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From The Contemporary Review. OLD AND NEW CANONS OF POETICAL

CRITICISM. I.

WHEN men have been long engaged in a discussion that seems to hold out no promise of a definite conclusion, the suspicion is naturally engendered that the endlessness of the controversy is caused by the too vague apprehension of the matter in dispute. Thence arises a craving for some definition that shall not be vague, but as particular and precise as the nature of the subject and the inherent infirmities of language will permit.

I fancy some such craving has arisen in connection with the controversies that have for some time been current concerning the respective merits of the English poets of this century who are silent in their graves. Few will doubt that there are at least three of these to each of whom in turn precedence is given over the other two by critics who are one and all entitled to an opinion, and who may fairly demand a hearing on this interesting theme. Byron, Shelley, and Wordsworth are the illustrious trio whose rival claims have caused and still support the controversy. Mr. Matthew Arnold has just pronounced, in explicit terms, in favor of Wordsworth. I imagine Mr. Swinburne, Mr. Rossetti, and others, would confer the palm upon Shelley. Finally, there are some of us who would be disposed to place Byron before either.

I do not propose in this paper to offer any direct contribution to that controversy. My purpose rather is to inquire whether it be possible to define what poetry peculiarly is, what is its main and distinguishing function, and upon what, principally, the greatness and superiority of the poet depend. It is obvious that if nothing of the kind be possible, then one man's opinion about poets and poetry is as good and as authoritative as another's, and all our attempted estimates resolve themselves into the mere rival assertions, "I like this," "I prefer that."

the fact that Mr. Matthew Arnold has been endeavoring to provide us with one. Had he been successful in the attempt, there would have been no room for further observation. Unfortunately the new canon Mr. Arnold advances concerning poetry, should it gain acceptance, will, it seems to me, only make confusion worse confounded. This may appear a bold thing to say of an attempt to assist our perplexity made by one who is both a poet of distinction and a critic of eminence. But I can only state my reasons for that conclusion, and leave it to others to decide whether the fresh difficulties Mr. Arnold bas created, for me at least, are fanciful or not.

Mr. Arnold is a singularly circumspect writer; and evidently it is with repugnance that he commits himself to a definite statement. He has written some of the most agreeable prose volumes of our time; in which he has let his consciousness play freely about the ideas of other people, whilst more or less concealing his own behind a fascinating veil. An instance of what I mean may be found at page 67 of "Culture and Anarchy," a work I should think no one ever opens without enjoying the luxury of an intellectual smile. It is a delightful volume, and makes much notable folly look more foolish than ever. But, probably, its own drift is anarchic, for, whilst rendering many nonsensical opinions untenable, it scarcely offers anything sensible in their place. After arguing that we want a principle of authority, to counteract the tendency to anarchy that seems to he threatening us, Mr. Arnold observes:

But how to organize this authority, or to what hands to trust the wielding of it? How to get your State, summing up the right reason of the community, and giving effect to it, as circumstances may require, with vigor? And here I think I see my enemies waiting for me with a hungry joy in their eyes. But I shall elude them.

In effect, he does elude them. But how That I am not alone in thinking some does he elude them? By alluding to the more exact definition of the main function difficulty, which is the kernel of the ques of the poet is required than we at present tion, no more; and by being so entertain seem to possess, may be gathered from|ing for two hundred pages further, that

The new canon upon poetry which Mr. Arnold invites us to accept is, that poetry is a criticism of life, and that those poets are the greatest whose criticism of life is the most healthy and the most true. I dare say the canon, put thus explicitly, will not altogether recommend itself to its own author. But I think I shall be able to show that this is the theory he really propounds; and that if it is to be modified it must disappear altogether, and so cease to be of any avail as a weapon of criticism, for which purpose it was avowedly forged.

most readers doubtless forget the ques-defined features. He begs us to observe tion ever arose. that "the noble and profound application of ideas to life is the most essential part of poetic greatness, and that a great poet receives his distinctive character of superiority from his application, under the conditions immutably fixed by the laws of poetic beauty and poetic truth, from his application, I say, to his subject, whatever it may be, of the ideas on man, on nature, and on human life, which he has acquired for himself." It is not easy for a careful reader either to assent or to object to these assertions; they are so inconveniently vague. But Mr. Arnold intends them, not as a recantation of the canon that poetry is a criticism of life, but as that canon writ large; written so large in fact, as to make it difficult to decide where the essential point really lies. It is possible that, just as in the passage from "Culture and Anarchy," he again

enemies waiting for me with a hungry joy in their eyes. But I shall elude them."

