In a late Review, we entered into some discussion respecting the nature, the justice, and the policy of the Austrian war;* and from the evidence arising out of the official documents published by the respective parties, we inferred that the war on the part of Austria was alike unjust and impolitic. The grand Manifesto of the Emperor Francis, which has appeared in very few of the public prints, is inserted in our present number, and forms an important document in the history of the war: it proves that Austria had for some time past been on the watch for a favourable opportunity for renewing the contest; and that the dream of recovering his former dominions, and influence in Europe, and of restoring the old, worthless Germanic Constitution, had been constantly floating in the brain of the Emperor. His conduct, in making vast preparations for war, and, instead, as he suggested, of acting merely on the defensive, mvading the territories of a neighbouring Sovereign, the King of Bavaria, against whom he does not appear to have urged any ground of complaint, affords additional evidence, that manner of commencing hostilities corresponded with his pretences? and too plainly proves the infatuation of those councils which have, after a short campaign, of three months, terminated a third war, and prostrated the Austrian Emperor at the feet of his thrice trid umphant conqueror.

Notes of considerable length on the Austrian Manifesto have ap peared in the official French paper, the Moniteur; but as arguments of a much more tremendous nature, (the ultima ratio regum) have since suspended, and in fact terminated the war, they may now be considered, comparatively speaking, of trifling impor tance. Our readers may judge of the manner in which these notes are written by the following paragraph towards the conclusion.

"Behold, these are all the grievances of which Austria complains, on "going to war. The remainder of the Manifesto is only a confession of ❝its aggression, and an inadequate and fallacious explanation of its hostile "6 measures and armaments. It would have been more noble to declare, I have never ceased, at the bottom of my heart, to be your enemy. I "have watched for occasions to attack you with advantage, and surprise " you undefended. I never had any other policy, and I thought I should "be absolved by victory. It was for this reason I took up arms in 1805, "when I thought your troops were engaged in the expeditions against "England. You vanquished me, but you did not changé me. I implored 66 your generosity; I used the only resource of the conquered. You treated me with a magnanimity which I dared not expect; but in restoring me 66 my crown and dignity, I ought to have thought that you gave me the "sentiments which belonged to them. You ought to have expected I "should be ungrateful. Re-placed in the position from which the fate of arms had torn me, I re-adopted the policy of my house. Thus it became

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* See Rev. for May, Vol. V. p. lxxviii.

me to do in 1808, what I ought to have done in 1806, and actually did "in 1805. Therefore, when I thought your troops seriously occupied in Spain, I took up arms to march against you."

The brilliant successes of the French during the first twenty days of the war, placed them in possession of the Austrian capital. Recollecting the result which shortly followed similar events in the year 1805, we expressed our opinion that the fate of Austria was rapidly advancing, and that from the moment the enemy was in possession of her capital she was in fact subdued. The Emperor, his generals, and armies, were, however, resolved to make one more desperate struggle, not only to check the progress of France, but, as it since appears by the language of the official details, to retrieve their past misfortunes, and to atchieve new conquests. In consequence of this resolution, battles have been fought, which are justly characterised by the Austrian generals, as "the most awful, sanguinary, and "murderous, that have taken place since the commencement of the "French Revolution." Both parties claimed the victory: the result however, too evidently discovers on which side the claim was just. The French armies about the time mentioned by Napoleon for the completion of his preparations, renewed their attacks; and in subsequent victorious conflicts, so completely disheartened the enemy, that a suspension of arms was solicited; which, happily for the interests of humanity, was almost immediately granted. The terms, are, as might naturally be expected, humiliating: the country of the Tyrolese, hitherto the theatre of obstinate conflict, is to be abandoned by the Austrians; the French armies are to remain in possession of the country they have conquered, and two important fortresses are to be placed in their possession. In short, what we predicted with some degree of confidence at the commencement of the contest, is awfully fulfilled;--the Austrian Emperor is now, after a three months campaign, in which he Iras lavished his resources, sacrificed above 100,000 of his subjects, and lost a considerable part of his dominions, entirely at the mercy of Napoleon!

What will be the final destiny of Austria, it is impossible to say, What we offer on the subject is merely conjectural, and our readers will receive it as such. We however, suspect, that the dictates of policy, if not of magnanimity, will suggest to the mind of Napoleon certain advantages which may arise from his not only permitting the Austrian Emperor, or King of Bohemia, or Hungary, (for his new title is scarcely yet settled) to retain his station amongst the sovereigns of Europe, but perhaps, by endeavouring to convert him from an enemy to a friend, render him subservient to his future purposes. May not some compensation for the loss of former dominions, influence, and authority in Germany, be made, by the

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VOL. VI.

offer of a participation in the division of some remaining old, decrepid, corrupt empire; or to use more statesman-like language, some remaining" regular government," devoted by Napoleon to destruction. The fall of the Turkish empire is an event which has been predicted by both politicians and divines: the latter, in particular, have confidently expressed their opinion, that the fate of the false prophet, Mahomet, at Constantinople, will be similar to, and folJow in quick succession that of the Beast at Rome. Should the Austrian Emperor be admitted into the councils of his imperial brothers of France and Russia, respecting the Turkish empire, the terms of such a proof of reconciliation and confidence, may easily be conjectured ;-A treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, against the " common enemy;"—a term within the past twelvemonth applied by the respective parties to Great Britain, which within these three months has been applied by Austria to France, and which in all probability, will ere long again be used agreeably to its former application.

