allowed to serve.

Many people are of opinion that it should be made lawful for the Crown to have the power of accepting such proffered services for a limited period, not exceeding say six months. But to accomplish this the existing law would have to be altered, and there are many persons whose opinions carry weight, who would strenuously oppose such a change, on the ground that internal troubles might not impossibly be considered as constituting a national emergency under which Volunteers would be allowed to offer and to give their services -a change which would involve many difficulties and complications. The adoption of any such measure would, in my opinion, be fraught with danger, and I would therefore advocate continuing to restrict the services of the Volunteers within the lines of the regulations framed in 1863, which differ in some respects from the original Volunteer Act which was in force at the beginning of the present century.

It is true that the possible contingency must be taken into consideration of our being involved in a foreign war of such magnitude that every nerve and sinew would be strained to the utmost, and in such a condition of things it would be hardly possible not to seek in some way or other to utilise the services of the Volunteers in a manner suited to the exigency of the case. But such an exceptional emergency may safely be left to be dealt with by special Act of Parliament when the necessity arises; and on this the country may reasonably rely.

The existence of a force so vast and powerful, so thoroughly armed and disciplined, can only be looked upon with perfect complacency— can only be acquiesced in and sympathised with by all classes and parties at home, and regarded without jealousy abroad, so long as it is known that it can be brought into active use only against a foreign and an invading foe.

It was the dread of invasion, and of the fearful consequences it must entail, that called the Volunteer force into being twenty-two years ago. Invasion of our country is the one and only national danger that would silence all party differences, and unite the whole nation in an overwhelming sense of the necessity of action. It is also the one danger that would cause every one to disregard personal inconvenience and to overcome the difficulty of abandoning for a time their ordinary avocations. The remarkable absence of jealousy with which the Volunteer force is now regarded is due to its thoroughly non-political character, a character which it is of vital importance to retain.

At the same time, the question must inevitably arise-Is it expedient, or indeed possible, to restrict the availableness of so vast a body of armed men to a single possible emergency which may never arise? Is it not a waste of power and a voluntary throwing away of a valuable addition to our limited resources?

The problem of how the Volunteer force can be made of service to the regular army, without changing its peculiar character and object, is in my opinion capable of being in some degree solved by utilising the force as a feeder to our regular Army Reserve. That it is already such, though in an indirect manner, must be conceded, as is shown both by the military spirit which it engenders among the people, and by the number of trained men who pass annually through its ranks into civil life. Practically it has become impossible, in making calculations as to the strength of our national armaments, to pass over the Volunteers. The fact that we possess 200,000 armed and disciplined troops, the pick of the nation, cannot be overlooked, nor can we forget that this number represents but a portion of those who have passed through the ranks, and have retired into civil life, but whom a great national danger would doubtless bring back to their regiments in large numbers. In the regiment with which I am best acquainted 1,400 men have during the last seven years passed through the corps, showing an entrance into the service of 200 men a year, and an exit into civil life of trained soldiers to the same amount. This, on an existing regimental establishment of 1,000 men, gives an average service of five years to each Volunteer.

Military legislation during the last few years has tended in the direction of the recognition of the Volunteers as an acknowledged branch of the service, and of the bringing together into working combination the three forces-the Regulars, the Militia, and the Volunteers; a system which may be further extended by drawing the Volunteers into the territorial system, of which they obviously form an essential part. Military men are daily growing to look upon the Volunteers less as amateurs and more as real soldiers. But it must be clearly understood that the intention of the Volunteers is not to take the place of the regular army, nor to abandon the civil element of their own lives. This feeling is truly expressed in the saying of a noble lord, which was frequently quoted in the early days of the movement-viz., that the Volunteers would fail in their purpose if one soldier less was maintained in Her Majesty's army in consequence of their existence.

I have already pointed out the rocks which lie ahead, and drawn attention to some of the dangers which those who guide the Volunteer force must guard against as time goes on. Change is a necessity of life, and where things stand still it is only for a moment before they begin to decay. There is a danger that the force may become inanimate and may dwindle away, as the apprehension of foreign invasion

passes off. Another danger, of an opposite character, is that whilst an endeavour is being made to obtain more from the Volunteers, and to make the force more generally available, it may become changed in constitution and impaired in character. I believe, however, that a considerable improvement and expansion may be effected, without risk to the well-being and essential character of the force, and combining at the same time great advantage to the regular army, by establishing a system by which the Army Reserve may be strengthened and recruited by men passing into it from the Volunteer ranks. Three years' drill with the colours is considered sufficient to qualify a man to take his place in the Army Reserve, and, under certain circumstances, the Secretary of State for War reserves to himself the right of passing into the Reserve men who have only served three years in the ranks. The establishment of an Army Reserve has never been popular in the service, although its absolute need has been shown time after time in our recent history. That which disturbs and vexes the spirit of our officers is, that regiments are sometimes sacrificed to the Reserve, and that men qualified by careful training to make creditable soldiers are drawn away into the Reserve, and pass into civil life, from which they may never return-at all events, into those regiments which made them and trained them into soldiers. Whilst the duty of supporting the Reserve is disliked by the army, I cannot doubt but that, if tried, it would be popular with the Volunteers, and would give them that connection with the regular service which has not been provided in the recent organisation scheme. The Volunteers form no part of the territorial regiments recently established, although down to the present moment this force is the only one which can properly claim that designation. In counties and large cities in the provinces it is the Volunteer force par excellence, and beyond all others, which the people take a pride in, and will even make personal sacrifices to maintain and support. Leaving the Volunteers out of the territorial system is a blot and a weakness which it is to be hoped will ere long be corrected.

The Volunteers and their officers have access to recruiting fields unknown to the agents of the regular army. The Volunteers deal with a class of men of greater intelligence and of more self-restraint than our soldiers usually are. They are the superior class of men who the authors of the short-service system confidently maintained would join the army as soon as long service was abolished. They are the men whom those who wish well to the army still hope to attract into the ranks at all times, but especially in time of war. But unless trained to arms, these men, however intelligent, would be worthless as soldiers.

The question is, therefore, how best to connect the Volunteers with the army, so that those who desire to serve during a campaign may find a ready path into the ranks. A Volunteer Service Reserve would,