Well, what you are required to do by the treaty is to sit down and discuss that with the other side to see how it will be handled in the treaty. What we should do is sit down and discuss that with the Soviets to see how it is included as something you can do within the treaty. So my view: yes, you can deploy this, but you are obliged to sit down and talk about it with the Soviets.

Senator PELL. Mr. Lodal, do you concur in that?

Mr. LODAL. Senator, this is a very common and very wrong reading of the ABM Treaty, not only its negotiating history but what it says. In fact, it says that "an ABM system is any system that is designed to counter ballistic missiles in their flight trajectory, currently consisting of ". And it was written that way on purpose, saying that the general prohibition is what applies in the treaty. The "currently consisting of" is strictly a description of today's situation.

What the paragraph says about systems based on new technology, if you read that, it is talking strictly about land-based systems. It doesn't at all interfere with the previous prohibition on space-based systems, which is absolute and comprehensive. It talks about land-based systems that might be based on new technologies, and therefore might not be countable in the same sense as interceptor systems, and says in that case they have to be subject to discussion.

But that is a further limitation. It is not a broadening of the treaty. And the prohibition on space is absolute.

General GRAHAM. May I add something? Let me cut through that knot. If you want to look at the treaty as a guardhouse lawyer to protect the Soviets against our deploying a space-borne system, you can make the case. If you want to look at the treaty as a guardhouse lawyer figuring out a way to deploy it and not violate the treaty, you can do that, too.

Now if you want to be most honest about it, you just simply go straight forward with an amendment to the treaty that says Soviets, if you want to put up a system that guards against a U.S. first strike by long range missiles, you go ahead because we want to do that; we want that in the treaty.

Senator PELL. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Senator PRESSLER. Following up on that, we should have the administration here. We requested them to be here today but they declined until they have studied the matter further. They have assured us they will come in early May.

Dr. Cooper did make a statement on this very subject, and I am going to place his reply to the question-it is the best thing we have at this time. We will ask him again in May on the ABM Treaty. He responded to a question from Senator Warner in the Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces.

[Dr. Cooper's response to Senator Warner on the ABM Treaty follows:]

Senator WARNER. Dr. Cooper, would a space-based laser ABM system be contrary to and require modification and/or abrogation of the ABM treaty?

Dr. COOPER. The ABM treaty bans the development, testing, and deployment of all ABM systems that are space-based; however laboratory research is permitted. Modification of or withdrawal from the treaty would be required before development, testing, or deployment of a space-based laser ABM system. Ballistic missile defense is, however, the most demanding mission for a space-based laser weapon system, and less capable systems could be developed for other missions, such as

attacking satellites or high flying aircraft. Development, testing or deployment of an anti-satellite or air defense space-based laser weapon system is not prohibited by the ABM treaty unless it has a distinct capability as an ABM system.

Senator WARNER. At what point would its development require such a change? Dr. COOPER. The term "development." as defined in the ABM treaty context, was explained by the (then) Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Gerard Smith, on July 18, 1972, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee:

"The prohibitions on development contained in the ABM Treaty would start at that part of the development process where field testing is initiated on either a prototype or breadboard model. It was understood by both sides that the prohibition on "development" applies to activities involved after a component moves from the laboratory development and testing stage to the field testing stage. wherever performed. The fact that early stages of the development process, such as laboratory testing, would pose problems for verification by national technical means is an important consideration in reaching this definition."

Senator PRESSLER. Let me ask a question. A space-based laser defense network will involve far more advanced technology than would be required for a system designed along High Frontier lines. What do you believe it will cost and how long will it take before a laser defense system in space could be possible?

Mr. DEUDNEY. I do not think that a laser system in space that will be effective against countermeasures will ever be possible, and it is the countermeasures that are important. These systems are going to be large; they are going to be vulnerable. It is possible to make maneuverable warheads, and the like.

So I do not think we are ever going to see it as a militarily viable technology unless the other side simply stands still, and the record thus far shows that we will probably have action-reaction continuing into space.