The infatuation which has so fatally seized the councils of Austria, has, judging from the language of the public prints, communicated itself to the principal political parties of this country. The writers in the ministerial prints, the Morning Post and the Morning He rald, more particularly, and in the Sidmouth print, the Times, have ever since the commencement of the Austrian war, had their heads totally bewildered with the old, idle dreams of the " deliverance "of Europe." The successes of the French appear to have had scarcely any effect in weakening the force of these delusions. The credit of the French bulletins has been warmly attacked; but after perusing the official accounts of both parties, after allowing for that colouring which is usually applied by all writers of military operations, the different accounts are not so contradictory, but that the truth may without any great difficulty be discovered. The attentive and impartial reader will perceive, that the Austrian details confirm, in the most material points, the French bulletins. By the eleventh bulletin it is evident, that although in the horrible conflicts of the 21st. and 22d. of May, the French claimed the victory, they were not victories of that description they were wont to claim; that they were materially checked in their career, and were disabled from pursuing the enemy: the reason assigned is" the destruc"tion of the bridges, owing to the sudden rise of the Danube, "when the Austrian army was on the point of being destroyed, by "which dreadful accident all the reserve parks of the artillery "which were advancing were detained on the right bank, as was "also a part of the heavy cavalry, and the whole of the Duke of "Auerstadt's corps.... that in consequence, the slackening of the fire, and the concentrating movement of the French army soon

"left the enemy no doubt respecting this unforeseen accident." The truth of this statement was not only denied, but the whole of it ridiculed by our public writers in general, who were sure that the check the French had received was entirely owing to the superior military manuœvres of the Archduke Charles, and to the superior ardour, patriotism, and bravery of the Austrian army. The Austrian account contained in the Supplement to the London Gazette, appears, with the exception of some ridiculous vauntings, to be admirably written, and excites very considerable interest. The main fact of the destruction of the bridges, is acknowledged, although there is a contradiction respecting the means by which this destruction was effected. In one part the writer observes, that" by means of fire ships sent down the Danube, the Arch“duke had caused the enemy's bridge on the Lobau to be broken "down" in another part, he states, that "Napoleon rode through "his ranks, and according to the report of the prisoners, made "them acquainted with the destruction of the bridge, but added, “that he had himself ordered it to be broken down, because in "this case there was no alternative but victory or death." The reports of prisoners as detailed by an enemy, are at all times to be regarded with suspicion: the latter account is not only inconsistent with the former account of both the French and Austrian writers, but carries absurdity on the face of it: the main fact is however, established; and we firmly believe that it was owing to the cause assigned in the French bulletin, that the French had not a decisive victory.

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A drawn battle, or a check of any kind to the French forces appeared so extraordinary to the Austrians, that the Emperor in his grateful acknowledgments to the Archduke thus addressess him. "It was reserved for you, the brother of my heart, the prime support of my throne to interrupt for the first time these fifteen years, the good fortune of the adversary. You are the "saviour of the country, which, as the monarch, will eternally "thank and bless you." This natural ebullition of gratitude in the Austrian Monarch arising from so remarkable an occurrence, is perfectly natural; but the writer of the details seems to have prescribed no bounds to the extravagance of his joy." For "the first time," he observes, " NAPOLEON had sustained a defeat "in Germany: from this moment he was reduced, to the rank of "bold, and successful generals, who like himself, after a long "series of destructive atchievements, experienced the vicissitudes "of fortune: the charm of his invincibility was dissolved.

7

No

longer the spoiled child of fortune, by posterity he will be cha "racterised as the sport of the fickle goddess! New hopes begin -“to animate the oppressed nations." The folly of these effusions

which have been so closely copied by the generality of our daily and weekly journalists, is now sufficiently demonstrated.

In the tenth bulletin it was stated by the French," The works "for replacing the bridges are continued with assiduity, and nothing will be undertaken until they are secure, not only against the accidents of the water, but against any thing that may be attempted against them: the rise of the river, and the rapidity of the stream, must require much labour and great "caution." Men attending to the dictates of common sense, after reading this passage, might naturally expect that nothing material would be attempted by the French for at least a few weeks. Every day, however, teemed with reproaches and insults cast on Napoleon and his armies: his inactivity, it was repeatedly affirmed, proved the completeness of his defeat. These writers were so fully employed in singing their Io triomphe, to all Europe, and in anticipating the halcyon days, when the "upstart Corsican, the "ruffias, the monster," should be stripped of all his tarnished laurels, that they had not leisure sufficient to put the questions,What are the victorious Austrians doing? Are they not pursuing their victories, and driving the defeated enemy from the capital? A little impartial attention bestowed on the subject, would soon have convinced them of the true nature of the boasted victories of the Austrians, who, they might easily have perceived, were disabled from attempting even the interruption of the French preparations for renewing their attacks, in the heart of the Austrian dominions.

But something worse than weakness, has been displayed by our ministerial writers on this occasion. Reports of a negociation between France and Austria have been prevalent in some of the foreign prints during the past two or three weeks. The wretched hireling who habitually digraces the Morning Post, in the paper of the 15th inst. thus vents his ravings:

"We are not of those who entertain apprehensions that under the 66 present circumstances, the Austrian cabinet will be enticed, or intimi"dated into a negociation. the mere probability of such an event "would lay prostrate the spirit that is every where springing up against "the oppressor of nations: the extinction of that spirit would smooth the

way for the safe return of his hordes to France, which otherwise must fall "victims to the vengeance of those whom they have so wantonly and cruelly

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trampled upon. The belief of a negociation would also allay the impa"tience of the French people, and afford some explanation of the inactivity "to which the once invincible energies of Bonaparte are reduced! Not only then might it facilitate his extrication from the perils of his present "situation, but to a mind so resourceful as his, afford perhaps the means "of reviving the verdure of his faded laurels. These are all powerful "motives with the enemy for insinuating and spreading such a report; "but they would all more powerfully operate on the mind of the Arch