On this occasion, however, he does not elude his enemies, or, as it would be more proper to put it, his humble admirers, who are waiting with a hungry joy for instruction at the hand of so consummate a master. For here the sportive workings of his own mind bring his consciousness to bay, and after a good long pursuit the canon about poetry being a criticism of life is at last run to earth in the following significant passage:

The schoolmen of the Middle Ages, for whom many persons in the nineteenth century entertain a contempt which I am sure Mr. Arnold does not share, laid down that a definition, to be of much use, should be both "inclusive" and "exclusive," therein repeating an observation | said to himself, "Here I think I see my made many centuries earlier by logicians equally cautious. In other words, a definition should include all the peculiar and essential qualities of the thing defined, and these should be qualities excluded from the definition of any other thing. To say, for example, of a horse, that it is an animal with four legs, is not to help to define it, because cows, sheep, and many other animals, have likewise four legs. In the same way, to say of poetry that it is a criticism of life, is to offer no help towards the definition of poetry, seeing, as Mr. Arnold confesses, that in so far as it is true at all, it is equally true of prose. "The end and aim of all literature," he says, “is, if one considers it attentively, nothing but that a criticism of life;" and then he is forced to add, "We are not brought much on our way, I admit, towards an adequate definition of poetry, as distinguished from prose, by that truth."

It will perhaps seem to many readers that this candid confession ends the controversy, and that we ought to be satisfied with this graceful withdrawal by Mr. Arnold of his own canon. As a fact, however, he does not withdraw it, but goes on battling gallantly to save it, by presenting it in other ways, and with less

for the worth of what he has given us in poetry Where, then, is Wordsworth's superiority? I hold to be greater, on the whole,. than the worth of what Leopardi has given us....

As compared with Leopardi, Wordsworth, though at many points less lucid, though far less a master of style, far less of an artist, gains so much by his criticism of life being, in certain matters of profound importance, healthful and true, whereas Leopardi's pessimism is not, that the value of Wordsworth's poetry, on the whole, stands higher for us than that of Leopardi.

Here we have the canon arrived at maturity, and raised to the dignity and efficacy of a dogma. In fact, Mr. Arnold has, I submit, advanced two propositions:

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1st. That poetry is a criticism of life. 2nd. That the relative greatness of a poet mainly depends on the healthfulness and truth of his criticism of life.

Against these two propositions I will ask leave to contend:

1st. That poetry is not a criticism of life, in any natural and previously accepted sense of the word criticism and the word life.

That this fact constitutes no cause of

all of these are remarkable for agreement, as compared with poets. Take five such poems, for example, as the "De Naturâ Rerum" of Lucretius, the "Divina Commedia" of Dante, Pope's "Essay on Man," Wordsworth's "Excursion," and Byron's "Don Juan." If these five poets, in these five poems, be passing a judgment upon life, all one can say is the impression left by their judgments, if they 2nd. That to make the relative great were intended for such, is to preclude the ness of a poet depend upon the healthful-reader from forming a consistent judgness and truth of his criticism of life, is to ment upon life at all. place the estimate of his poetry at the mercy of the opinion of anybody and every-reproach against these poets, I trust we body as to what is a true and healthy shall perceive in due course. But, for the criticism of life, about which no consensus present, what is the inference to be drawn exists. from it? Obviously it is this. If poetry be a criticism, in other words, a judgment upon, or estimate of, life, and poets form different estimates and pass different judgments, what next becomes necessary? Either we must agree to let them disagree, or we must ourselves create a court of appeal, to decide which estimate is the most correct and whose judgment is nearest to the truth.

3rd. That in proportion as a poet occupies himself in his poetry mainly with a criticism of life, to that extent he injures his chance of being a great poet.

Since every controversy must turn in some measure upon the signification of the words employed, I think it is not captious to ask that familiar words should carry a familiar meaning. Previously, therefore, to inquiring whether poetry be a criticism of life, it is necessary to ascertain what is the meaning of the word life, and what the meaning of the word criticism. The meaning I have always found attached to these words is as follows:

Life is the sum total of the sensations and actions of mankind; in other words, whatever men perceive, feel, think, or do. Criticism is forming and pronouncing a judgment upon something or other; and criticism of life, therefore, is passing a judgment upon life.

Now, is poetry, or, in other words, is the main and special function of the poet, passing a judgment upon life? If it is, let us see what follows.