Mr. RATHJENS. I think that is basically correct. I do believe we could probably build space-based systems using lasers that could be effective in blinding or destroying limited numbers of satellites. I do not believe that we could build a system at any time, as far as I can see into the future, that would be able to cope with a significant number of ballistic missiles if the other fellow were making a concerted effort to defeat it.

There is a big difference between destroying satellites on the one hand, a few satellites, and a large number of ballistic missiles on the other.

Mr. LODAL. Senator, to give an illustration of the magnitude of the problem, you need to improve laser systems by about a factor of 1,000 to make them work, even if the other side doesn't take any countermeasures, because you need to get about 10 times more power out of a laser; you need to get about a 10 times bigger mirror to reflect it; and you need to get about 10 times more accuracy in aiming it before you can hit anything. If the other guy then takes countermeasures, you have a lot longer to go.

That is why technology such as High Frontier I think make more sense, such as the kinds of ballistic missile defenses for our ICBMs that Dick Garwin suggested, and I think we should put more of our research and development into those kinds of technologies and less of it into the esoteric but perhaps more exciting technologies for the people who are doing the work.

General GRAHAM. Well Senator, you know one has to watch, asking a question of technology and cost about space-borne defensive systems

when you are asking somebody who says he wouldn't want it if he could get it free tomorrow.

Now as far as how long it would take to get an effective laser or other energy beam weapon, our estimate in the High Frontier study is that it would take 10 or 12 years. That is why we didn't go for it. For one thing, if you could have got it nearer in, we would have contemplated it.

I, for one, before I got the scientific and technical team together, thought we would come up with lasers. We did not.

What it would cost, though, is entirely dependent upon which of the many possibilities for laser weaponry you go for. There are chemical lasers, free electron lasers, and X-ray lasers, which is Ed Teller's favorite. Nobody has developed that technology to the point where you can make an estimate of how much they would cost.

So we don't make any estimate of the cost of anything in High Frontier that we could not verify by going to the people who would have to produce the hardware. There are no such people today in those technologies. So we don't know how much that would cost.

Senator PRESSLER. I want to thank our witnesses for being with us this afternoon and bearing with us during the delays. We very much appreciate your testimony.

There are some photographs I am submitting for the record; the U.S. ASAT interceptor, an artist's conception of ASAT being fired from the F-15; an artist's conception of the ASAT target satellite; and, an artist's conception of the Soviet ASAT in attack. [The photographs referred to follow:]

Artist's Conception of the Soviet Antisatellite Weapon Making an Interception

Senator PRESSLER. Also, there are some Op.Ed. pieces that should appear in the record if there is no objection. Mr. Lodal's Washington Post Op.Ed., Fred Ikle's article in the Washington Post which appeared March 27, Harold Brown's Op.Ed. piece and William Perry's Op.Ed. piece would be excellent ones to include, plus others that Senators have to offer, will, I think, shed light on this entire matter. [The material referred to follows:]

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 27, 1983]

No, MR. REAGAN, IT WON'T WORK

(By Jan M. Lodal1)

In his speech last Wednesday night, President Reagan urged American scientists "to turn their great talents to the cause of mankind and world peace: to give us the means of rendering. . . nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete."

The world would surely rejoice if such a feat were possible. Unfortunately, it is not. Following the president's proposed course would only create false hopes and, in all likelihood, intensify nuclear dangers rather than diminish them.

There are, to begin with, serious doubts about the technical feasibility of defense against ballistic missiles that the Soviets could not easily counter-doubts that were aired widely in the late '60s and early '70s.

Our nation has overcome many technical challenges in the past, of course, and we certainly should not shrink from another if it would end or seriously reduce the threat of nuclear war. But the president's approach has problems that go far beyond technology. Consider just five:

1. Defending against bombers and cruise missiles. Ballistic missiles are only part of the nuclear threat we face. For example, low-flying bombers and terrain

1 Jan Lodal is a former senior staff member and director of program analysis for the National Security Council.