most divisions; and ultimately he kept | reports, the ruinous delays, the misdiback from the fatal field a force only of rected movements to which we have sixteen thousand Prussians.

tried to point attention! In fact, if a mistake of the emperor was the origin of the series of events which marred his operations after the 16th, we do not hesitate to assert that his complete overthrow was due mainly to his lieutenant, and that if Grouchy could probably not have made Waterloo a French victory, he might and ought to have saved his chief from ruin, both by supplying him with correct intelligence, and by detaining many more Prussians than he actually did on the 18th.

It has been urged in defence of Grouchy that he was not to blame for these operations, inasmuch as he was obeying Napoleon's orders, which plainly enjoined him to go to Wavre, and that, accordingly, the emperor alone was answerable for his lieutenant's movements. But setting Grouchy's other mistakes aside - Napoleon, when prescribing the march to Wavre, was merely acting on Grouchy's reports, which, as we have seen, were not correct; in addition, in directing Grouchy is, however, a very different question on Wavre, Napoleon left that general to choose the way, and did not send him on an exterior line; and, consequently, nothing relieves Grouchy from the responsibility that attaches to him. From these considerations we can fairly estimate the respective merits of Napoleon and Grouchy in the operations in which they acted in common.

It

whether Grouchy, had he been a capable man, could have stopped the whole of the fifty-five thousand Prussians who marched from Wavre on Waterloo, and have thus left the emperor entirely free to strike Wellington with his whole forces. French critics, and Jomini concurs with them, insist that this was within Grouchy's power, at least to a Napoleon was mistaken on the 17th, very considerable extent; and as the as to the position and purpose of Blü-march from Wavre was a flank march cher; he ought, perhaps, to have re- through a wet, wooded, and intricate connoitred from Sombreffe in person, country, and Blücher's troops would and certainly to have observed the have been greatly exposed, had Prussians better; he detached Grouchy Grouchy, as he might have done, apsome hours too late and allowed him to peared on their flank, it is idle to disgo at first in a wrong direction; and, regard this opinion. Still Grouchy adhering to his original belief that Blü- had only thirty-three thousand men; cher was falling back on his base, and the old Prussian marshal had nearly could not appear in force for some time, ninety thousand; and bearing in mind he did not keep up vigilantly his com- the energy of Blücher, and the stern munications with Gembloux, and he purpose which upheld his troops, we attacked at Waterloo on the false as- think that, probably, he would have sumption that he would have Welling- found means to throw at least one corps ton alone before him. All these errors, on the flank of Napoleon, which would however, it should be observed, flowed have been quite sufficient to make Welnaturally from a single misconcep- lington secure, and to wrest victory tion made ruinous by the conduct of from the emperor's grasp. This again Grouchy; and this misconception was indicates, as we have said before, that not in the least surprising — for hardly Napoleon's forces in this campaign one of Napoleon's many antagonists were not adequate to his vast designs. would have rallied his army as Blücher Turning to the strategy of the Allied did, still less attempted to march from chiefs, those who are not blinded by Wavre, a very critical and perilous the glare of success can see that it movement. But if this miscalculation is not beyond criticism. Notwithstandcertainly was a leading cause of Napoleon's failure, how great had been the share of Grouchy in it, through the tardiness, the indecision, the incorrect

ing the pitiable conduct of Grouchy, victory hung trembling in the balance at Waterloo, and this, too, though the state of the weather had delayed Na