No one will pretend that a consistent, homogeneous judgment or estimate of life can be extracted from a perusal of all the poets with whom readers of poetry are most familiar. Indeed, I doubt if any class of writers leave so contradictory and confusing an impression of life upon the mind as the poets. Historians differ, metaphysicians dispute, and doctors notoriously disagree. But I should say that

Now let us mark what follows from this unavoidable alternative. If we agree to let them disagree, then the proposition that poetry is the passing of a judgment upon life, intended as a canon of criticism and an instrument or measure for testing the relative greatness of poets, falls to the ground, and is of no avail. If, in consequence of their disagreement, we appeal to a higher court, where shall we find it? Shall the judges be selected from among our philosophers? Philosophy has not yet found its first cause, or its final end. The languages spoken amid the wreck of the Tower of Babel had more resemblance than the verdicts of philosophy, for at least they had a common root. Shall we pick our judges from practical moralists? Even if these entirely agreed, which they do not, and if they could be brought to determine whether morality be intuitive and self-dependent, or inductive and utilitarian, I should still have to observe that life that is to say, all that men perceive, feel, think, and do - is considerably more extensive, and covers far more ground, than practical morality. I confess I am

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unable to suggest or indicate any other | ous observations upon life, and if we are body of men who would provide the consentaneous authority of which we are in search. Like "your State summing up the right reason of the community," as declared to be the object of quest in "Culture and Anarchy," but unhappily not discovered, it "eludes " us, and our "hungry joy" is changed into hungry disappointment.

the 66

66

to regard them, in their entirety, so far as
entirety can be predicated of them, as crit-
icisms of life, most persons would find
themselves in this dilemma, vis-à-vis of
Mr. Arnold's canon, that the views ex-
pressed in "Don Juan "are perhaps true,
but are certainly not healthy. "The
Excursion," like the "Essay on Man,"
generally passes for orthodox with the
unwary; partly because a poet not fla-
grantly heretical is too uncommon a phe-
nomenon for his opinions to incur search-
ing examination by the orthodox, and “in
the kingdom of the blind one-eyed people
are kings," partly because Wordsworth
led a blameless life, and is assumed to be
right since he meant well. Yet Mr. Ar-
nold himself dismisses Wordsworth's phi-
losophy with curt ceremony, and, what is
stranger still, said long ago of the poet
whom he now ranks so highly, precisely
66 on account of his criticism of life,” that

Wordsworth's eyes avert their ken
From half of human fate.

Many of my readers will remember the
passage, and to recall it is likewise to re-
mind ourselves that in the poem from
which it is taken Mr. Arnold spoke of
Sophocles as one

Who saw life steadily, and saw it whole.

Many illustrations might be borrowed from the poets themselves to fortify this conclusion; but a few will suffice. What are we to say of the "De Rerum Natura"? Is it healthful and true? To many people, probably to most, it is at best only a fine piece of paganism, not true, and therefore not healthy. In the eyes of some orthodox Protestants, the Divina Commedia" is necessarily a mass of beautiful, and not always beautiful, superstition. If any one will turn to the edition of Pope's works, begun by Mr. Elwin, and now being so ably continued by Mr. Courthope, he will be puzzled to find that divines, not open to any charge of heterodoxy, have pronounced Essay on Man" to be what Pope declared he meant it for, a vindication of the ways of God, while others, equally sound on the theological side, protest that an infidel who hated divines and divinity with all his heart dictated its doctrines." This is Mr. Elwin's opinion, and he evi- What would the Christian critic of life dently inclines to think the poetry of the say to this, seeing that, when Sophocles poem not much better than its philoso-wrote, Christianity had not yet been phy. Dugald Stewart, on the contrary, a heard of? man not prone to rash enthusiasm, affirmed that the "Essay on Man" is the noblest specimen of philosophical poetry which our language affords, and with the exception of a very few passages, contains a valuable summary of all that human reason has been able hitherto to advance in justification of the moral government of God." Bowles, more circumspectly, affirmed that the poem "will continue to charm from the music of its verse, the splendor of its diction, and the beauty of its illustrations, when the philosophy that gave rise to it, like the coarse manure that fed the flowers, is perceived and remembered no more." It may be suspected, however, from what we have seen, that a great many people who dislike the philosophy of the "Essay on Man," its view of the relations of God to ourselves, in other words, those who dislike its criticism or estimate of one of the chief things apper-us. taining to life, will look somewhat coldly on its verse, its diction, and its illustrations. In "Don Juan" there are numer

