3. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

4. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verificaiton by national technical means of compliance with this treaty. Article IV

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this treaty, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission, established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972.

2. Within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, with respect to this treaty, the Parties will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification, and questions involving unintended impeding of verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this treaty;

(d) consider, as appropriate, cooperative measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national technical means;

(e) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this treaty, including the activities of other States; (f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this treaty.

Article V

The Parties undertake to begin, promptly after the entry into force of this treaty, active negotiations with the objective of achieving, as soon as possible, agreement on further measures for the limitation and reduction of weapons subject to limitation in Article II of this treaty.

Article VI

In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this treaty, each Party undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this treaty, through any other State or States, in any other manner.

Article VII

Each party undertakes not to assume any international obligation which would conflict with this treaty.

Article VIII

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this treaty.

2. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this treaty.

Article IX

This treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Article X

Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decisions to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XI

1. This treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party.

2. This treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Article XII

1. Done in two copies, each in the English and Russian language, both texts being equally authentic.

2. This treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much.

Dr. Garwin.

[Mr. Garwin's biographical data follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA OF RICHARD L. GARWIN

Richard L. Garwin was born in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1928. He received the B.S. in Physics from Case Institute of Technology, Cleveland, in 1947, and the Ph. D. in Physics from the University of Chicago in 1949.

After 3 years on the faculty of the University of Chicago, he joined IBM Corporation in 1952, and is at present IBM Fellow at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, New York; Adjunct Research Fellow in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Andrew D. White Professor-at-Large, Cornell University; and Adjunct Professor of Physics at Columbia University. In addition, he is a consultant to the U.S. Government on matters of military technology, arms control, etc. He has been Director of the IBM Watson Laboratory, Director of Applied Research at the IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center, and a member of the IBM Corporate Technical Committee. He has also been Professor of Public Policy in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

He has made contributions in the design of nuclear weapons, in instruments and electronics for research in nuclear and low-temperature physics, in the establishment of the nonconservation of parity and the demonstration of some of its striking consequences, in computer elements and systems including superconducting devices, in communication systems, in the behavior of solid helium, in the detection of gravitational radiation, and in military technology. He has published about 100 papers and been granted 27 U.S. Patents. He has testified to many Congressional committees on matter involving national security, transportation, energy policy and technology, and the like. He is coauthor of the books Nuclear Weapons and World Politics (1977), Nuclear Power Issues and Choices (1977), Energy: The Next Twenty Years (1979), and Science Advice to the President (1980).

He was a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee 1962-65 and 1969-72, and of the Defense Science Board 1966-69. He is a Fellow of the American Physical Society and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; and a member of the National Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Medicine, the National Academy of Engineering, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the American Philosophical Society. The citation accompanying his 1978 election to the U.S. National Academy of Engineering reads "Contributions applying the latest scientific discoveries to innovative practical enginering applications contributing to national security and economic growth." He was awarded the 1983 Wright Prize for interdisciplinary scientific achievement.

He is a member of the Council of the Institute for Strategic Studies (London), and during 1978 was Chairman of the Panel on Public Affairs of the American Physical Society.

His work for the government has included studies on antisubmarine warfare, new technologies in health care, sensor systems, military and civil aircraft, and satellite and strategic systems, from the point of view of improving such systems as well as assessing existing capabilities.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. GARWIN, IBM THOMAS J. WATSON RESEARCH CENTER; ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF PHYSICS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY; ANDREW D. WHITE, PROFESSOR-AT-LARGE, CORNELL UNIVERSITY; ADJUNCT RESEARCH FELLOW, KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, YORKTOWN HEIGHTS, N.Y.

Mr. GARWIN. These are, of course, my own views. I testified September 20 to this committee urging the Government to conclude with the Soviet Union an agreement effectively banning testing of antisatellite weapons, and banning the deployment of weapons in space. Mr. Adelman just spoke vehemently of the desirability of effectively banning such threats to satellites, and so I gather it is just a matter of details over how we proceed.

A bilateral ASAT treaty drafted with the goal of becoming an international agreement should have no difficulty in gaining wide support after it entered into force between the United States and the Soviet Union, so regardless of discussions in the Committee on Disarmament I believe our national interest will be served best by entering as soon as possible into serious negotiations with the Soviet Union. A close reading of the draft treaty provided you shows, of course, that it forbids actual attack on satellites of other states, and that is article I. That in itself would be little comfort to us, like a renunciation of the use of force, abjuring attack on satellites without limiting testing and readiness and without maintaining vigilance about the potential threat would hardly add to our security. But this article I motivates the rest of the draft.

The real teeth and protection of the draft reside in article II, banning the placing of ASAT weapons in orbit and banning the testing of such weapons in space or against space objects. This would ban any further testing of the Soviet ASAT, which has apparently been tested in only a very limited range of orbital inclinations and with only about a 50 percent success rate.

It would also ban space tests of the U.S. miniature homing vehicle, the key element of the F-15 aircraft-launched ASAT now nearing test phase. Furthermore, it would ban tests of ground-based lasers against satellites as well as ban the testing of space-based lasers which otherwise might be claimed to be ASAT oriented but which were in fact a Soviet program which might evolve to BMD [ballistic missile defense] capability.

I have to condense and I would like your approval of placing into the record my full opening statement and the backup material and, in addition, letters which I have published in the New York Times on March 30, 1983, and this very day, May 18.

Senator PRESSLER. Without objection.

Mr. GARWIN. Thank you.

