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But to the subject of your inquiries. You seem to be more than usually at a loss with our "Science of Correspondences." The great difficulty with novitiates in contemplating this subject, arises from its being entirely new; not new in itself; for all truth is as old as creation; but new to the world. It is so unheard of, so strange, and, in reality, so grand, that there is not the slightest connexion, either in name or idea, with any thing that is found in the old theology. There is no connecting link, and you are obliged to leave the old entirely before you can enter into it. It is ours altogether. It is one of our new tongues" with which we speak, and of which Christ spoke when he sent his disciple to "all the world to preach the gospel to every creature." Every new receiver, therefore, has to be educated in this doctrine from first to last; and we have sometimes great difficulty in getting some persons to "frame their mouths" to pronounce this, which in some respects is our Shibboleth, aright. This may account for its very singular appearance to you. But still, since it is the subject of your particular inquiry, I will do what I can towards enabling you to understand what we mean by it. But, as I observed in one of my previous notes, my efforts will be very imperfect; and I would not have you form your conclusion from what I may say; for I must candidly confess, that my knowledge is very limited, and what I have is almost all borrowed from Swedenborg's general writings, and Mr. Noble's "Plenary Inspiration," &c.; to which I beg to refer you.

Much confusion is liable to arise from not drawing a broad line of distinction between metaphor and correspondence; for frequently the absolute reality of the latter is lost in supposing it to be identical with the arbitrary and fanciful brilliancy of the former; than which, there is nothing farther from the truth. Metaphor is a mere poetic image,a real or presumed resemblance of one thing to another, which the fancy or imagination may draw. Metaphor is, therefore, mere imagery, and implies but a fanciful connexion between the thing and its presumed resemblance. But Correspondence is the natural and eternal relation that an external thing bears to an internal one. Thus, there is a correspondence between matter and spirit, earth and heaven, body and soul, creation and God. In all these the relationship is not fanciful, but fixed and divine, and necessarily exists from the nature of things. Metaphor, then, depends upon the imagination of man for its existence, but Correspondence is one of the created entities of God.

I do not know whether this general distinction will be sufficiently clear, but perhaps, from an example, it may be made so. Let us take

those beautiful lines of the improvident Byron on the death of Kirk White, as the ground of an illustration :—

"So the struck eagle, stretched upon the plain,
No more through rolling clouds to soar again,
Viewed his own feather on the fatal dart,
And winged the shaft that quivered in his heart!
Keen were his pangs, but keener far to feel,
He nursed the pinion that impelled the steel;
While the same plumage that had warmed his nest,
Drank the last life-drop of his bleeding breast."

ENGLISH BARDS, &c.

All this is mere metaphor; but how beautiful it is in a master's hand like Byron's! The "struck eagle" is "unhappy White,” the “fatal dart" is the disease, which "his own feather," his genius, impelled to fatality in consequence of being cultivated too seduously; hence, he says,

""Twas thine own genius gave the final blow,

And helped to plant the wound that laid thee low."

Now, you will at once perceive that there is no natural connexion between any one of these similies and Kirk White. It is the poet's fancy that has drawn the likeness, and however beautiful it may be, there is still no absolute reality in the connexion.

You may perceive a distinguishing difference between metaphor and correspondence in this remarkable fact. A correspondence can only signify one thing, while a metaphor will stand for many. For instance, fire corresponds to love, and water to truth; and when we speak correspondentially, fire always means love, and water, truth; and if they are used otherwise, it is not correspondence. But, on the other hand, metaphor is a thing that can be changed at will, to suit the pleasure of the user. This one of the "struck eagle," taking it just as it stands, will answer for fifty other things almost as well as for White. Suppose we apply it to an historical event, and say, that the "struck eagle" is a strong castle," the fatal dart" its beseiging enemies, and "the feather," traitors, who secretly open the gates and conduct the enemy, "the dart," into the heart of the stronghold, and thus enable him to destroy the castle. Here you perceive the metaphor would answer; and there is just as much real connexion between the eagle and the castle as there is between it and White. It is all but a beautiful fancy-a delightful imagery, that illustrates the subject, and conveys it home to our hearts and our heads.

Let us assume this difference, therefore, as true, until we have opportunity of proving it, which we may be able to do, in some measure, in a

subsequent part of our correspondence, and then we shall be able to understand how it is possible to construct a system of writing upon this plan of symbolism or correspondence. Suppose it to be a law in creation, which we believe it to be, that every natural thing shall be the type, form, and correspondence of a spiritual principle or idea; as, for instance, that a man's words shall be the type of his ideas—his actions, of his intentions—his body, of his soul, and, to carry it out further, that all nature shall be the type of man; and suppose, too, that each of these types bears a fixed and unvarying correspondence; now, would it not be possible to place these types in a certain order, and make them speak a connected series of ideas? Is not this the very plan upon which our oral and written language is constructed? Examine this. What are words, oral words? Considered in themselves, they are mere sounds, which the different languages of the world show to have no distinct meaning in themselves; for a Frenchman does not use the same sound to convey the same meaning as we do, and so on with every other language; which seems to show that words are sounds which, in themselves, have no sense, but to which, by mutual consent, we attach certain meanings. Sounds thus become artificial symbols of our ideas, and which, by a certain arrangement according to laws which we call grammar, may be made to convey any number of ideas. Thus our oral language, in reality, is but an artificial kind of correspondence, the symbols of which our children have gradually to learn from their infancy upwards. The same is true of our written language. The black marks that we make upon paper are as senseless in themselves as the rude scrawl of our infants. Doubtless, at the commencement of writing, they were taken from certain forms in nature; for even now, the characters of some languages seem to bear a faint resemblance to the forms of the animal kingdom. But, as it is, our written characters have no meaning whatever in themselves; mankind, however, have agreed that a certain mark shall stand for a certaine sound, and by writing several together, a compound sound is understood, which, by compounding these again, make a sentence and convey an idea. Now, all this, up to this point, is but an artificial correspondence, which men agreed to, under another name, after true correspondence was lost and forgotten.