poleon's attack some hours, and was | Had this been done, it is difficult to see greatly against offensive movements. that Napoleon could have had a chance Had Grouchy, too, acted with ordinary on the 18th; and in that case the obviskill, the success of the Allies could not ous objections to the Allies fighting at have been great; had he been directed all at Waterloo would be almost wholly rightly from the first, or been a chief of without foundation. Blücher, too, a high order, the battle might have though his energy was above praise, been won by the French; and in the showed some hesitation on the 18th. events which happened, though we do He promised to be earlier on the field, not think he would have been following and that, too, with his whole army, but the art of war, had Napoleon fallen Bülow did not attack till four, Blücher with his whole force on Wellington, was not in line until after seven; twotaking Grouchy with him, and neg-thirds only of the Prussian forces took lecting Blücher, he must, humanly part in the battle of Waterloo, and speaking, have gained a triumph. Con- these delays, to be ascribed doubtless to sidering that after the 16th the Allies Blücher's knowledge of the danger of could dispose of about one hundred and his march, not only reflect on his geneighty thousand men, and Napoleon of eral plan, but for a time imperilled the only about one hundred and ten thou- British army. Independently, besides, sand, the fact that they did not assure of Blücher's movements, remains the success, tends to show that their move-question whether the duke ought to ments were far from perfect, and this, have offered battle alone at Waterloo, we believe, is the true conclusion. In that is, exposed himself for some hours leaving his base on the 17th, and march- at least to the attack of Napoleon at ing towards the duke and Wavre, the head of forces greatly superior in Blücher exposed his communications strength? It may be affirmed with nearly as much as if he had joined the confidence that if the duke had thought duke at once; and in rallying at Wavre, that Blücher would have been as late nine miles from his colleague, and as he was, he would not have run this divided from him by difficult ground, serious risk; and it should be added he rendered himself liable to an attack that as a large part of the inferior solin flank which might have prevented diers of Wellington's army could not his reaching Waterloo. In fact, poor have endured the trial of a long retreat, as were Grouchy's manœuvres, Blücher the reasons for fighting on the 18th did not himself set off from Wavre with were strong. Still, it is difficult to anthe twenty-six thousand men who struck swer the observation that the duke and down Napoleon, until noon on the 18th. Blücher would have done better had He was very nearly being too late, and they declined an action until their conceivably he might have been too troops had been assembled within late had Grouchy been equal to his closer reach, and retiring behind the task-to send an adequate force to forest of Soignies, had waited until the Wellington, in which event the two 19th or 20th to fight, concentrated in Allied armies would have been placed front of Brussels. We have already in a critical position. It is probable, noticed that it is vain to justify the isotherefore, since the Prussian marshal lation during the 18th of a large part had boldly resolved to abandon his base, of the forces of the duke on his right; that he ought to have retired on Water- and we certainly think that, victorious loo on the 17th, and though Bülow as they were, the general dispositions would thus have joined him later, this of the Allied chiefs, even at the close of disadvantage would have been trifling this memorable contest, were inferior to compared to the enormous gain of those of their great adversary, though, effecting the junction of the Allied as soldiers, they showed perhaps higher forces before the 18th, and avoiding qualities; and the skill of Wellington the flank march of that day, a most on the field of Waterloo will always hazardous and doubtful operation. claim the highest admiration.

The great features of the campaign | nothing can justify or excuse Grouchy, of Waterloo seem to us, therefore, suffi-and though the French army and some ciently plain. Napoleon's general plan of its chiefs were not equal to what was brilliant in the extreme; and the they had once been. In truth, if we manner in which he assembled his consider this memorable struggle in its army, and swept with it over the Bel- broadest and most historical aspect, gian frontier, was one of the finest of we see that one main reason of the his military operations. The advantage emperor's failure was that he forgot he gained on the 15th well-nigh gave that he had formed antagonists who him success next day; and an accident understood his strategic system, and only prevented Ligny from proving were different men from the foes of fatal to one of his foes, and perhaps his youth, that fierce national passions from assuring his ultimate triumph. had changed the quality of many of the After the 16th a single misconception troops opposed to him, and that the affected his movements, and led to exhaustion of France and her late remistakes, to which we may trace his verses had told on his army and his final failure; but the lieutenant he lieutenants; and this explanation makes trusted was wanting to him, and caused many difficulties of the campaign clear. his defeat to be what it was; and in As regards the conduct of the Allied his operations, though marred and chiefs, their general arrangements crossed, we see to the last the force of were, beyond doubt, inferior to those his genius, and the splendor of his mil- of their mighty foe, and their first itary conceptions. It must also never movements show want of concert, but be forgotten that the error into which they displayed military qualities of the Napoleon fell can surprise no one who highest order; and, at last, through a has studied his career; it was really combination of vigor and firmness, to probable in the highest degree that Blücher would retire on the Meuse; and it would be easy to show that the emperor committed mistakes as great as that of 1815, in several of his most successful campaigns. We, therefore, reject the idle theory that his powers at this time were not what they had been; and if he appeared to have been less careful and vigilant than in former days, this was rather because his antagonists possessed these qualities in very great degree, than owing to any decline in his faculties. We believe, however, that he took the field with an army rather too small for his purpose; he held his antagonists too cheap, and trusted too much to his own genius; and in this we see new proofs of the overweening confidence which was his chief fault as a leader in war.

Unquestionably the campaign throughout showed that he underrated Blücher and Wellington, and took too little account of their troops; he believed that the first would not rally in Wavre, he thought that he could crush the second at Waterloo ; and this contributed largely to his discomfiture, though

which it is not easy to find a parallel, they succeeded, though not without hazardous risk, in bringing their superior forces against the emperor, and to overwhelm him on the field of Waterloo.

From Longman's Magazine. HOW MARTHA DIDN'T MARRY A SUMPMAN.

A CORNISH MINING STORY.