It would appear, therefore, that in their criticism of life poets have differed materially, and that, upon the question whether any particular poet's criticism of life be healthful and true or the reverse, or healthful and not true, or true and not healthful, there is a like divergence and an equal variety of opinion. What is the unavoidable conclusion? Surely that the canon which would represent poetry as a criticism of life, and would make the relative greatness and superiority of a poet turn upon his criticism of life, far from lending us any fresh light, gravely darkens counsel; and, worse than this, that it tends to confirm the pernicious habit only too common amongst us already, of estimat ing writers rather by what they say than by the consideration of how they say it; in other words, rather by what we want them, than by what they intend, to offer

For if Mr. Arnold will think of it, is it not the fact that he has unintentionally embodied, and stamped with his high

authority, the unconscious standard by | get; and it is precisely because I think which most people judge not of poets with Mr. Arnold that the dictum which and poetry alone, but of pictures, statues, declared Wordsworth's poetry to be premusic, in a word, of any production of cious because his philosophy is sound an art? They estimate works of art, for the unfortunate dictum, that I cannot help most part, according as these seem to thinking Mr. Arnold's own dictum that agree with and promote, or to conflict Wordsworth is a greater poet than Leowith and oppose, what for the moment I pardi because his criticism of life is more will call their prejudices. I think Mr. healthy and true than Leopardi's, also an Arnold will scarcely doubt that there are unfortunate dictum. Indeed, Mr. Arnold many men of the world who think Pope a seems to me, in effect, to propound, and far greater poet than discriminating criti- in the passage relating to Wordsworth cism could allow him to be, simply be- and Leopardi to propound in explicit cause he writes about the themes that terms, the very canon he deprecates when interest them most, and takes just about advanced by others. as imaginative a view of men and things It will perhaps be remembered that I as accomplished men of the world, who proposed to establish three propositions; are nothing else, are able to take. Again, and I would submit that the second of I fancy he would not deny that many cul- these, That to make the relative greattivated, tender-bearted women have ad-ness of a poet depend upon the healthfulmired the poetry of Mrs. Hemans, and, ness and truth of his criticism of life is let us say, some of the poorer and more to place the estimate of his poetry at the commonplace portions of the poetry of mercy of the opinion of anybody and Byron, more than those compositions de- everybody as to what is a true and healthserve to be admired, because these pre-ful criticism of life, about which no concisely represent what they, at the moment sensus exists, has in the course of the of reading, themselves happened to be foregoing observations been established. feeling. It is this that makes Pollok's If we look at poetry, taken in its entirety, "Course of Time" such agreeable read-as a criticism of life, we shall find in its ing to some persons, and that has obtained for the works of Mr. Tupper so wide a circulation and so much popularity. Nay, as Mr. Arnold himself points out, "the fervent Wordsworthian will add, as Mr. Leslie Stephen does, that Wordsworth's poetry, is precious, because his philosophy is sound;" and if so lettered a reader, so clear a thinker, and so shrewd a critic as Mr. Leslie Stephen, can judge in this manner, is it wonderful that the world at large, the admirers of Pollok, the worshippers of Mr. Tupper, should judge in this manner? It may be thought that to adduce the instance of Mr. Tupper is to trifle with the question, or at least to import into the discussion of it that peculiar form of prejudice which is usually engendered by the ridiculous. But I would submit that the persons who think Mr. Tupper's "poetry precious because his philosophy is sound," and the persons who think Wordsworth's poetry precious because his philosophy is sound, are, as the phrase is, tarred with the same brush. They are both measuring poetry by a wrong and irrelevant standard, both weighing the finest and most delicate of all things in the clumsiest and most inaccurate of all balances. But I should have thought that "philosophy" and "criticism of life" are as near to being interchangeable terms as one can well

music, which we have been accustomed to think so harmonious, but "sweet bells jangled." If we look at the poets separately, and attempt to allot them their places in the poetic hierarchy according to the truth and healthfulness with which they individually seem to have criticised life, then we must make ourselves judges of what is true and healthful criticism of life, which is to leave us the victims of our own social prejudices and theological prepossessions, or to compel us to seek for other and better-agreed judges elsewhere, and these are not to be found. The amazing conclusions to which men of large capacity and lofty judgment have been led in their literary criticisms by their own particular criticism of life should serve as a warning to less gifted and less impartial persons. It led Frederick Schlegel to place Calderon above Shakespeare. Had he confined himself to stating his conclusion we might have felt perplexed. Fortunately for us, if unfortunately for himself, he has given the reasons that convinced him. Here they are:

The second place in the scale of dramatic art is due to effective representations of human passion where the deeper shades and springs of action are portrayed; a delineation of characteristics, not individual, but general, of the world and of life, in manifold variety, their in

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