Here, then, we see that it is not only possible to construct a language according to correspondences or symbols, but that it is absolutely impossible to construct a language without them, either of a real or artificial kind. Instead of using the characters we do, we might take particular objects of nature, which, as we have said, correspond naturally

and according to divine intention, to certain principles and ideas in the spirit of man, and place them in a certain order, which shall answer to the ideas we intend to convey. This was the plan adopted among the Egyptians, as I intend to show before we leave the subject; but we, by means of what I have called "artificial correspondences," may arrive at the same thing by, to us, an easier method. I have called it " artificial," because every thing below the idea in written language, such as the arbitrary marks, the sounds we attach to them, their arrangement in a certain order, &c., are changeable according to the country in which we live; and what is changeable is not fixed and real. The marks and the sounds, and their arrangement, therefore, are all arbitrary, and not the natural exponents of the idea; but in consequence of an agreement among men, are understood. By custom and use, however, this "artificial correspondence" communicates the idea sooner than making its natural type would. For instance, we can much sooner write the word "house" than draw a house, &c., but what we gain in time by this plan, we lose in perfection, for the mere word "house" leaves many things to be supposed, which may be either true or false; hence pictorial writing contains something more real and natural than the common "black marks." Nevertheless these will serve to convey to us the idea, and when once we get the idea, true correspondence begins in the mind. When we obtain an idea of a natural object, such as fire, water, house, or any natural circumstance, such as is recorded in the letter of Scripture, by understanding the general laws of correspondences, we may perceive that a spiritual truth lies within them all, and that this spiritual truth, again, is but an external covering to a truth still more interior, in the same way as sense and meaning lie within sounds and letters, and the mind or soul within the body of man.

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Correspondence, then, is so fixed and certain, that, by using its symbols, a distinct and continued sense may be communicated. If men and nations, and lands, and cities, have a fixed representation, as we assume, you will easily perceive that, under the apparent history of these things, a sense altogether distinct from, yet, by correspondences, answering exactly to, the letter of the history, may be conveyed. Now, this is our idea of the character of the Word. We believe its history of the Jews, and every thing else it contains, to be true, with certain given exceptions, as far as they go, in the letter; but, so arranged and formed by the verbal inspiration of God, that they may be the type and symbol of, and correspond to, certain spiritual and divine truths, which it was necessary that God should reveal to man. Perhaps I may be

able to give you an illustration. It is written in the third chapter of Exodus, ver. 1-" Now Moses kept the flock of Jethro his father-inlaw, the priest of Midian; and he led the flock to the back side of the desert, and came to the mountain of God, even to Horeb." Here, according to first appearances, is but the history of a simple, natural event that occurred three or four thousand years ago. But, on further examination, we shall find that it is so divinely worded, as to be the symbol of another sense that lies within. Moses was the medium of conveying truth from God to man, and, at the same time, the leader of Israel; we therefore say that he is the type of the truth which he taught to man, and which leads man onward in his spiritual journey. The flock or sheep are principles of charity, or those who are in charity; hence the Lord calls the charitable sheep, and the uncharitable goats. (Matt. xxv. 32, 33.) Jethro, being a priest, is the good from which God is worshiped; for good, like a priest, communicates with the Deity, and stands before Him upon the altar of our hearts, preparing us to receive, and bringing down the divine blessings into our external man. But this good or Jethro is the father-in-law of Moses, that is, it begets the spiritual affection of truth. A woman is the symbol of affection, while man is the type of truth; so that, spiritually, affection is the wife of truth, and truth the husband of affection. Affection for truth, then, is the wife of Moses. Now all real affection for truth comes from the good by which God is adored; hence Jethro the priest, is the fatherin-law of Moses. We, therefore, see from this, that all genuine affection for truth, and all true principles of charity, are produced by, and belong to, and are dependent upon, the love of God, or, the good from which He is sincerely worshiped! Important and exalting lesson! But it is truth or Moses that is the shepherd of this spiritual flock. Without truth, charity would run astray and commit evil to others; it is, therefore, necessary that we should commit every good principle to the guidance of truth. This is especially necessary, at certain times and in certain states; for, occasionally, the mind, with all its principles of charity, or flock, is in the spiritual desert. There are times when we are tempted and troubled, and afflicted, and cast down, and then we are in the wilderness! The desert is the symbol of temptation; and because of this the Israelites and the Lord were tempted in the wilderness. And sometimes, when we are in this wilderness, we wander about, and are driven to the very verge of despair. Hope begins to expire, and the most dreadful forebodings seize upon our thoughts, and life itself may become a burden. This extreme of despair in temptation is typified by the "backside," or far end, of the desert. Moses