Verification by national technical means in our draft would, of course, include the use of existing radars, optical telescopes, satellite sensors and the like with which the U.S. monitors compliance with existing arms control agreements. It would become worthwhile also to make specialized observation systems to determine whether Soviet satellites were being heated by ground-based lasers, to provide close-in photographs of maneuverable space objects and the like.

In general, it is much easier to detect a violation of such a treaty than to determine which of an enormous array of permitted activities in the absence of a treaty are a threat to U.S. security. But, as Senator Tsongas noted, it would be difficult to verify that F-15s are not equipped with banned ASATs and, as Mr. Adelman indicated, we do not need arms control if it is only going to be a cause for serious strife between our nations.

That is why one needs to limit one's desires in the scope of a treaty to what can be reasonably verified, and that is why our draft treaty bans testing of ASAT and other space weapons and does not undertake to ban possession.

Then I describe the Soviet ASAT program mounted on an SS-9like

Senator TSONGAS. Could I interrupt for just a moment? [Pause.]

Senator TSONGAS. Thank you.

Mr. GARWIN. And I describe our own. But I emphasize the urgency of stopping the evolution of ASAT systems. On February 24 of this year, Prof. Carl Sagan and I prepared a petition for a ban on space weaponry which is among the backup material. More than 40 space scientists, physicists and others have joined us in urging the United States, the Soviet Union, and other space-faring nations-this is a direct quote "to negotiate for their benefit and for the benefit of the human species a treaty to ban weapons of any kind from space and to prohibit damage to or destruction of satellites of any nation."

In this petition, we noted specifically the continuing tests of the Soviet ASAT and the imminent test of the U.S. system. We cabled the petition March 26 to the leaders of France, India, Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Now in no way can we negotiate for the U.S. Government, but we would be remiss if we did not use our experience and our knowledge to provide our best judgment to the leaders of the world who are capable of action to reduce the threat of conflict in space. We have received one reply, included with the backup material, and I include also our reply to Secretary Andropov, reminding him:

Your reply mentions American plans and pronouncements on American antisatellite weapons but says nothing about the existing Soviet antisatellite capabilities.

We believe that significant steps toward a practical and equitable treaty banning space weaponry would be greatly aided if the U.S.S.R. would publicly state that as part of a comprehensive treaty banning space weaponry it would be willing to forego tests of any antisatellite system it may have developed or deployed, provided the United States made an identical commitment.

Our defenses and backup systems are important, although if we ban all further testing of the Soviet ASAT and any space testing of our own system, it would be many months before either side had an effective system after denouncing the treaty.

The defense of satellites against ASATS is going to be extremely difficult. Maneuver, hardening-some things can be done there-parasols against ground-based lasers, mostly, though, backups which I have sketched in some detail for supplementing our satellite capabilities in case of theater war in Europe will render destruction of our satellites useless. We can have the same capability in a limited theater

for weather, radar, photo reconnaissance, navigation and so on at a high cost-if we had to pay it every day for decades-but at a very affordable cost, day-by-day, in comparison with a large-scale war.

Space defense against nuclear weapons, which has come up in this meeting my views are on the record of a Senate Armed Services meeting of May 2, and here I should just ask that that be placed in the record, and I want to note the judgment by Edward Teller, testifying at that same hearing, that ballistic missile defense systems based on satellites would cost vastly more than the system which could defeat them.

That does not mean that Teller agrees with me that we are taking the wrong approach in emphasizing now defense before we understand how to do it, or that the Secretary of Defense has a warranted position when he explained on national television March 27 that he is confident that we can have an essentially perfect defense against nuclear ballistic missiles and against nuclear-armed cruise missiles as well. That goes far beyond the President's speech and far beyond, I think, what Professor Teller would sav.

So my views on the utility of space defense are negative, and I certainly do not think that the hopes for such space defense-supposed to be undertaken anyhow in conformance with the ABM Treaty obligations-I do not believe that those opportunities, so-called, should stand in the way of an urgent negotiation to ban antisatellite activities and to protect our satellites for military and civil uses.

Thank you.

[Mr. Garwin's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. GARWIN

Thank you for the invitation to present my views in support of the improved national security to be obtained by limitations on the possible threat to our satellite systems, so important now to our society, to our conventional military capability, and especially to our confidence in understanding the world and in avoiding developments which might lead to nuclear war.

I testified to this Committee September 20, 1982, urging the U.S. Government to conclude with the Soviet Union an agreement effectively banning testing of antisatellite weapons, and banning the deployment of weapons in space. It is important to limit the evolution of Soviet antisatellite capabiltiy, and continued use of U.S. satellites in peace and in war is much more important to the United States than the freedom to test our own ASAT system. A bilateral ASAT treaty drafted with the goal of becoming an international agreement should have no difficulty in gaining wide support, after it entered into force between the United States and the Soviet Union. At that hearing I indicated that it would be useful for even a private group to consider an appropriate text, and I am grateful to the Union of Concerned Scientists for providing the text which has been presented by Dr. Gottfried, and which I support.

Since the 1950's, I have been involved in military and civil space activities, as well as with the evolution of our ICBM and SLBM forces, with the R&D program on ballistic-missile defense (BMD), and with the assessment of the balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. I have participated, on behalf of the U.S. Government, in international negotiations to prevent surprise attack, to limit the testing of nuclear weapons, and I have studied such matters for many years for the Department of Defense, for the White House, and for other government agencies.

A close reading of this draft treaty shows, of course, that it forbids actual attack on satellites of other states (Article I). That in itself would be little comfort to us; like a renunciation of the use of force, abjuring attack on satellites without limiting testing and readiness and without maintaining vigilance about the potential threat would hardly add to our security. But this Article I motivates the rest of the Draft.