Controlling Space Weapons: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session on S. Res. 43 ..., S.J. Res. 28 ... April 14 and May 18, 1983U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983 - 173 pages |
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Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM systems ABM Treaty ADELMAN administration allies American antisatellite weapons arms control agreements arms race Article ASAT capability ASAT system ASAT weapons attack ballistic missile defense believe billion Chairman Committee CONGRESS THE LIBRARY cost countermeasures cruise missiles defensive systems deployed deployment destroy destruction DEUDNEY draft treaty earth effective effort forces Garwin going GRAHAM High Frontier ICBM IKLE important issues kind laser launched LIBRARY OF CONGRESS limit LODAL ment MIRVS mutual assured destruction national security national technical means negotiations nuclear weapons offensive orbit Outer Space Treaty possible potential President President's prohibiting proposed question radars RATHJENS Reagan reconnaissance satellites SALT II scientists Senator PELL Senator PRESSLER Senator TSONGAS shuttle Soviet ASAT Soviet Union space arms control space objects space systems space weapons space-based laser strategic talks target Test Ban threat tion U.S. ASAT U.S. satellites United warheads weaponry weapons in space weapons systems
Fréquemment cités
Page 68 - ... achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, US supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The US does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the US Government attaches...
Page 57 - I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.
Page 67 - Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
Page 68 - Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile landbased.
Page 129 - XVI 1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party.
Page 65 - Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 139 - States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.
Page 67 - Agreement,* agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels.
Page 68 - ... not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. 2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher...
Page 163 - I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and raise certain problems and ambiguities. If paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that.