"No, I ain't going to marry no sumpman,1 Harry, ef you do want me ; theest must larn some traade or 'nuth

er.

"Traade !" There was a world of scorn in Harry Trethowan's voice as he echoed the girl's word. "I've been a sumpman saame as feyther, and his feyther, and his feyther's feyther, way backlong to Adam I do b'law (I believe). I cuddn't be nawthun' else. Why, ye're a rack-maiden 2 yerself, Martha, and do work to bal,3 saame as I do. What do ee do that for?" he

But his knowledge of women was of the slightest (owing to his youth), or he would not have been sure of any action on the part of one of them. Martha answered promptly.

asked triumphantly, feeling certain that explanation. The term “’Un Jane”
Martha could not answer him.
did not mean that she was a relation of
Martha's; simply "'Un,” for “
Aunt,'
is a term of respect applied to elderly
and old women, as "Uncle" is to old
men in Cornwall. The case of 'Un
Jane was indeed a warning to girls not
to marry 66
""
sumpmen.
It was now
many years since her man was blawed
up." The facts were as follows: "Un
Jane's ""

"Because I do like being my own missus, and having my hevenings to myself, and to wear what cloes I do like. So there now, are ee satisfied?"

Whilst

man-his very name was forHarry did not answer at once, but gotten - was sinking a shaft at Wheal stood silently watching her as she gazed Vor; his assistant had missed in chargsaucily up at him. She looked so sturdy ing a hole; it was therefore necessary and independent in her mine-girl's to pick out the charge-a dangerous dress, with her short woollen petticoat, operation for the operator. clean white touser, big bonnet, black""Un Jane's man" was engaged in worsted stockings, and her tiny feet picking it out, the charge exploded. clad in leather shoes of Harry's own When the remains were brought to the making, that she angered him. He surface, their aspect was so horrible felt he would conquer her, and lost his that one of the miners shovelled them temper as he asked angrily, "Why into the furnace of an engine close at waant ee marry a sumpman?" hand.

66 Why? 2
Martha sat herself down
on the stile by which they were stand-
ing, that divided the bal-dumps 1 from
the lane which wound down-hill to the
village of St. Endellion.

"" Why?" she said again, more gen-
tly than she had yet spoken. "Be-
I do waant to be a proper
widdaw, and for ee to have a proper
burrying."

cause

"A widdaw! Aw, my dear! I don't see what ee do want me to die for."

"I doan't! That's what I'm a telling of ee."

"But theest said ""

"Theest a great bufflehead,'
" inter-
rupted the girl in softened tones, and a
glance of her bright, dark eyes, which
Harry was quick to take advantage of.
But Martha evaded the touch of his
outstretched hand, and waving him
back, continued, "I do mane ef I got
to be a widdaw, I shouldn't like to be
a second 'Un Jane up to Wheal 2 Vor." |
There was silence. The fate of 'Un
Jane, or, to be more correct, Aunt
Jane, was too well known to need any

1 Heaps of refuse from the mines, or "bals."'

Bitter as was the trouble to "Un Jane," it was made unutterably more so by the absence of a corpse to lay out, and for the neighbors to admire. There was no funeral, with its hymn-singing, winding down the steep hill to the parish church of St. Endellion. "There wasn't nawthin'." And "Un Jane cuddn't wear black without a funeral, nor a body." And " 'passon wuddent leave her put a headstone up 'mongst his people's, as there wasn't no grave.” So the poor woman was only a widow "by compliment," as it were, and was an object of unfeigned pity to the whole mining community.

Harry at first seemed convinced by Martha's argument, but a few moments' reflection showed him the feebleness of Martha's reasoning.

"Tes nonsense, Martha; we arn't driving no shafts up to Wheal Agnes, and shaan't be; I awnly wish we cud; 'twould shaw times was lookin' up a bit, instead of gettin' bad, as Cappun Williams do say they are. 'Tes pure fullishness."

"Fullishness is et? Aw, my dear, I baan't so fullish as to marry a sump

2 "Wheal" is from "huel," the ancient Cornish man ef the bal es going scat." 8

for "a work," and is used constantly in Cornwall
before the name of a mine.

3"Bal es going scat"-Mine is going to stop working.

"I dedn't say 'twas, Martha. I dinner-hour. No! Martha had hers to awnly said herself; she was not going to wait for "I was fullish," finished Martha,"turns." She'd always have "first rising with dignity; and as she saw turn" herself, and be first in the field Harry was going to accompany her she to take her pick of the young men to be said angrily, "Noa, I doan't want ee; her "shiner" for the time. I'm goin' to see ef Charley Tresize can mend the hen-house door."